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Abstract
We show that inflation disagreement, not just expected inflation, has an impact on nom-
inal interest rates. In contrast to expected inflation, which mainly a↵ects the wedge
between real and nominal yields, inflation disagreement a↵ects nominal yields predom-
inantly through its impact on the real side of the economy. We show theoretically
and empirically that inflation disagreement raises real and nominal yields and their
volatilities. Inflation disagreement is positively related to consumers’ cross-sectional
consumption growth volatility and trading in fixed income securities. Calibrating our
model to disagreement, inflation, and yields reproduces the economically significant
impact of inflation disagreement on yield curves.
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1. Introduction
Inflation expectations a↵ect consumption and investment decisions and are important in
determining nominal interest rates. Likewise, central banks base decisions about short-term
interest rate changes on their inflation views. Inflation expectations and the compensation
for inflation risk are also important drivers of long-term borrowing costs for households,
firms, and governments. However, not everyone has the same expectation about inflation
as the early work of Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers (2004) shows. For example in December
2015, the interquartile range of annual inflation expectations is 0.9% to 4.6% according to the
Michigan Surveys of Consumers, and 1.87% to 2.25% according to the Survey of Professional
Forecasters.
Inflation disagreement can lead to di↵erent investment and consumption decisions. For
example, Malmendier and Nagel (2015) show that households who think that inflation will be
high are more likely to borrow using fixed-rate mortgages and less likely to invest in long-term
bonds.1 Professional investors struggle with their inflation views too. PIMCO’s Total Return
Fund shunned nominal U.S. treasuries after the Great Recession to bet on increased inflation
which never materialized for example.2 Given the evidence that households and professionals
have di↵erent views about inflation and the important role that inflation plays for fixed
income investments, we consider an equilibrium model where investors have heterogeneous
beliefs about inflation and test its implications for interest rates.
We show that inflation disagreement, and not just expected inflation, has an impact on
nominal interest rates. The e↵ect through which inflation disagreement operates is di↵erent
than that for expected inflation. While expected inflation mainly impacts the wedge between
real and nominal interest rates, inflation disagreement predominantly works through the real
side of the economy. The mechanism is as follows. When investors disagree about inflation,
they perceive di↵erent real returns on investments. Hence, they di↵er in their consumption-
savings decisions because they take di↵erent positions in inflation-sensitive securities. For
instance, consider two otherwise identical investors with di↵erent views about long-term
inflation. In equilibrium, the investor who thinks inflation will be high will buy Treasury
inflation protected securities or chose a fixed rate mortgage whereas an investors with the
opposite view will buy nominal Treasury bonds or borrow at floating rates. If inflation turns
out to be high, then the investor who thought inflation would be low loses wealth relative
1Piazzesi and Schneider (2012) show that inflation disagreement among younger and older households
may reconcile their di↵erent investment decisions. Doepke and Schneider (2006) show that even moderate
inflation episodes lead to sizable wealth redistributions of U.S. households.
2See, for example, thereformedbroker.com/2014/09/28/do-we-need-to-fire-pimco/.
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to the other investor. Ex-ante, each investor expects to capture wealth from the other
investor and, hence, they expect future consumption to be higher than without inflation
disagreement. When the income e↵ect dominates the substitution e↵ect, then the desire to
consume more today drives an increased demand for borrowing. If aggregate consumption
cannot fully adjust to the increased consumption demand, then the real interest rate increases
for markets to clear.
We formalize this intuition in a tractable model with transparent economic forces. Specif-
ically, we assume complete markets in a pure exchange economy where two investors di↵er
in their beliefs about the distribution of inflation, not just expected inflation.3 There are no
frictions and, thus, inflation has no e↵ect on real quantities when there is no inflation dis-
agreement. In this case, money is neutral and expected inflation has a well-known one-to-one
e↵ect on nominal yields. In contrast, inflation disagreement leads to a feedback into the real
economy which increases the cross-sectional consumption volatility and the level and volatil-
ity of real yields.4 We show that this feedback e↵ect, induced by heterogeneity in investor’s
consumption and investment decisions driven by their di↵erent inflation views, unambigu-
ously increases nominal interest rates even though the e↵ects of inflation disagreement on
the inflation risk premium are ambiguous.
Empirically, we find that inflation disagreement has a strong impact on the nominal yield
curve. We use the Surveys of Consumers from the University of Michigan (MSC) and the Sur-
vey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) to compute one-year expected inflation disagreement
measures for households and professionals, respectively. These surveys di↵er with respect
to the sophistication of the constituency, the size of the survey, and the data frequency;
thus, they provide complementary support for our predictions. We show that there exists a
statistically and economically positive relation between inflation disagreement and nominal
yields across all maturities after controlling for expected inflation. For instance, an increase
in disagreement of households/professionals by one standard deviation (1.9%/0.3%) raises
the five-year nominal yield by 59%/38% of their standard deviations. Inflation disagree-
ment remains economically and statistically significant after accounting for other theories or
views about interest rates. Moreover, the volatilities of nominal yields increase with inflation
disagreement and the coe cient estimates also have large economic significance.
Our empirical results show that inflation disagreement has a strong e↵ect on nominal
interest rates that is distinctly di↵erent from the e↵ect of expected inflation. To empirically
3The economic mechanism that increases interest rates also works in a production economy with positive
capital adjustment costs.
4If the substitution e↵ect dominates the income e↵ect, the real yield is decreasing with inflation disagree-
ment.
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test the channel through which inflation disagreement impacts nominal yields, we consider
di↵erent proxies for the real yield and show that inflation disagreement has an economically
and statistically positive e↵ect on real yields.5 For instance, using real yield data from Cher-
nov and Mueller (2012), we find that an increase in disagreement of households/professionals
by one standard deviation (1.6%/0.3%) raises the real five-year yield by 60%/38% of its stan-
dard deviation. In addition, consistent with our theory, real yield volatilities increase with
inflation disagreement and the coe cient estimates also have large economic significance.
In our model, inflation disagreement a↵ects yields because it leads to heterogeneity in
consumption and investment decisions. To empirically test the economic channel through
which inflation disagreement operates, we verify, using the Consumer Expenditure Survey
(CEX), that there is indeed a positive relation between cross-sectional consumption growth
volatility and inflation disagreement. We also show that inflation disagreement has a sta-
tistically positive e↵ect on trading in nominal Treasury bonds, fixed income futures, and
inflation swaps. These securities have a significant inflation exposure and, thus, investors
may use them to directly trade on their inflation beliefs.6 Moreover, this evidence allevi-
ates the concern that inflation disagreement impacts yields because of its correlation with
disagreement about other economic quantities such as GDP growth or earnings.7 To con-
clude, the fact that inflation disagreement is positively related with the level and volatility
of real yields, the cross-sectional consumption growth volatility, and trading in fixed income
securities including inflation swaps makes it less likely that inflation disagreement does not
operate through our economic channel and unambiguously raises nominal yields.
We derive theoretical predictions for interest rates without imposing restrictions on in-
vestors’ beliefs about the distribution of future inflation which is a generalization to existing,
typically tightly parameterized, disagreement models. For example, investors can have beliefs
that di↵er by more than one parameter or even belong to di↵erent classes of distributions.
In particular, disagreement about higher order moments of inflation, not just expected infla-
tion, raises interest rates. To test this prediction, we use the probability distribution forecasts
for one-year inflation rates from the SPF to calculate disagreement about the variance and
skewness of inflation. We find that there is an economically and statistically positive rela-
tion between real and nominal yields and disagreement about the variance and skewness of
inflation.
5We show in the Internet Appendix that inflation disagreement also has an economically and statistically
positive e↵ect on the break-even inflation rate and the inflation risk premium.
6Armantier, de Bruin, Topa, van der Klaauw, and Zafar (2015) show that consumers act on the inflation
expectations they report in the MSC.
7We also show in the Internet Appendix that real and nominal yields and their volatilities are higher
when inflation disagreement is high after controlling for disagreement about real GDP growth and earnings.
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Consumers’ preference to smooth consumption over time implies that interest rates are
high when expected economic growth is high and thus a correlation between expected growth
and inflation disagreement, if not properly accounted for, may lead to the incorrect inference
that inflation disagreement a↵ects interest rates. To address this concern, we construct dif-
ferent measures for expected economic growth and show that inflation disagreement remains
statistically significant after controlling for expected growth and the mean and volatility
of inflation. Similarly, interest rates are volatile when growth rates are volatile and thus
we show that inflation disagreement remains statistically significant after controlling for the
volatility of economic growth, in addition, to the mean and volatility of inflation.
A large literature in economics and finance uses inflation disagreement as a measure
of inflation uncertainty, or more generally, economic uncertainty.8 First, there is no clear
theoretical link between disagreement and uncertainty and the empirical support for this
assumption is mixed.9 Second, the impact of uncertainty on yields is fundamentally di↵er-
ent than that of disagreement.10 While higher disagreement is associated with higher yields,
higher uncertainty typically lowers yields through the precautionary savings channel. Never-
theless, to address the concern that economic uncertainty, not inflation disagreement, could
be driving our results, we show that all our empirical findings are robust to controlling for
inflation volatility. Moreover, we show that the impact of inflation disagreement on yields is
robust to including five di↵erent measures of economic uncertainty (real consumption growth
volatility, real GDP growth volatility, industrial production growth volatility, the Jurado,
Ludvigson, and Ng (2015) Uncertainty Measure, and the Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2015)
Uncertainty Measure).
In the final part of the paper, we show, by imposing more structure on our model,
that it quantitatively matches our empirical results. Specifically, we consider two investors
who disagree about the dynamics of expected inflation and are endowed with habit-forming
preferences which helps to match asset pricing moments. The model admits closed-form
solutions for bond prices, is rich enough to capture average yields and yield volatilities, and
8For example, Bloom (2009) and Wright (2011) use disagreement among forecasters as a measure of
uncertainty and Ilut and Schneider (2014) and Branger, Schlag, and Thimme (2016) use disagreement as a
measure of uncertainty aversion.
9Figure 17.1 in Zarnowitz (1992) shows simple examples of distributions where high and low disagreement
is associated with either high or low uncertainty. While some papers empirically show that there is a very
high correlation between inflation disagreement and measures of economic uncertainty which justifies the use
of inflation disagreement as measure for economic uncertainty, other works argue that inflation disagreement
is distinctly di↵erent from inflation uncertainty and other forms of economic uncertainty.
10Similarly, if one interprets forecast dispersion as uncertainty in Gao, Lu, Song, and Yan (2016), then
the main predictions are exactly the opposite of the prediction based on disagreement which is inconsistent
with that paper’s empirical evidence.
4
generates upward sloping real and nominal yield curves. We calibrate the model to the data
by matching the average and volatility of inflation disagreement and the mean and volatility
of consensus inflation in the SPF. The calibrated model shows that inflation disagreement
has a significant impact on real and nominal yields and their volatilities with a plausible risk
premium and Sharpe ratio for inflation risk. Moreover, performing our main empirical tests
on simulated data leads to statistical and economic significance of inflation disagreement
that is consistent with the data.
For yields to increase with inflation disagreement as our empirical results show, the EIS
has to be less than one as in a power utility model with risk aversion greater than one or in a
habit model (see Abel (1990), Campbell and Cochrane (1999), and Chan and Kogan (2002)).
This is opposite from the long-run risk literature (see Bansal, Kiku, and Yaron (2010) and
the references therein) that assumes an EIS well above one. Although the empirical evidence
on the EIS is mixed, the majority of estimates suggests an EIS less than one.11 For instance,
Havranek, Horvath, Irsova, and Rusnak (2015) consider 169 published studies that provide
2,735 estimates for the EIS for 104 countries and report an average EIS of 0.5; the average
for the United States is 0.6. Recently, Gao, Lu, Song, and Yan (2016) study the role of
macro disagreement in the cross-section of stock returns. They show that a stock with a
high covariance with macro disagreement, i.e., a high disagreement-beta stock, commands
a higher risk premium. Their mechanism is similar to ours as high macro disagreement is
associated with higher perceived trading profits, and as long as the EIS is less than one, a
high disagreement-beta stock also earns a high expected return.
Our paper relates to the literature on speculative trade with short-sale constraints. Miller
(1977), Harrison and Kreps (1978), and Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) show that asset prices
increase with disagreement as optimists hold the asset when pessimists are prohibited from
shorting. Gallmeyer and Hollifield (2008) point out that short-sale constraints can have the
opposite e↵ect in a dynamic model with intermediate consumption. Our empirical evidence
shows that inflation disagreement lowers bond prices, which is consistent with our frictionless
model, but it does not rule out that constraints might mitigate or strengthen this e↵ect. In
concurrent work, Hong, Sraer, and Yu (2016) focus on the e↵ects of short-sale constraints in
the U.S. Treasury bond market and show that inflation disagreement lowers expected excess
bond returns in the presence of short-sale constraints.
Our paper is also part of a growing literature that studies how disagreement impacts
11Thimme (2016) provides a review of the literature on the EIS and discusses several recent advances of
the theory and highlights estimation challenges since the early, close to zero, EIS estimates by Hall (1988).
5
bond markets.12 Xiong and Yan (2010) show that a moderate amount of heterogeneous
expectations about inflation can quantitatively explain bond yield volatilities, the failure
of the expectations hypothesis, and the predictability of the Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005)
factor. Buraschi and Whelan (2013) use survey data about various macroeconomic quantities
to study the e↵ects of disagreement on yield curve properties. Giacoletti, Laursen, and
Singleton (2015) study the impact of yield disagreement in a dynamic arbitrage-free term
structure model. Our paper di↵ers from all of these works as we derive novel theoretical
predictions that we empirically test on quantities including real and nominal yield levels,
their volatilities, and the cross-sectional consumption growth volatility. Another aspect of
our work that di↵ers from the literature is that we calibrate our model to disagreement data.
This paper is also part of the large literature on heterogeneous beliefs models that mainly
focuses on disagreement about real quantities.13 We focus on inflation disagreement because
inflation views have a significant impact on the value of many widely held securities, such
as nominal Treasury bonds, fixed/floating interest rate mortgages, and fixed income deriva-
tives among others and hence strongly impact nominal interest rates. Our contribution to
this literature is threefold. First, we provide novel predictions for the e↵ects of inflation
disagreement on interest rates. Second, our analysis is not limited to a tightly parameter-
ized inflation disagreement model. Third, we provide a methodological contribution to the
literature, that does not rely on continuous-time finance techniques and, hence, is accessible
to a broader audience.
2. Theoretical Results
We present in this section a general model of inflation disagreement that generates testable
predictions for interest rates.
Our model is a pure exchange economy with a single perishable consumption good. The
time horizon T 0 of the economy can be finite or infinite. Real prices are measured in units of
the consumption good and nominal prices are quoted in dollars. Let Ct denote the exogenous
real aggregate consumption process and ⇧t the exogenous price process that converts real
12Other papers that empirically explore the role of inflation beliefs on the term structure include Ang,
Bekaert, and Wei (2007), Adrian and Wu (2010), Chun (2011), and Chernov and Mueller (2012).
13See for example Harris and Raviv (1993), Detemple and Murthy (1994), Zapatero (1998), Basak (2000),
Jouini and Napp (2006), Jouini and Napp (2007), Yan (2008), Gallmeyer and Hollifield (2008), Dumas,
Kurshev, and Uppal (2009), Cvitanic´, Jouini, Malamud, and Napp (2012), Chen, Joslin, and Tran (2010,
2012), Jouini and Napp (2007), and Bhamra and Uppal (2014). Basak (2005) provides a survey of this
literature.
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prices into nominal prices, that is, nominal consumption is ⇧tCt. The sample space ⌦ and
the information set Ft on which we define all random variables and probability measures, in
short beliefs, represent the uncertainty in the economy.
Two investors share a common subjective discount factor ⇢, a Bernoulli utility function
u(C/H) = 11   (C/H)
1   with   > 0, and an exogenous habit process or, more generally, a
preference shock Ht. Let Pi denote investor i’s belief about inflation ⇧t, consumption Ct,
and the preference shock Ht. The investors have the same information set Ft and agree
on the events of Ft that cannot occur. Hence, there is no asymmetric information and the
likelihood ratio defined as  t ⌘ dP2dP1 is strictly positive and finite.
Both investors trade a complete set of Arrow-Debreu (AD) securities. There is a unique
equilibrium AD pricing functional that both investors agree on and that will be determined in
Proposition 1. Let ⇠it denote the state price density that represents the AD pricing functional
under the probability measure Pi and Ei the expectation under Pi. Each investor chooses a
consumption process C it to maximize
Ei
"
T 0X
t=0
e ⇢tu
✓
C it
Ht
◆#
s.t. Ei
"
T 0X
t=0
⇠itC
i
t
#
 wi0, (2.1)
where wi0 denotes initial wealth of investor i.
14 If time is continuous, then replace the sums
in equation (2.1) with integrals.
To focus on inflation disagreement, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 1. There is no disagreement about the distribution of consumption and the
preference shock, that is, investors have identical joint distributions of CTCt and
HT
Ht
conditional
on Ft, for all, t < T  T 0.
Assumption 1 rules out any e↵ects of disagreement about real quantities on yields and
their volatilities. However, it allows for disagreement about higher order moments of in-
flation, not just expected inflation, and it allows for disagreement about the correlation
of inflation and consumption. We formalize the implications of Assumption 1 in the next
definition.
Definition 1 (Inflation Disagreement). Assumption 1 implies that any disagreement is about
inflation and not consumption growth or preference shocks. There is no disagreement if
 t = 1 for all t. There is inflation disagreement if  t 6= 1 for some t.
14Investors are either endowed with shares of a claim on aggregate consumption or with a fraction of the
aggregate consumption process.
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We determine the equilibrium consumption allocations C1t and C
2
t and state price den-
sities ⇠1t and ⇠
2
t in the next proposition.
Proposition 1 (Consumption Allocations and State Price Densities). Optimal consumption
allocations are C1t = f( t)Ct and C
2
t = (1  f( t))Ct with
f( t) =
1
1 + (y t)
1
 
, (2.2)
where y = y
2
y1 and y
i is the constant Lagrange multiplier from the static budget constraint
given in equation (2.1). The state price densities are
⇠1t = (y
1) 1e ⇢tC  t H
  1
t f( t)
  , ⇠2t = (y
2) 1e ⇢tC  t H
  1
t (1  f( t))  . (2.3)
The likelihood ratio  t summarizes the impact of inflation disagreement on the con-
sumption allocations and state prices. To derive the equilibrium in Proposition 1, we do not
impose any restrictions on the likelihood ratio  t. It can be driven by a Brownian motion or
a Poisson process where only one of the investors will survive in the long run. It can also be
driven by a bounded martingale to guarantee the survival of all investors in the long run.15
Example 1. Edgeworth Box: Consider an economy with two dates. Let the subjective
discount factor be zero and normalize aggregate consumption and the habit or preference
shock to one. The price level today is normalized to one and the price level tomorrow is
either ⇧u or ⇧d. There are two investors with di↵erent beliefs Pi = (pi, 1 pi). The likelihood
ratio   equals p
2
p1 with probability p
1 and 1 p
2
1 p1 with probability 1   p1. Define the inflation
disagreement parameter as   = p
2 p1
p1
.16 The baseline parameters for the Edgeworth box
example are p1 = 0.4, p2 = 0.6,⇧u = 1.25, and ⇧d = 0.9.
Since there is no uncertainty about consumption in this example, full insurance is Pareto
e cient if there is no disagreement about inflation ( u =  d = 1). Hence, each investor
consumes the same share of consumption in the high and low inflation state in equilibrium.
This is no longer true when investors disagree about inflation. For instance, if the first
investor thinks that the low inflation state is more likely, then she consumes a larger fraction
of consumption in this state because  u >  d and, thus, fu < fd. Therefore, full insurance is
no longer an equilibrium and inflation disagreement a↵ects state prices.
15See Basak (2005) and the references therein for a discussion of heterogenous beliefs models when the
likelihood ratio is driven by Brownian motions and there is e↵ectively only disagreement about means. For
details on investors’ survival in heterogenous beliefs models see Fedyk, Heyerdahl-Larsen, and Walden (2013)
and the references therein.
16We divide by p1 to make the inflation disagreement parameter comparable across examples.
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We consider two additional examples, where the economy is dynamic and the likelihood
ratio is unbounded, to illustrate the generality of our results. In both examples, the con-
sumption and habit process are normalized to one. The three examples allow us to focus on
how inflation disagreement impacts real and nominal bonds because ⇠1t = ⇠
2
t = 1 if there is
no inflation disagreement.
Example 2. Geometric Brownian Motion: Consider a continuous-time economy in
which the price level ⇧t follows a geometric Brownian motion and two investors disagree on
the expected inflation rate. The dynamics of the price level are
d⇧t = x
i⇧t dt+  ⇧⇧t dz
i
t, (2.4)
where xi denotes the expected inflation rate and zit denotes the perceived nominal shock of
investor i. The dynamics of the likelihood ratio  t are
d t =   t dz
1
t ,   =
x2   x1
 ⇧
. (2.5)
The baseline parameters for the GBM example are  ⇧ = 2%, x1 = 1.5%, and x2 = 2.5%.
Example 3. Poisson Process: Consider a continuous-time economy in which the dynamics
of the price level are
d⇧t = x⇧t  dt+ ✓⇧t dN it , (2.6)
where x denotes a constant and ✓ denotes the constant jump size with ✓ 6= 0 and ✓ >  1.
The two investors agree on the jump times of the Poisson process but disagree on the jump
intensity li. Hence, they disagree on the expected inflation rate x+ ✓li. The dynamics of the
likelihood ratio  t are
d t =   t 
 
dN1t    l1dt
 
,   =
l2   l1
l1
. (2.7)
The baseline parameters for the Poisson example are x = 6%, ✓ =  10%, l1 = 12.5%, and
l2 = 27.5%.
The Edgeworth box example is simple and transparent and allows us to illustrate the
e↵ects of inflation disagreement without relying on continuous-time finance techniques. The
GBM example, where (log) inflation rates are normally distributed with a constant mean
and volatility, focuses on the e↵ects of disagreement about expected inflation on consump-
tion allocations and asset prices. The Poisson example illustrates how disagreement about
expected inflation and higher-order moments of inflation a↵ect consumption allocations and
9
asset prices. The three examples also illustrate that we do not impose any restrictions on the
likelihood ratio. Specifically, the likelihood ratio is a bounded martingale in the Edgeworth
box example, a martingale with unbounded variation in the GBM example, and a martingale
with finite variation in the Poisson example. We determine bond prices in all three examples
in closed form (see the Internet Appendix).
2.1. Definitions
All bonds are default-free zero-coupon bonds, in zero-net supply, and are priced using the
state price densities from Proposition 1. A nominal bond pays one dollar at maturity and
its nominal price is Pt,T = Eit
h
⇠iT
⇠it
⇧t
⇧T
i
. A real bond pays one unit of the consumption good
at maturity and its real price is Bt,T = Eit
h
⇠iT
⇠it
i
. The continuously-compounded yields of
a nominal and real bond maturing at T , where T 2 [t, T 0], are yPt,T =   1T t log (Pt,T ) and
yBt,T =   1T t log (Bt,T ), respectively. The relation between the yields on a real and nominal
bond with maturity T is
yPt,T = y
B
t,T + EINFL
i
t,T + IRP
i
t,T| {z }
BEIRt,T
, i = 1, 2, (2.8)
where IRPit,T ⌘ 1T t log (Eit [RXt,T ]) = yPt,T   yBt,T   EINFLit,T denotes the annualized log
inflation risk premium and EINFLit,T ⌘   1T t log
⇣
Eit
h
⇧t
⇧T
i⌘
denotes the annualized expected
log inflation rate perceived by investor i = 1, 2.17 Note that investors agree on prices, so they
agree on the break-even inflation rate denoted by BEIRt,T = yPt,T   yBt,T . Hence, inflation
disagreement a↵ects the nominal yield through two channels: (i) the real yield and (ii) the
break-even inflation rate. We discuss the two channels in the remainder of this section.
2.2. Real Yields and the Cross-Sectional Consumption Volatility
The next theorem shows how inflation disagreement a↵ects the level and volatility of real
yields.
17The real gross return on a nominal bond in excess of the real gross return on a real bond both maturing
at T is RXt,T =
⇧t
⇧T
e(y
P
t,T yBt,T )(T t) and Jensen inequality implies that
EINFLt,T =   1
T   t log
✓
Et

⇧t
⇧T
 ◆
 1
T   tEt

log
✓
⇧T
⇧t
◆ 
 1
T   t log
✓
Et

⇧T
⇧t
 ◆
,
and, thus, IRPt,T is higher than the inflation risk premium implied by other measures for expected inflation.
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Theorem 1 (Real Yields). If Assumption 1 is satisfied, then
1. real yields and their volatilities do not depend on inflation disagreement if   = 1,
2. real yields are higher with inflation disagreement if   > 1 (the opposite is true if   < 1),
and
3. the volatility of real yields is higher with inflation disagreement if   6= 1 and  t is
independent of Ct and Ht.
Why are real yields higher with inflation disagreement if   > 1 and lower if   < 1? Intu-
itively, investors make di↵erent consumption and savings decisions based on their di↵ering
views about inflation. Both investors think they will capture consumption from the other
investor in the future; hence, classical income and substitution e↵ects impact the demand
for consumption today. If   > 1, then the real interest rate rises to counterbalance increased
demand for borrowing. If   < 1, then the real interest rate falls to counterbalance lowered
demand for borrowing.18 There is no e↵ect on real yields if the income and substitution
e↵ects exactly o↵set (  = 1), as in Xiong and Yan (2010).19
When investors make di↵erent consumption and savings decisions based on their di↵ering
views about inflation, then individual consumption growth should be more volatile. Formally,
the cross-sectional consumption growth variance from time t to T is
 2CS( t, T ) =
1
4
✓
log
✓
C1T
C1t
◆
  log
✓
C2T
C2t
◆◆2
=
1
4 2
✓
log
✓
 T
 t
◆◆2
. (2.9)
There are no fluctuations in the cross-sectional consumption distribution when there is no
disagreement ( T =  t = 1). Moreover, there is less variation in cross-sectional consumption
allocations if investors are more risk averse because they trade less aggressively on their be-
liefs. Trading on beliefs not only increases the cross-sectional consumption growth volatility,
but it also leads to more volatile real yields.
We generalize the real yield and cross-sectional consumption growth volatility results
by defining a measure of inflation disagreement to study the e↵ects of changes in inflation
disagreement on real yield levels and the cross-sectional consumption growth volatility. Mea-
suring disagreement is straightforward in all three examples because investors’ beliefs belong
18See Epstein (1988) or Gallmeyer and Hollifield (2008) for additional details.
19If there is disagreement about real quantities, then real yields and their volatilities are a↵ected by
this disagreement even if   = 1. We focus on inflation disagreement in this paper and hence we rule out
disagreement about real quantities with Assumption 1.
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to the same class of distributions and there is only disagreement about a single parameter.
To measure inflation disagreement among investors more generally, we define it as relative
entropy per year.20 This measure allows us to study the e↵ects of inflation disagreement on
bond yields when investors have beliefs that di↵er by more than one parameter or do not
even belong to the same class of distributions.
Definition 2 (Inflation Disagreement Measure). Consider a belief structure Bt,T = (P1,P2)
with the likelihood ratio  u =
dP2
dP1 |Fu for all t  u  T . Define inflation disagreement as
Dt,T =   1
T   tE
1
t

log
✓
 T
 t
◆ 
. (2.10)
Inflation disagreement Dt,T is nonnegative. It is zero if and only if the two investors have
the same belief, in which case  t =  T = 1. It is straightforward to show that the inflation
disagreement measures strictly increases in the inflation disagreement parameter,  , in all
three examples and that it is zero if and only if   = 0.
We show in the next theorem that all results of Theorem 1, except for the yield volatility
result, generalize when we compare economies with di↵ering levels of inflation disagreement
(holding everything else fixed including   and ⇢).
Theorem 2. Adopt Assumption 1 and consider two economies E = (Bt,T , f( t)) and E⌘ =⇣
B⌘t⌘ ,T⌘ , f(⌘t⌘)
⌘
with
• the same time horizon, that is, ⌧ = T⌘   t⌘ = T   t,
• the same current consumption allocations, that is, ft = f( t) = f(⌘t⌘),
• the same distribution of real quantities, that is, the joint distribution of CT⌘Ct⌘ and
HT⌘
Ht⌘
conditional on Ft⌘ is equal to the joint distribution of CTCt and HTHt conditional on Ft,
and
•  t second-order stochastically dominates ⌘t⌘ .21
Then, there is more inflation disagreement in economy E⌘ than in economy E , that is,
D⌘t⌘ ,t⌘+⌧   Dt,t+⌧ , and
20The relative entropy or Kullback-Leibler divergence is widely used in statistics and information theory
to measure the di↵erence between two probability distributions (see Kullback (1959)). While this measure
is not symmetric, the results do not change if we compute the relative entropy with respect to the second
investor. Similarly, all our results still follow if we consider other divergence measures suggested in the
literature (see Csisza´r and Shields (2004)).
21See Remark 2 in the Appendix for details.
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1. real yields are the same in both economies if   = 1,
2. real yields are higher in economy E⌘ than in economy E if   > 1 (the opposite is true
if   < 1), and
3. the expected cross-sectional consumption growth volatility is higher in economy E⌘ than
in economy E if  T t and " are independent.
The concept of second-order stochastic dominance allows us to focus on one-dimensional
decompositions of the conditional distribution of
⌘T⌘
⌘t⌘
. This one-dimensional multiplicative
decomposition nevertheless covers a large class of stochastic processes.22 Intuitively, one can
think of ⌘T⌘ as a noisy version of  T . For instance,  t second-order stochastic dominates
⌘t in all three examples if  ⌘     and, thus, real yields and the expected cross-sectional
consumption growth volatility are increasing functions of inflation disagreement as shown in
the first and second plot of Figure 1, respectively.
The third plot of Figure 1 shows that real yield volatility is also increasing in inflation
disagreement. The black star and black diamond lines represent the Poisson example with
  = 2 and   = 0.5, respectively. The green dash-dotted star and the green dash-dotted
diamond lines represent the GBM example with   = 2 and   = 0.5, respectively. Real yield
volatility in the GBM and Poisson example is higher for   = 0.5 than for   = 2 since the
expected cross-sectional consumption growth volatility is decreasing with risk aversion.
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Figure 1: Real Yield and Consumption Volatility
The first plot shows that real yields are increasing in inflation disagreement D0,1 when   = 7.
The second and third plot show the expected cross-sectional consumption growth volatility
and real yield volatility as strictly increasing function of inflation disagreement D0,1. The
expected cross-sectional consumption growth volatility is decreasing in risk aversion and,
thus, real yield volatility is lower with   = 2 than with   = 0.5.
22All results still follow if we consider additive mean-independent and comonotone decompositions of the
conditional distribution of
⌘T⌘
⌘t⌘
.
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2.3. Nominal Yields
We already know how expected inflation a↵ects nominal yields and, thus, we fix the market
view or belief about expected inflation to provide a meaningful comparison between nominal
yields with and without inflation disagreement. Before we define and discuss the market
view about the expected real value of one dollar, recall the decomposition of nominal bond
yields:
yPt,T = y
B
t,T + BEIRt,T = y
B
t,T + EINFL
i
t,T + IRP
i
t,T , i = 1, 2. (2.11)
Investors agree on the real yield and the break-even inflation rate, but they may have
di↵erent beliefs about inflation and the compensation for inflation risk. If they disagree
about the expected real value of one dollar, then by equation (2.11) they disagree on the
inflation risk premium. For example, consider the case when the first investor predicts lower
inflation than the second investor, that is, EINFL1t,T < EINFL
2
t,T . Subtracting the expected
inflation rate from the agreed upon break-even inflation rate leads to a higher perceived
compensation for inflation risk for the first investor, that is, IRP1t,T > IRP
2
t,T .
23
If investors agree on the expected real value of one dollar, that is, EINFL1t,T = EINFL
2
t,T ,
then they agree on the inflation risk premium. Hence, the nominal yield is higher with
inflation disagreement if the real yield plus the inflation risk premium is higher with inflation
disagreement. However, if EINFL1t,T 6= EINFL2t,T , then inflation disagreement a↵ects the
nominal yield through three channels: (i) the real yield, (ii) the perceived inflation risk
premium, and (iii) perceived expected inflation.
To study the e↵ects of inflation disagreement, rather than the e↵ects of an overall change
in the expected real value of one dollar on the nominal yield, we would like to hold a “market
view” about the expected real value of one dollar constant. However, it is not obvious which
belief to hold constant when increasing inflation disagreement in a heterogeneous beliefs
economy. We could consider a mean-preserving spread while keeping the average belief
about the expected real value of one dollar constant to unambiguously increase inflation
disagreement. Still, this does not take into account that the belief of a wealthier investor has
a stronger impact on real and nominal yields than the belief of a poorer investor. Hence, to
take into account that a wealthier investor has a larger impact on prices, we define the market
view as the weighted average across each investor’s expected real value of a dollar, where the
weights are given by the fraction of output that each investor consumes (f( t), 1  f( t)).
23See Section 1.5 of the Internet Appendix for a detailed discussion of the inflation risk premium.
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Definition 3 (Market View). Let P0 denote the market view that satisfies
E0t

⇧t
⇧T
 
= f( t)E1t

⇧t
⇧T
 
+ (1  f( t))E2t

⇧t
⇧T
 
. (2.12)
In the remainder of this section, we hold the market view about inflation fixed when we
increase inflation disagreement and thus any changes in the break-even inflation rate are due
to changes in the inflation risk premium and not expected inflation. To simplify the analysis,
we rule out any risk premia for inflation risk when there is no inflation disagreement and,
thus, we make the following assumption.24
Assumption 2. Inflation ⇧t is independent of consumption Ct and the habit Ht.
We show in the next theorem that inflation disagreement has qualitatively the same e↵ect
on nominal yields as on real yields even though the e↵ects on the inflation risk premium are
ambiguous.
Theorem 3 (Nominal Yield). Fix the market view as in Definition 3 and suppose Assump-
tions 1 and 2 are satisfied, then
1. the break-even inflation rate and nominal yields do not depend on inflation disagree-
ment if   = 1 and
2. nominal yields are higher with inflation disagreement if   > 1 (the opposite is true if
  < 1) even though the e↵ects of inflation disagreement on the break-even inflation
rate are ambiguous if   6= 1.
The first plot of Figure 2 shows nominal one-year yields as a function of risk aversion  .
The red dashed circle, green dash-dotted circle, and black circle lines represent the Edgeworth
box, GBM, and Poisson examples, respectively, when there is no inflation disagreement. The
corresponding lines without circles represent the examples when there is inflation disagree-
ment and the market view is fixed. The plot shows that in all three examples nominal yields
are higher with inflation disagreement than without it if   > 1 and lower if   < 1.
We discuss the implications for nominal yields for di↵erent market views by means of
the GBM example. Investors share aggregate consumption equally, that is, f = 0.5. The
24We relax this assumption in the appendix at the cost of an additional restriction on the perceived
covariances between ⇧t⇧T and
⇠0T
⇠0t
when defining the market view (see Definition 4 of the modified market
view).
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expected inflation rate is two percent x¯ = 2%, if there is no inflation disagreement in which
case the nominal yield is 1.96% (green dash-dotted circle line). We consider three di↵erent
cases with inflation disagreement: (i) baseline with x1 = 1.5% and x2 = 2.5% (green dash-
dotted line), (ii) x1 = 1% and x2 = 2% (green dash-dotted plus line), and (iii) x1 = 2%
and x2 = 3% (green dash-dotted cross line). In all three cases the inflation disagreement
parameter,  , is the same but the market view is di↵erent. The consumption share weighted-
average belief in the first case is approximately 2% and, thus, the market view is the same
with and without inflation disagreement.25 If the consumption share weighted-average belief
is below 2%, then inflation disagreement lowers nominal yields if   < 1, but does not always
increase nominal yields if   > 1. Intuitively, inflation disagreement pushes up real yields,
but lowers the expected inflation rate. If the second e↵ect dominates the first, then nominal
yields are lower than in the no disagreement economy. The intuition is similar for the third
case.
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Figure 2: Nominal Yield and Break-Even Inflation
The first and third plot show the nominal yield as strictly increasing function of risk aversion
  and inflation disagreement D0,1, respectively. In the first plot nominal yields are higher
(lower) with than without inflation disagreement when     ()1 except for the cases GBM
II and III, where the market view is not fixed. The left plot shows the di↵erence between
the break-even inflation rate in an economy with and without disagreement as a function of
risk aversion  . If     1, then the break-even inflation rate is higher with disagreement in
the GBM, Poisson, and second Edgeworth box examples. The opposite is true in the first
Edgeworth box example.
Remark 1 (Market View). There is more than one belief in economies with disagreement
and thus the concept of a single market view is essential to make sensible predictions for any
e↵ects of disagreement on yields, or asset prices more generally. Specifically, nominal yields
rise when the market view about the expected real value of one dollar is fixed or increases with
inflation disagreement (  > 1). The e↵ect of inflation disagreement needs to outweigh any
25In this example, we have that 0.5e 1.5% + 0.5e 2.5% ⇡ e 2%.
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decrease in the market view in order for nominal yields to go up with inflation disagreement.
Inflation has no e↵ect on real yields when there is no inflation disagreement and hence
inflation disagreement raises real yields regardless of its e↵ect on the market view. This is in
stark contrast to economies with disagreement about real quantities such as expected output
growth. In this case, it is necessary to define a market view about expected output growth to
unambiguously sign the e↵ect of disagreement about output growth on real yields.
The second plot of Figure 2 shows the di↵erence between the break-even inflation rate in
an economy with and without inflation disagreement as a function of risk aversion. If   = 1,
then the break-even inflation rate does not depend on inflation disagreement. Thus, the red
dashed lines (Edgeworth Box example), the green dash-dotted lines (GBM example), and the
black lines (Poisson example) all intersect at zero. If   > 1, then the break-even inflation rate
is higher with inflation disagreement in the GBM and Poisson examples. The quantitative
e↵ect is smaller for the short-end of the yield curve and it is larger in the Poisson example
than the GBM example. In contrast to real yields, the e↵ects of inflation disagreement on the
break-even inflation rate are ambiguous. For instance, consider an Edgeworth box example
where risk aversion is greater than one and the second investor thinks that the high and
low inflation state are equally likely. If the first investor thinks that the high inflation state
is less likely (red dashed star line), than the break-even inflation rate is lower with than
without inflation disagreement. The opposite is true when the first investor thinks that the
high inflation state is more likely (red dashed diamond line).
Nominal yields are always higher with inflation disagreement when   > 1 even though
the speculative trade induced by inflation disagreement may lead to a lower inflation risk
premium and, thus, a lower break-even inflation rate because the market view about expected
inflation is fixed. The third plot of Figure 2 shows that nominal yields in all three examples
are strictly increasing in inflation disagreement D0,1 when   > 1 and while keeping the
consumption-share weighted expected value of one dollar fixed.
3. Empirical Evidence
To validate the theory, we use the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) and the Michi-
gan Surveys of Consumers (MSC) to empirically test whether disagreement about expected
inflation a↵ects nominal and real yields (Table 2), nominal and real yield volatilities (Ta-
ble 3), the cross-sectional consumption growth volatility (Table 4), and trading on inflation
disagreement (Table 4). The two surveys di↵er with respect to the sophistication of their
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constituencies, the survey size, and the data frequency. Thus, they provide complementary
support for our predictions.
3.1. Data
Inflation Disagreement. Disagreement about inflation, our main explanatory variable,
is the cross-sectional standard deviation of one year ahead inflation forecasts abbreviated
as DisInf. Disagreement of consumers is directly taken from the MSC database (Table
32: Expected Change in Prices During the Next Year) and disagreement of professionals is
computed from their individual responses for the CPI Inflation Rate taken from the SPF
database (series CPI).26 The MSC inflation forecasts, conducted at a monthly frequency,
are available since January 1978 while the SPF inflation forecasts, conducted at a quarterly
frequency, are available since September 1981. The GDP deflator forecasts for the current
and next calendar year are also available since September 1981.
Yields. The U.S. Treasury only began issuing TIPS in 1997, so we merge the implied
real yields in Chernov and Mueller (2012), which are available at quarterly frequency from
Q3-1971 to Q4-2002, with real yields on Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS) to
build a longer time series of real bond yields. The available real yield maturities are 2, 3, 5,
7, and 10 years.27 Monthly nominal Fama-Bliss discount bond yields are from CRSP.28 The
Fama-Bliss discount bond file contains yields with 1 to 5 year maturities with data going
back to 1952, where we focus on the 1 and 5 year maturities. Lastly, from the real and the
nominal yield series, we compute the time series of real and nominal yield volatilities by
estimating a GARCH(1, 1) model with an AR(1) mean equation. We use all available data
in the GARCH estimation.
Consumption and Industrial Production. We calculate monthly cross-sectional
consumption growth volatility, starting from April 1984, from consumption growth rates
of consumers using data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) of the Bureau of
26See www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data for a detailed description of the Survey of Profes-
sional Forecasters, which is conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. The website
www.sca.isr.umich.edu/ contains detailed information regarding the Michigan Surveys of Consumers.
27The real yield data are available at personal.lse.ac.uk/muellerp/RealYieldAOT5.xls. The TIPS data are
available from Gu¨rkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2010). For 5, 7, and 10 year maturities, we use TIPS data
from 2003 onwards. Given that ex ante real yields are not directly observable for most of the sample, but
estimated using a term structure model, we show in the Internet Appendix that the results are robust to
various alternative measures of ex ante real yields. For the 2 and 3 year maturity, we interpolate the rates
for 2003 with cubic splines.
28The Fama-Bliss discount bond file is available from wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds.
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Labor Statistics.29 For further information regarding the CEX data and how to construct
consumption growth rates of households from the raw data, see Malloy, Moskowitz, and
Vissing-Jorgensen (2009) and the references therein. We obtain aggregate quarterly real
personal consumption expenditures per capita for non-durables and services from the US.
Bureau of Economic Analysis and compute consumption growth rates as logarithmic changes
starting in January 1947. We estimate a GARCH(1, 1) model with an ARMA(1, 1) mean
equation using the whole sample, to obtain a time series of quarterly expected consumption
growth and consumption growth volatility forecasts over multiple horizons. Consumption
data is not available at the monthly frequency and, thus, we use industrial production
growth rates instead. We obtain the industrial production index at the monthly frequency
from FRED starting in January 1919.
Trading on Inflation Disagreement. We construct three measures for trading on
inflation disagreement. First, we use the volatility of total Treasury volume scaled by out-
standing Treasuries.30 The trading volume data and the outstanding amount of Treasuries
are available from the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) at a
monthly frequency since January 2001.31 To measure the volatility of trading in Treasuries,
we estimate a GARCH(1, 1) model with a constant mean term. Second, we use the open
interest in interest rate futures and scale it by the open interest of all financial futures to
account for increased security trade over time. The open interest data for interest rate and
financial futures are from the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) at a
monthly frequency since April 1986.32 Third, we use de-trended log inflation swap notionals
available at the monthly frequency since December 2005.33 The monthly notional amounts
correspond to averages of daily brokered inflation swap activity.
Inflation. We obtain quarterly and monthly CPI data from the Federal Reserve Eco-
nomic Data to compute inflation rates as logarithmic changes starting in January 1947. We
estimate a GARCH(1, 1) model with an ARMA(1, 1) mean equation using the whole sample
to obtain a time series of monthly and quarterly expected inflation and inflation volatility
forecasts over multiple horizons.
29We thank Jing Yu for advising us on the use of the CEX data including how to compute the cross-
sectional consumption growth volatility.
30We follow Grossman and Zhou (1996), Longsta↵ and Wang (2013), and Ehling and Heyerdahl-Larsen
(2016) to capture the intensity of trading by using the volatility of turnover because turnover is not defined
in a frictionless economy.
31The data are from SIFMA’s website at this link: www.sifma.org.
32CFTC data are available from www.cftc.gov.
33See Fleming and Sporn (2013) for a description of the data. We thank Michael Fleming for sharing the
aggregated inflation swap notional data with us.
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Summary Statistics. We conclude this subsection with summary statistics of all vari-
ables in Table 1 and a discussion of the main variables of interest, that is, inflation dis-
agreement and real and nominal yields plotted in Figure 3. The blue solid line in Figure
3 shows inflation disagreement of consumers in the left plot and professionals in the right
plot, respectively. There are three important takeaways. First, there is substantial inflation
disagreement among consumers and professionals, that is, the average is 5.19% for MSC
and 66bp for SPF. Second, inflation disagreement varies substantially over time, that is, the
volatility is 1.58% for MSC and 34bp for SPF. Third, large and volatile inflation disagreement
across consumers and professionals is not restricted to the Volker experiment of the early
1980s where interest rates were high and volatile.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics. The table reports the mean (%), median (%), standard
deviation (Std, (%)), and number of observations (N) of quarterly real yields with 2-year
and 5-year maturities, SPF based inflation disagreements (DisInf), nominal yields with 2-
year and 5-year maturities and monthly nominal yields with 2-year and 5-year maturities,
MSC based inflation disagreements (DisInf), and CEX cross-sectional consumption growth
volatility (CEX C) and income growth volatility (CEX I). Quarterly sample: Q3-1981 to
Q2-2014. Monthly sample: January 1978 to June 2014.
Quarterly: Real Yields SPF MSC Nominal Yields
2y 5y DisInf DisInf 2y 5y
Mean 1.93 2.26 0.66 5.19 5.16 5.81
Median 2.37 2.43 0.56 4.90 5.08 5.59
Std 1.98 1.59 0.34 1.58 3.42 3.22
N 132 132 132 132 132 132
Monthly: Nominal Yields MSC CEX C CEX I
2y 5y DisInf
Mean 5.67 6.22 5.54 36.67 89.81
Median 5.56 5.97 5.20 36.60 90.15
Std 3.63 3.33 1.95 2.22 17.78
N 438 438 438 345 330
The red line in Figure 3 shows the nominal two-year yield adjusted for expected inflation
in the left plot and the two-year real yield in the right plot. We plot two-year yields because
there is no one-year real yield available. We subtract the annualized expected inflation
rate based on an ARMA(1,1) model from the two-year nominal yield to account for the
market view of expected inflation which always raises nominal yields. Figure 3 shows that
the expected inflation-adjusted two-year nominal yield and the two-year real yield covaries
significantly with inflation disagreement and this relation is not solely driven by the Volker
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experiment. In fact, the correlation between MSC inflation disagreement and the expected
inflation-adjusted two-year nominal yield is 50% over the entire sample, while it is slightly
higher at 53% since the start of the financial crisis in the fourth quarter of 2007. The SPF
inflation disagreement correlation with the real interest rate tells a similar story. Over the
entire sample, the correlation is 41%, while it is slightly higher at 54% since the start of the
financial crisis.
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Figure 3: Inflation Disagreement and Interest Rates
The blue solid line shows the cross sectional standard deviation of one-year ahead inflation
expectations from the MSC at the monthly frequency in the left plot and from the SPF at the
quarterly frequency in the right plot. The correlation between both inflation disagreement
measures is 43%. The red line shows the nominal two-year yield adjusted for expected
inflation based on an ARMA(1,1) model in the left plot and the real yield based on Chernov
and Mueller (2012) and TIPS in the right plot. The grey shaded areas are NBER recessions.
3.2. Nominal Yields
We show in this subsection that an increase in inflation disagreement raises nominal yields
of all maturities when controlling for expected inflation. This is consistent with our the-
ory which predicts that nominal yields increase with disagreement when the consumption
weighted-average inflation belief, in short the market view, does not change with disagree-
ment. Yields of di↵erent maturities are highly correlated and, thus, we only report results
for the two- and five-year nominal yields in this section and defer the reader to the Internet
Appendix (IA) for Fama-Bliss nominal yield results with maturities ranging from one to five
years and Gu¨rkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2007) nominal yield results with maturities ranging
from one to fifteen years.
Univariate regressions of nominal yields on inflation disagreement (not reported) lead to
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statistically and economically positive coe cients. Theoretically, this increase in nominal
yields could be due to an increase in the market view about inflation rather than an increase
in disagreement. To rule this out, we need to control for the market view about inflation
which, unfortunately, is unobservable. Hence, we use annualized expected inflation rates
over the corresponding yield maturities based on an ARMA(1,1) model as a proxy for the
unobservable market view.34
Table 2 shows the slope coe cients, t-statistics, the adjusted R2’s, and the number of
observations (N) for three multivariate regression models. We regress nominal two- and
five-year yields on inflation disagreement (DisInf) based on the SPF (columns 2 and 3) and
the MSC (columns 4 and 5). To facilitate a comparison between the SPF and the MSC, we
standardize the regression coe cients in all tables. To correct for serial correlation in error
terms, we compute Newey-West corrected t-statistics with 12 lags in all regressions. We
control for expected inflation (ExpInf) in regression model 1, ExpInf and inflation volatility
(SigInf) in regression model 2, and ExpInf, SigInf, and expected consumption or industrial
production growth (ExpC or ExpIP) in regression model 3. The forecast horizons for ExpInf,
SigInf, ExpC, and ExpIP correspond to the yield maturity in each regression. Specifically, we
control for inflation volatility to address concerns that inflation disagreement raises nominal
yields because of its positive correlation with inflation volatility.35 We also control for the
annualized estimator of expected consumption growth (ExpC) over the corresponding yield
maturity based on an ARMA(1,1) time series model of quarterly consumption growth.36
Controlling for expected consumption growth addresses the concern that interest rates are
high because of high expected growth. Hence, if expected consumption growth and inflation
disagreement are correlated, then omitting expected consumption growth when regressing
real and nominal yields on inflation disagreement leads to a biased estimate for the coe cient
on disagreement and perhaps to the incorrect inference that inflation disagreement a↵ects
interest rates. Nominal yields are available at the monthly frequency and, thus, we use
monthly data starting in January 1978 for the MSC. In this case, we replace expected
consumption growth with expected growth in industrial production (ExpIP) as consumption
growth data is not available at the monthly frequency. Hence, the sample size using the
MSC is 438 and it is 132 when using the SPF.
34In Section 4, we calibrate a dynamic model where investors disagree about the expected inflation rate to
disagreement, inflation, and yield data and show that using expected inflation, estimated as an ARMA(1,1)
model instead of the consumption share weighted-average belief, does not cause a bias in the estimated
coe cient and t-statistic of inflation disagreement.
35We also normalize inflation disagreement by inflation volatility and show in Table IA.38 of the IA that
inflation disagreement remains economically and statistically significant. For a detailed discussion of this
measure, see Section 4.
36The popular long-run risk model assumes an ARMA(1,1) model for consumption/GDP growth.
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Table 2: Inflation Disagreement and Yields. The table reports results from OLS regres-
sions of two- and five-year nominal and real yields on disagreement about inflation (DisInf),
expected inflation (ExpInf), the volatility of inflation (SigInf), and expected consumption
growth (ExpC). Real consumption data is not available at the monthly frequency and, thus,
we instead use expected industrial production growth (ExpIP) in nominal yield regressions
with MSC inflation disagreement. The t-statistics (t-stat) are Newey-West corrected with
12 lags. Regression coe cients are standardized. Quarterly sample: Q3-1981 to Q2-2014.
Monthly sample: January 1978 to June 2014.
Nominal Yields Real Yields
SPF MSC SPF MSC
Maturity 2y 5y 2y 5y 2y 5y 2y 5y
DisInf 0.36 0.38 0.51 0.59 0.41 0.39 0.56 0.58
t-stat 3.60 3.88 4.39 5.05 3.48 3.23 3.04 3.29
ExpInf 0.45 0.42 0.30 0.20
t-stat 4.37 4.19 2.73 1.62
adj. R2 0.40 0.39 0.56 0.55 0.16 0.14 0.31 0.33
N 132 132 438 438 132 132 132 132
DisInf 0.37 0.40 0.54 0.64 0.29 0.28 0.45 0.49
t-stat 3.50 3.63 4.55 5.42 2.27 2.12 2.55 3.00
ExpInf 0.43 0.40 0.26 0.14 0.35 0.36 0.25 0.24
t-stat 3.07 2.83 2.41 1.24 2.19 2.03 1.98 1.87
SigInf -0.04 -0.05 -0.09 -0.13 0.10 0.07 0.11 0.06
t-stat -0.40 -0.47 -1.31 -1.97 0.71 0.48 1.04 0.62
adj. R2 0.39 0.39 0.57 0.56 0.24 0.24 0.34 0.36
N 132 132 438 438 132 132 132 132
DisInf 0.34 0.37 0.55 0.65 0.25 0.24 0.46 0.49
t-stat 3.54 3.95 4.75 5.57 2.21 2.18 3.25 4.23
ExpC (ExpIP) 0.37 0.38 0.10 0.09 0.41 0.45 0.44 0.48
t-stat 2.38 2.30 1.24 1.12 2.46 2.67 3.56 3.97
ExpInf 0.49 0.46 0.27 0.15 0.41 0.43 0.29 0.29
t-stat 3.29 3.07 2.53 1.34 2.43 2.29 2.21 2.21
SigInf 0.17 0.17 -0.04 -0.07 0.34 0.33 0.34 0.32
t-stat 0.92 0.87 -0.49 -1.09 1.42 1.37 2.04 2.01
adj. R2 0.49 0.49 0.57 0.57 0.36 0.39 0.49 0.54
N 132 132 438 438 132 132 132 132
The coe cients for disagreement are positive as well as economically and statistically
significant for the SPF and MSC at all maturities, as shown in the top panel of Table 2.
An increase in disagreement by one standard deviation for the SPF (0.34%) and the MSC
(1.95%) raises the two-year nominal yield by 36% and 51% of its standard deviation (3.42%
and 3.63%, respectively). The economic significance of inflation disagreement is large and
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comparable to that of expected inflation, which is 45% and 30% respectively across the two
surveys. The second panel of Table 2 shows that the coe cient estimates for disagreement
remain positive and statistically significant when we control for the mean and volatility of
inflation.37 All coe cient estimates for inflation volatility are negative and insignificant,
except for the 5-year nominal yield in the MSC regression which is negative and significant
at the 5% level. Finally, the bottom panel of Table 2 shows that the coe cient estimates
for disagreement remain positive and statistically significant when we control for expected
inflation, inflation volatility, and expected consumption growth.38
3.3. Real Yields
We show that an increase in inflation disagreement raises real yields at all maturities. This is
consistent with our theoretical prediction when investors have power utility with risk aversion
greater than one or habit forming preferences. Moreover, it confirms the economic channel
through which nominal yields increase. All results presented in this section are based on the
two- and five-year real yields from Chernov and Mueller (2012), but they are robust to other
maturities and proxies for the real rate.39
Table 2 shows the slope coe cients, t-statistics, the adjusted R2’s, and the number of
observations (N) for a univariate and two multivariate regression models. We regress the
two- and five-year real yields on disagreement about inflation (DisInf) based on the SPF
(columns 6 and 7) and the MSC (columns 8 and 9). To facilitate a comparison between
the SPF and the MSC, we use the sample period Q3-1981 to Q2-2014 and standardize
the regression coe cients in all tables. To correct for serial correlation in error terms, we
compute Newey-West corrected t-statistics with 12 lags in all regressions. The top panel of
Table 2 shows the univariate regression results. The coe cient estimates for disagreement
are positive and statistically significant for the SPF and the MSC. Inflation disagreement is
also economically significant, that is, an increase in disagreement by one standard deviation
of the SPF (0.34%) and the MSC (1.58%) raises the two-year real yield by 41% and 56% of
its standard deviation (1.98%). The results are similar for the five-year real yield.
37The results are similar for other maturities as Table IA.6 for Fama-Bliss data and Tables IA.32 and
IA.33 for Gurkaynack, Sack, and Wright data in the IA show.
38Tables IA.7–IA.13 in the IA show that inflation disagreement remains positive and statistically significant
when controlling for other estimators of expected consumption growth.
39We report results for the two-, three-, five-, seven-, and ten-year real yields from Chernov and Mueller
(2012) in Table IA.14 of the Internet Appendix (IA). Moreover, we subtract two di↵erent measures of expected
inflation from nominal yields to compute two additional proxies for real yields and report the results in Tables
IA.34 and IA.35 of the IA. Both tables show that inflation disagreement has an economically and statistically
positive impact on real yields for all maturities.
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Inflation disagreement may be significant in a univariate regression because it correlates
with other variables that impact real yields. For instance, empirical evidence such as in
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999) shows that money is not neutral and, thus, ex-
pected inflation and inflation volatility can a↵ect real yields. As both of these quantities
are positively correlated with inflation disagreement in our data, we control for expected
inflation (ExpInf) and inflation volatility (SigInf) in regression model 2. The second panel
of Table 2 shows that the coe cient estimates for disagreement remain positive and sta-
tistically significant when we control for the mean and volatility of inflation. Expected
inflation is positively related to real yields and borderline statistically significant, whereas
inflation volatility produces statistically insignificant coe cient estimates in all regressions.
We control for expected inflation, inflation volatility, and expected consumption growth in
the bottom panel of Table 2. The coe cient on expected consumption growth has the ex-
pected statistically positive sign. More importantly, the coe cient on inflation disagreement
for consumers and professionals remains positive and statistically significant. The results
for other maturities and when using expected GDP growth instead of expected consumption
growth, shown in Tables IA.15 and IA.16 of the IA, are similar and thus omitted.
3.4. Real and Nominal Yield Volatilities
We now test whether real and nominal yield volatilities increase with inflation disagreement.
Table 3 presents standardized coe cients and Newey-West adjusted t-statistics with 12 lags
for the SPF in columns 2, 3, 6, and 7, and for the MSC in columns 4, 5, 8, and 9 for two
multivariate regression models. Specifically, the top panel of Table 3 shows results when we
control for expected inflation and inflation volatility. Like the real and nominal yield levels,
the coe cients for disagreement are positive and economically significant for the SPF and
the MSC for all maturities. Table 3 shows that an increase in disagreement by one standard
deviation for the SPF (0.34%) and the MSC (1.58%) raises the two-year real yield volatility
by 52% and 33% of its standard deviation (0.30%) and the two-year nominal yield volatility
by 61% and 46% of its standard deviation (0.26%). The results are similar for five-year
yields and the second regression model.
In the bottom panel of Table 3, we also control for the volatility of economic growth
measured as the GARCH(1,1) estimate of consumption volatility. From the panel, we see that
there is a significant positive relation between the volatility of real and nominal yields and
inflation disagreement even after controlling for consumption volatility. The only exception
is the volatility of the real two-year yield using MSC inflation disagreement, where the
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coe cient is still positive but the t-statistic is only 1.45. For nominal yields and MSC
inflation disagreement, we control for SigIP, instead of SigC, as consumption data is not
available at the monthly frequency.40
Table 3: Inflation Disagreement and Real and Nominal Yield Volatilities. The
table reports results from OLS regressions of two- and five-year real and nominal yield
volatilities on disagreement about inflation (DisInf), expected inflation (ExpInf), inflation
volatility (SigInf), and consumption growth volatility (SigC). Real consumption data are not
available at the monthly frequency and thus we instead use volatility of industrial produc-
tion growth (SigIP) in nominal yield volatility regressions with MSC inflation disagreement.
The t-statistics (t-stat) are Newey-West corrected with 12 lags. Regression coe cients are
standardized. Quarterly sample: Q3-1981 to Q2-2014. Monthly sample: January 1978 to
June 2014.
Nominal Yields Real Yields
SPF MSC SPF MSC
Maturity 2y 5y 2y 5y 2y 5y 2y 5y
DisInf 0.61 0.64 0.46 0.51 0.52 0.62 0.33 0.42
t-stat 5.20 8.13 4.03 3.65 8.13 8.61 1.97 2.15
ExpInf 0.26 0.20 0.26 0.13 0.02 0.08 0.07 0.14
t-stat 2.74 2.31 1.44 0.68 0.20 0.94 0.61 1.20
SigInf 0.12 0.06 0.17 0.11 0.24 0.18 0.39 0.35
t-stat 1.21 0.81 2.26 1.45 2.17 1.84 2.87 2.66
adj. R2 0.54 0.53 0.47 0.38 0.40 0.50 0.28 0.34
N 132 132 438 438 132 132 132 132
DisInf 0.49 0.53 0.45 0.41 0.45 0.54 0.17 0.26
t-stat 4.16 6.02 4.45 4.03 6.24 8.02 1.45 2.05
SigC (SigIP) 0.33 0.32 0.16 0.18 0.23 0.25 0.27 0.28
t-stat 2.40 2.23 1.73 1.74 1.56 1.70 1.54 1.60
ExpInf 0.23 0.17 0.28 0.27 -0.00 0.06 0.09 0.15
t-stat 3.60 2.95 1.60 1.49 -0.04 0.76 0.82 1.46
SigInf 0.00 -0.06 0.09 0.06 0.16 0.10 0.30 0.26
t-stat 0.06 -0.92 1.43 0.86 1.63 1.13 2.14 1.86
adj. R2 0.61 0.60 0.54 0.48 0.43 0.54 0.31 0.38
N 132 132 438 438 132 132 132 132
40The results for all maturities in this case are shown in Table IA.23 in the IA. The results for all nominal
and real yield maturities are shown in Tables IA.21 and IA.27 in the IA when controlling for the mean and
volatility of inflation. Tables IA.22 and IA.28 in the IA show it when also controlling for the volatility of
consumption growth.
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3.5. Economic Channel
Testing for the economic channel through which disagreement a↵ects yields, we find that in-
flation disagreement raises the cross-sectional consumption growth volatility. The top panel
of Table 4 shows two regression specifications (columns 2 to 3). In the first specification,
we regress the CEX cross-sectional consumption growth volatility on the MSC inflation dis-
agreement and time-dummies that control for changes in the definition of food consumption
and for missing data at the beginning of 1986 and 1996 due to changes in the household iden-
tification numbers. The second specification contains the CEX cross-sectional income growth
volatility as a control. The coe cient estimates on inflation disagreement in both regressions
are positive with t-statistics of 2.22 and 2.89, respectively. Adding expected inflation and
the volatility of inflation as additional explanatory variables into both regressions, shown in
the bottom panel of Table 4 (columns 2 to 3), produces slightly lower coe cient estimates
with t-statistics of 1.94 and 2.29. In the regressions shown in Table 4, we lag DisInf by two
months. We motivate lagging DisInf given the quarterly frequency of the CEX interviews for
a household. Even if the survey participants adjust consumption contemporaneously with
inflation beliefs, current innovations in consumption due to DisInf are reflected in the CEX
the earliest within the same month and the latest with a two month lag.
To provide further evidence for our economic channel, we consider three di↵erent classes
of securities for which we expect increased trading when inflation disagreement is high. First,
inflation disagreement increases trading in nominal Treasury bonds. Column 4 in Table 4
shows a statistically positive relation between the MSC inflation disagreement and trading in
Treasuries measured by the volatility of total Treasury volume scaled by outstanding Trea-
suries. The regressions di↵er in that in the bottom regression we add in ExpInf and SigInf
as controls. The univariate regression produce a t-statistic of 2.33, while the multivariate
regression produces a t-statistic of 3.78.
Second, inflation disagreement increases trading in interest rate futures. We use open
interest in interest rate futures scaled by open interest in financial futures and present the
evidence for this trading channel in column 5 of Table 4. The t-statistics for the regression
coe cients on the MSC inflation disagreement are 2.60 (univariate) and 2.99 (multivariate
using ExpInf and SigInf), respectively.
Third, inflation disagreement raises trading in inflation swaps. We measure inflation
swap trading by detrending aggregated inflation notionals in both regressions. The univariate
regression of inflation swap trading on the MSC DisInf produces a t-statistics of 4.35. The
multivariate regression, shown in the bottom panel of Table 4, does not yield a statistically
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significant coe cient estimate, which is likely caused by multicollinearity.41
Table 4: Cross-Sectional Consumption Growth Volatility and Trading. The table
reports OLS regression results. Dependent variables are cross-sectional consumption growth
volatility, volatility of U.S. government bond trading volume, open interest of interest rate
futures scaled by open interest in financial futures, and detrended inflation swap notional
amounts. Explanatory variables are disagreement about inflation (DisInf), expected inflation
(ExpInf), the volatility of inflation (SigInf), and CEX cross-sectional income growth volatility
(SigInc). The CEX based regression contains a time-dummy and DisInf, ExpInf, and SigInf
are lagged by two months. The t-statistics (t-stat) are Newey-West corrected with 12 lags.
Regression coe cients are standardized. Montly samples: April 1984 - December 2012,
January 2001 - August 2013, April 1986 - December 2013, May 2005 - February 2012.
CEX CEX Volatility Open Inflation
Consumption Consumption of Interest Swaps
Volatility I Volatility II Volume Ratio
DisInf 0.162 0.146 0.332 0.314 0.265
t-stat 2.22 2.89 2.33 2.60 4.35
SigInc 0.303
t-stat 4.31
adj. R2 0.37 0.49 0.10 0.10 0.06
N 345 330 151 333 70
DisInf 0.145 0.127 0.549 0.282 0.153
t-stat 1.94 2.29 3.78 2.99 1.34
ExpInf 0.036 0.068 -0.356 0.080 0.080
t-stat 0.43 1.06 -2.45 0.66 0.67
SigInf -0.159 -0.069 -0.577 -0.402 0.228
t-stat -2.24 -0.96 -3.15 -3.70 1.27
SigInc 0.281
t-stat 3.92
adj. R2 0.40 0.50 0.31 0.28 0.05
N 345 330 151 333 70
3.6. Additional Results and Robustness
We conduct several robustness checks of our empirical results that we summarize in this
section. Due to space constraints, we report the results in the Internet Appendix (IA).
Section 3.2 and 3.3 illustrate that disagreement about expected inflation increases the
nominal and real yields. Our theory in Section 2 also shows that real and nominal yields
41The regression produces a high F-statistic with an insignificant t-statistic for each variable.
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increase when there is disagreement about other moments of inflation, not just the mean. To
empirically test this prediction, we use the SPF to compute disagreement about the mean
(DisInfMean), which serves as a robustness check for the results of Subsections 3.2 and 3.3,
disagreement about the variance (DisInfVar), and disagreement about the skewness (DisIn-
fSkew) of the one year inflation rate based on the probability forecasts for the GDP deflator.
We discuss this in detail in Section 3 of the Internet Appendix where Table IA.2 shows
that the coe cient on DisInfMean, DisInfVar, and DisInfSkew are positive and statistically
significant in real and nominal yield regressions.
In a model with power utility, higher expected consumption growth leads to higher real
yields. Hence, a possible concern is that inflation disagreement is high in times of high
expected consumption growth. In Table 2, we control for expected consumption growth
estimated as an ARMA(1,1) model. However, this might not be su cient if expected con-
sumption growth impacts inflation disagreement or vice versa. For instance, if aggregate
consumption can adjust to increased consumption demand due to higher inflation disagree-
ment, then investment drops, and consequently, expected consumption growth decreases. If
the aggregate production function shows a decreasing marginal product of capital or there
are investment adjustment costs, then both consumption and real yields change. To ad-
dress this concern, we regress future quarterly consumption growth on current consumption
growth, current disagreement, current inflation, and the instrumented current real yield (the
current real yield lagged by one quarter). While past quarter’s consumption growth is a
strong predictor and the instrumented real interest rate is a weak predictor (significant at
the 10% level), inflation disagreement does not predict future consumption growth. This
mitigates the concern that the classical relation—high interest rates with high expected
growth—holds in the data and inflation disagreement is significant in our yield regression
because we did not control for an estimator of expected consumption growth that reflects
its predictive relation.42
There are several empirical studies that use disagreement to proxy for economic uncer-
tainty and, thus, one might be concerned that it is economic uncertainty and not disagree-
ment that drives our results. For example, Bloom (2009) and Wright (2011) use disagreement
among forecasters to measure uncertainty. Therefore, to address a possible omitted variable
problem in our main regression specifications, we consider five di↵erent measures of economic
uncertainty: i) real consumption growth volatility estimated by a GARCH(1,1) model (Table
42We discuss this concern in more detail in the IA where we consider four di↵erent predictive regressions for
consumption growth and show in Tables IA.17, IA.18, IA.19, and IA.20, that inflation disagreement remains
positive and statistically significant when controlling for the resulting estimators of expected consumption
growth.
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IA.45), ii) real GDP growth volatility estimated by a GARCH(1,1) model (Table IA.46), iii)
industrial production growth volatility estimated by a GARCH(1,1) model (Table IA.47), iv)
the Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng (2015) Uncertainty Measure (Table IA.48), and v) the Baker,
Bloom, and Davis (2015) Uncertainty Measure (Table IA.49). Inflation disagreement is still
statistically and economically significant after controlling for each of the first four uncertainty
measures. Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2015) use the SPF-based inflation disagreement to con-
struct their uncertainty measure and, thus, it is not surprising that inflation disagreement
is insignificant after controlling for it.
In addition to consumption growth volatility, we use other measures for the volatility of
economic growth to address the concern that there is an omitted variable that drives both
inflation disagreement and real and nominal yield volatilities. Tables IA.26 and IA.31 in the
IA show that the coe cient on inflation disagreement for nominal and real yield volatilities is
positive, but not always significant when controlling for the VXO, the old VIX.43 The weaker
results are not surprising as the VXO incorporates information about the volatility of the
stochastic discount factor which in our model would lead to a high endogenous correlation
between the VXO and inflation disagreement. Tables IA.25 and IA.30 in the IA show that
inflation disagreement remains positive and statistically significant when controlling for the
mean and volatility of consumption growth and inflation.
To address the concern that the real yields data of Chernov and Mueller (2012) are mea-
sured with error that may correlate with inflation disagreement, we show that our results
remain robust when we consider two alternative proxies for real yields constructed by sub-
tracting two di↵erent measures of expected inflation from nominal yields. We consider an
ARMA(1,1) expected inflation estimate in Table IA.34 and a VAR expected inflation esti-
mate in Table IA.35. Specifically, expected inflation in Table IA.35 is predicted by regressing
future inflation over the horizon of each bond on current inflation and yields with maturities
ranging from one to five years.
The advantage of using the nominal zero-coupon yields data extracted from U.S. Treasury
security prices by the method of Fama and Bliss (1987) in the main text is that yields are
not computed through a fitted function which smooths across maturities. However, the
disadvantage of the Fama and Bliss (1987) data are that the maturities only range until year
five. Hence, we consider zero-coupon bond yields ranging from 1 year to 15 years extracted
from U.S. Treasury security prices by the method of Gu¨rkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2007).44
43We use the VXO which is the CBOE volatility index based on trading S&P 100 (OEX) options taken
from the CBOE because the new VIX is only available since January 1990.
44Maturities beyond 15 years are not available before November 1985.
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The SPF-based regressions are in Table IA.32 and the MSC-based regressions are in Table
IA.33.
Tables IA.36 and IA.37 show that all our results are robust if we consider the cross-
sectional variance and the interquartile range of individual forecasters as measures of dis-
agreement, instead of the cross-sectional standard deviation. We also scale our disagreement
measure by inflation volatility to address the concern that in times when inflation volatility
and disagreement is high (low), the risk-return trade-o↵ for trading on inflation beliefs is
low (high), and linearly controlling for inflation volatility (as done in our main regression
specifications) may not be enough. Tables IA.38, IA.39, and IA.40 confirm that our results
are robust when scaling inflation disagreement by inflation volatility. Additionally in Ta-
ble IA.41, we construct the first principal component from the SPF and the MSC inflation
disagreement to show that our results are robust to this alternative disagreement measure.
Disagreement about real quantities also raises interest rates and hence we address the
concern that this form of disagreement, that is correlated with inflation disagreement, may
drive our results. Specifically, Tables IA.42 and IA.43 show that inflation disagreement still
has an economically and statistically positive impact on the level and volatility of yields
when controlling for disagreement about real GDP growth based on the SPF. Disagreement
about real GDP is statistically significant for the real and nominal yields levels and nominal
yield volatility regressions, but insignificant for the real yield volatility regressions. Table
IA.44 shows that our results are robust to controlling for disagreement about earnings among
analysts. Disagreement among analysts has a negative, but insignificant, relation with real
and nominal yield levels.
Finally, as interest rates may depend on the output gap in a New-Keynesian model, or
more generally, the state of the economy, we show that our results are robust to controlling
for the output gap as constructed in Cooper and Priestley (2009) (Table IA.50) and the
Stock and Watson quarterly measure of the NBER business cycle indicator (Table IA.51).
4. Model-Based Quantitative Evidence
Based on our theoretical and empirical evidence, we present a dynamic model that fits mo-
ments of inflation, inflation disagreement, and real and nominal yields and implies plausible
Sharpe ratios for inflation risk to quantitatively reproduce the impact of inflation disagree-
ment on yield curves.
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4.1. Model
The exogenous real aggregate output process Ct follows a geometric Brownian motion with
dynamics given by
dCt = µCCt dt+  CCt dzC,t, C0 > 0, (4.1)
where zC represents a real shock. The dynamics of the price level ⇧t and the unobservable
expected inflation rate xt are
d⇧t = xt⇧t dt+  ⇧⇧t dz⇧,t, dxt =  (x¯  xt) dt+  x dzx,t, ⇧0 = 1, (4.2)
where z⇧,t represents a nominal shock. The three Brownian motions zC,t, z⇧,t, and zx,t are
uncorrelated.
To obtain zero inflation disagreement in the steady state and a tractable stochastic
disagreement process, we assume that investors agree on the long run mean x¯ and the speed
of mean reversion , but di↵er in their beliefs about the volatility of expected inflation,  x.45
The dynamics of the price level and the best estimator for expected inflation as perceived
by investor i are given by (Liptser and Shiryaev (1974a,b)):
d⇧t = x
i
t⇧t dt+  ⇧⇧t dz
i
⇧,t, dx
i
t = 
 
x¯  xit
 
dt+  ˆix dz
i
⇧,t, x
i
0 ⇠ N
⇣
µix¯,0,  
2
xi0
⌘
. (4.3)
The volatility  ˆix is a function of  and  
i
x. Investors observe the price level for a su ciently
long time so that the perceived volatility,  ˆix, has reached its steady state level.
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Investors’ nominal innovation processes are linked through the inflation disagreement
process  t =
x2t x1t
 ⇧
, which summarizes current disagreement about expected inflation.
Specifically, the perceived shock of investor 2 is related to that of investor 1 through dz2⇧,t =
dz1⇧,t    tdt. As a consequence, the dynamics of the likelihood ratio are d t =  t tdz1⇧,t.
The inflation disagreement process  t follows an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process
d t =    tdt+   dz1⇧,t,   =
 ⇧ +  ˆ2x
 ⇧
,    =
 ˆ2x    ˆ1x
 ⇧
. (4.4)
We determine the inflation disagreement measure of Definition 2 in the next proposition.
45The inflation disagreement process is deterministic if there is only disagreement about the long run mean
and it is not Markov if there is disagreement about the speed of mean reversion.
46The steady state level is  ˆix =  ⇧
 r
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⇣
 ix
 ⇧
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  
!
.
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Proposition 2. The inflation disagreement measure is
Dt,T ⌘ D
 
 2t , T   t
 
=
 2 
4 
+
1
4  (T   t)
✓
 2t  
 2 
2 
◆ 
1  e 2 (T t)  . (4.5)
Inflation disagreement is strictly increasing in  2t and converges to
1
2 
2
t and
 2 
4  as T
goes to t and infinity, respectively. Hence, the instantaneous inflation disagreement measure
is given by 12 
2
t and the long-run inflation disagreement measure equals
 2 
4  . In Section 3,
we measure inflation disagreement as the standard deviation of expected inflation across
investors, which in the model is 12 ⇧
1
 (1  e ) | t|. Therefore, the empirical inflation dis-
agreement measure is strictly increasing in D ( (t)2, T   t) for any maturity T   t.
Each investor solves the consumption-savings problem given in equation (2.1). We con-
clude the description of the model by specifying an external habit process to help match
asset pricing moments.47 Specifically,
log(Ht) = log(H0)e
  t +  
Z t
0
e  (t a) log(Ca) da,   > 0, (4.6)
where   describes the dependence of Ht on the history of aggregate output. Relative log
output !t = log(Ct/Ht), a state variable in the model, follows a mean reverting process
d!t =  (!¯   !t) dt+  C dzC,t, !¯ = (µC    2C/2)/ . (4.7)
Equilibrium consumption allocations and state price densities are given in Proposition 1.
In the Internet Appendix, we provide closed-form solutions for real bond prices and show
that both real and nominal bond prices can be represented as weighted averages of artificial
bond prices that belong to the class of quadratic Gaussian term structure models.48
4.2. Calibration
We set the preference parameters (⇢,  ,  ) to match the level of nominal yields. The con-
sumption parameters (µC ,  C) are from Chan and Kogan (2002). The inflation parameters
(x¯,,  x) and the inflation disagreement parameters ( 1x,  
2
x) match the mean, standard de-
viation, and autocorrelation of the consensus belief and disagreement in the SPF. We set the
47See Abel (1990), Abel (1999), Chan and Kogan (2002), and Ehling and Heyerdahl-Larsen (2016).
48Our solution method relies on a binomial expansion similar to the approach in Yan (2008), Dumas,
Kurshev, and Uppal (2009), and Bhamra and Uppal (2014).
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belief of the econometrician such that  ˆx equals ( ˆ1x+  ˆ
2
x)/2. We use the SPF instead of the
MSC as the SPF explicitly asks professionals about CPI growth and, thus, leads to lower
inflation disagreement. The last parameter  ⇧ matches the volatility of inflation. Panel A
in Table 5 reports the parameters.
To analyze the quantitative implications of the model, we generate 10,000 sample paths
that are 50 years long by simulating from the model under the belief of the econometrician
( x) instead of the belief of one of the investors ( 1x or  
2
x). All statistics are based on
averages across the 10,000 sample paths.49 Panel B in Table 5 shows the mean, volatility,
and autocorrelation of the consensus forecast and inflation disagreement. We compute the
mean and volatility of expected inflation across investors to determine the consensus belief
and inflation disagreement. The model matches the mean, volatility, and to a lesser extent
the autocorrelation of the consensus belief and inflation disagreement. Panel C in Table
5 reports the mean, standard deviation, and autocorrelation of real and nominal yields in
the model and in the data. The model matches the level and volatility of real and nominal
yields. The persistence of nominal yields in the model is lower than in the data, that is, the
average autocorrelation across maturities is 0.68 in the model and 0.77 in the data.50
4.3. Quantitative E↵ects of Inflation Disagreement
Figure 4 shows real and nominal yields with maturities ranging from 1 to 5 years for two
realizations of current inflation disagreement  . In the two plots, the black solid line cor-
responds to the steady state level of  , which is 0, and the blue dashed line corresponds
to a one standard deviation increase in  , which is 0.5143. The plots show that inflation
disagreement has an economically significant impact on real and nominal yields comparable
to the data. Specifically, an increase in inflation disagreement by one standard deviation
raises the two-year real yield by 0.94% and the two-year nominal yield by 0.82%. The e↵ects
in the data are 0.407⇥ 1.976 = 0.80% for the two-year real yield and 0.356⇥ 3.424 = 1.22%
for the two-year nominal yield. The economic significance for longer maturities is lower in
the model than in the data as inflation disagreement is less persistent in the model.
Table 6 shows regression results of real and nominal yields and their volatilities on infla-
tion disagreement and the econometrician’s view about expected inflation. Coe cients and
t-statistics for expected inflation are omitted to save space. As in the empirical analysis,
49This version of our model, as most continuous-time heterogeneous belief models, is not stationary and,
thus, we cannot compute unconditional moments.
50The mean, volatility, and Sharpe ratio of the market portfolio defined as a claim to aggregate output
are 3.8%, 16.4%, and 0.23, respectively.
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Table 5: Calibration. This table reports the calibration results. Panel A reports the
parameter values. Panel B reports the annual mean, volatility, and autocorrelation for the
consensus belief and inflation disagreement. Panel C reports summary statistics for real and
nominal yields. The data are described in Section 3. Model coe cients and standardized
t-statistics are based on averages across 10,000 sample paths of 50 years of simulated real
and nominal yields and their volatilities under the belief of the econometrician.
Panel A: Parameters
µC  C  ⇧ x¯   ˆx
Consumption and Inflation 0.0172 0.0332 0.02 0.0317 0.19 0.01
⇢     f0  ˆ1x  ˆ
2
x
Preferences and Beliefs 0.006 7 0.05 0.5 0.0044 0.0156
Panel B: Consensus and Disagreement
Consensus Disagreement
Average Volatility Autocorrelation Average Volatility Autocorrelation
SPF 0.031 0.012 0.683 0.007 0.003 0.190
Model 0.032 0.013 0.703 0.005 0.004 0.168
Panel C: Yields in the Model and the Data
Average Volatility Autocorrelation
Real 2 year 5 year 2 year 5 year 2 year 5 year
Data 0.019 0.023 0.020 0.016 0.66 0.73
Model 0.021 0.024 0.023 0.019 0.59 0.76
Nominal 2 year 5 year 2 year 5 year 2 year 5 year
Data 0.052 0.058 0.034 0.032 0.76 0.78
Model 0.053 0.055 0.025 0.020 0.60 0.76
the t-statistics are Newey-West corrected with 12 lags and coe cients are standardized in
all four regressions. The coe cients, t-statistics, and R2’s for the real and nominal level
and volatility regressions are similar to the data. In the second column of the nominal yield
regression, we control for the market view about expected inflation instead of the econome-
trician’s view. Using the econometrician’s view instead of the market view about expected
inflation does not lead to any noticeable di↵erences and, hence, alleviates the concern that
measurement error may lead to biased coe cients and t-statistics in the empirical analysis.
4.4. Inflation Risk Premium and Trade
To study investors’ exposure to inflation shocks and their perceived inflation risk premia and
Sharpe ratios, we specify a simple asset structure that dynamically completes the market.
Specifically, there is an inflation-protected money market account with real price Bt, a claim
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Figure 4: Real and Nominal Yields
The left plot shows real yields and the right plot shows nominal yields as function of time
to maturity for two realizations of current inflation disagreement  . The black solid line
corresponds to the steady state level of   and the blue dashed line corresponds to a one
standard deviation increase in  .
Table 6: Inflation Disagreement Regressions. The table reports results from OLS
regressions of the level and volatility of real and nominal yields on disagreement about
inflation and the econometrician’s view about expected inflation. In the second column of
the nominal yield regression, we control for the market view about expected inflation instead
of the econometrician’s view. Coe cients and t-statistics for expected inflation are omitted.
The data are described in Section 3. Model coe cients and standardized t-statistics are
based on averages across 10,000 sample paths of 50 years of simulated real and nominal
yields and their volatilities under the belief of the econometrician. The t-statistics (t-stat)
are Newey-West corrected with 12 lags.
Real Yields Nominal Yields
Level Volatility Level Volatility
Maturity Model SPF Model SPF Model SPF Model SPF
2 year 0.49 0.33 0.53 0.64 0.46 0.46 0.41 0.48 0.67
t-stat 5.67 3.09 7.17 8.10 5.66 5.65 3.60 6.62 5.96
adj. R2 0.34 0.24 0.35 0.38 0.41 0.41 0.40 0.38 0.56
5 year 0.27 0.31 0.37 0.72 0.25 0.25 0.38 0.30 0.68
t-stat 2.82 2.89 4.40 7.94 2.81 2.80 3.88 3.97 8.95
adj. R2 0.18 0.24 0.21 0.50 0.27 0.27 0.39 0.32 0.55
to aggregate consumption St, and a nominal money market account with real price pt.
The real and nominal money market accounts are in zero net supply and the aggregate
consumption claim is in unit supply. The perceived equilibrium asset price dynamics of
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investor i 2 {1, 2} are51
dBt = rtBtdt, B0 = 1,
dSt =
  
rt + ✓C,t 
S
C,t +  
S
⇧,t✓
i
⇧,t
   Ct St dt+  SC,tSt dZC,t +  S⇧,tSt dZi⇧,t, S0 > 0
dpt =
 
rt    ⇧✓i⇧,t
 
pt dt   ⇧pt dZi⇧,t, p0 = 1.
Investors agree on the market price of risk for the real shock, ✓C,t =   C , but perceive di↵erent
market price of risks for the inflation shocks, that is, ✓1⇧,t = (ft   1) t and ✓2⇧,t = ft t,
respectively. Hence, agent i perceives the inflation risk premia to be IRP it =   ⇧✓i⇧,t,
which is non-zero, as long as there is inflation disagreement. In particular, the investor who
perceives a positive inflation risk premium invests cash at the nominal short rate (longs
the money market account) whereas the investors who perceives a negative inflation risk
premium borrows at the nominal short rate (shorts the money market account).
We focus on the case where investor 1 perceives a positive inflation risk premium due
to a lower expected inflation rate than investor 2, that is,     0. The top left plot of
Figure 5 shows that the inflation risk premium and the Sharpe ratio perceived by investor 1
are strictly increasing in inflation disagreement  . The maximal Sharpe ratio and inflation
risk premium when both investors share output equally (f = 0.5) and   = 0.5143, which
corresponds to a one standard deviation increase from the steady state of zero, are 0.2571
and 0.0051, respectively. As shown more generally in Proposition 1 of the Internet Appendix,
the top right plot of Figure 5 confirms that the inflation risk premium and the Sharpe ratio
perceived by investor 1 declines when her consumption share in the economy increases. When
her consumption share is close to one, then prices reflect only her view about inflation, and
thus, the inflation risk premium and the Sharpe ratio are close to zero. However in this case,
investor 2 perceives the highest Sharpe ratio and inflation risk premium in absolute terms
because she is short the nominal money market account.
Investors perceive di↵erent inflation risk premiums and, thus, they trade with each other.
That is, one investor borrows cash from the other investor. The bottom two plots of Figure
5 show open interest, defined as the dollar amount invested in the nominal money market
account, scaled by total wealth. Open interest is increasing in inflation disagreement,  ,
which is shown in the left bottom plot of Figure 5 when both investors have the same
consumption shares. The right plot of Figure 5 shows that in this case, open interest attains
51Denote the nominal price of the nominal money market account as Pt with dynamics dPt = rP,tPtdt,
then pt =
Pt
⇧t
. Hence, while the nominal value of the nominal money market account is locally risk-free,
the real value of the nominal money market account is locally perfectly negatively correlated with inflation.
Thus, it has the same local volatility as inflation.
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its maximum. While the e↵ects of inflation disagreement on trade are consistent with the
empirical findings reported in Table 4, the actual open interest numbers are di cult to
compare to the model because in reality, investors trade many di↵erent inflation sensitive
securities such as cash, nominal bonds, mortgages, and interest rate derivatives. Trading
on inflation disagreement leads to an annual cross-sectional consumption growth volatility
of 3.22%. This is significantly lower than the 44.65% in the data, but roughly a quarter
of the cross-sectional consumption volatility once measurement error is taken into account
(Constantinides and Ghosh (2016)).
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Figure 5: Sharpe Ratio, Inflation Risk Premium, and Open Interest
5. Concluding Remarks
Surveys of consumers and professionals show that there is disagreement about inflation. But
does this disagreement a↵ect asset prices or individual consumption? We consider a pure
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exchange economy with frictionless complete markets to answer this question theoretically.
We show that inflation disagreement has a strong impact on the cross-sectional consump-
tion growth volatility as well as real and nominal yield curves. Intuitively, investors make
di↵erent consumption-savings decisions based on their di↵erent beliefs about real returns on
investments which raises the volatility of individual consumption and yields. Investors think
that the high real returns on their investments will make them wealthier and, thus, interest
rates have to rise for consumption markets to clear.
We find empirical support for our theoretical predictions using a survey of consumers and
a survey of professionals. Specifically, real and nominal yields are higher and more volatile
with inflation disagreement. The e↵ects are economically and statistically significant. An
inflation disagreement increase of one standard deviation raises real and nominal yields
and their volatilities by at least 38% of their respective standard deviations. We provide
empirical support for the economic channel through which inflation disagreement a↵ects asset
prices by showing that there is more trade in nominal Treasuries, interest rate derivatives,
and inflation swaps as well as higher cross-sectional consumption growth volatility when
inflation disagreement is high. Calibrating a dynamic model where investors disagree about
the dynamics of expected inflation to disagreement, inflation, and yield data reproduces
the economically and statistically significant impact of inflation disagreement on real and
nominal yield curves.
We document that inflation disagreement raises individual consumption volatilities as
well as real interest rates and their volatilities which seems to be an undesirable outcome
for policymakers. Clearly, it is optimal for investors to trade on their inflation beliefs in our
complete market economy. However, all investors cannot have correct beliefs and, thus, it is
not clear whether trading on their beliefs is ex-post welfare improving. Recent studies such
as Brunnermeier, Simsek, and Xiong (2014), Gilboa, Samuelson, and Schmeidler (2014), and
Heyerdahl-Larsen and Walden (2016) show that policies that reduce disagreement or restrict
trade on disagreement and, hence, avoid an increase in individual consumption volatilities,
may be socially optimal in this case. Better understanding how central banks respond to
inflation disagreement and potentially impact bond markets could be fruitful for future work.
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A. Theoretical Results
Proof of Proposition 1. See Detemple and Murthy (1994) or Basak (2005).
Proof of Theorem 1. We split this proof into three parts
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1. Real Yields:
Let ⇠0T denote the state price density when there is no disagreement. Specifically,
⇠0t = e
 ⇢tC  t H
  1
t .
By Assumption 1, investors have identical joint distributions of CTCt and
HT
Ht
conditional
on Ft and, thus, the real price of a real bond when there is no disagreement and the
representative investor has belief P0 is
B0t,T = E0t

⇠0T
⇠0t
 
= E1t

⇠0T
⇠0t
 
= E2t

⇠0T
⇠0t
 
.
The real price of a real bond with disagreement is
Bt,T = E1t

⇠1T
⇠1t
 
= E1t
"
⇠0T
⇠0t
✓
f( T )
f( t)
◆  #
,
where f(·) is the consumption sharing rule given in equation (2.2). We have that✓
f( T )
f( t)
◆  
=
 
1 + (y T )
1
 
1 + (y t)
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 
! 
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 T
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! 
,
and, hence,
Bt,T = E1t
"
⇠0T
⇠0t
 
ft + (1  ft)
✓
 T
 t
◆ 1
 
! #
.
Suppose   = 1. Then the bond price simplifies to
Bt,T = E1t

⇠0T
⇠0t
✓
ft + (1  ft)
✓
 T
 t
◆◆ 
= ftE1t

⇠0T
⇠0t
 
+ (1  ft)E1t

 T
 t
⇠0T
⇠0t
 
= ftE1t

⇠0T
⇠0t
 
+ (1  ft)E2t

⇠0T
⇠0t
 
= ftB
0
t,T + (1  ft)B0t,T = B0t,T .
This concludes the proof of the case   = 1.
Consider the function h(x) = x
1
  , which is strictly increasing and convex if   < 1 and
strictly concave if   > 1. Suppose   > 1 and, thus, h(x) is strictly concave. The case
of   < 1 is similar and, thus, omitted.
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The real price of a real bond with disagreement is
Bt,T = E1t
"
⇠0T
⇠0t
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= B0t,T Eˆ1t
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✓
 T
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◆◆  
,
where Eˆ1t denotes the conditional mean using the bond price B0t,T as numeraire. Specif-
ically,
⇣1T
⇣1t
⌘ dPˆ
1
dP1 =
⇠0T
⇠0t
1
B0t,T
.
We have that
Eˆ1t
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 t
 
= E1t

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 t
⇣1T
⇣1t
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= E2t

⇣1T
⇣1t
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E2t
h
⇠0T
⇠0t
i
B0t,T
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B0t,T
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= 1.
Strict concavity of h(·) and 0 < ft < 1 leads to
fth(1) + (1  ft)h
✓
 T
 t
◆
< h
✓
ft · 1 + (1  ft) ·  T
 t
◆
.
Hence,
Bt,T = B
0
t,T Eˆ1t
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ft + (1  ft)h
✓
 T
 t
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< B0t,T Eˆ1t
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h
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ft · 1 + (1  ft) ·  T
 t
◆  
= B0t,T
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ft + (1  ft)Eˆ1t
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 T
 t
 ◆
= B0t,T (ft + (1  ft)) = B0t,T .
This concludes the proof of the case   > 1.
2. Real Yield Volatility
If   = 1, then real yields with disagreement are equal to real yields when there is no
disagreement and, thus, the volatility of yields does not depend on disagreement.
Suppose   6= 1. The real price of a real bond with disagreement is
Bt,T = B
0
t,T Eˆ1t
✓
ft + (1  ft)h
✓
 T
 t
◆◆  
,
where Eˆ1t denotes the conditional mean using the real bond price without disagreement,
B0t,T , as numeraire. Let y
B
t,T denote the real yield when there is disagreement and y
B0
t,T
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the real yield when there is no disagreement. We have that
yBt,T =  
1
T   t log (Bt,T ) =  
1
T   t log
 
B0t,T
   1
T   t log
✓
Eˆ1t
✓
ft + (1  ft)h
✓
 T
 t
◆◆  ◆
= yB
0
t,T  
1
T   t log
✓
Eˆ1t
✓
ft + (1  ft)h
✓
 T
 t
◆◆  ◆
, (A.1)
and  t is independent of Ct and Ht and, hence,
Vi
⇥
yBt,T
⇤   Vi hyB0t,Ti , 8i = 0, 1, 2,
with equality if the conditional expectation in equation (A.1) is constant.
To prove the results in Theorem 2 without imposing any parametric restrictions on investors
inflation beliefs, we link the belief structure Bt,T with the likelihood ratio  t to the belief
structure B⌘t⌘ ,T⌘ with the likelihood ratio ⌘t⌘ such that B⌘t⌘ ,T⌘ represents more disagreement
than Bt,T . We accomplish this by assuming that  t second-order stochastically dominates ⌘t⌘ .
We chose second-order stochastic dominance because it is a well known concept in finance
and economics (see Gollier (2001) and the references therein) and, hence, the reader is
familiar with its implications, summarized in Remark 2, with proofs deferred to the Internet
Appendix. There are other links between the two belief structures that can be used to prove
Theorem 2, e.g., an additive comonotone decomposition of the likelihood ratio ⌘t⌘ .
Remark 2. [Second-Order Stochastic Dominance]
Consider the probability space (⌦,F) and the three strictly positive random variables x˜, y˜,
and "˜ with corresponding probability measures Px, Py, and P". Let y˜ and x˜ have unit mean,
that is, Ey [y˜] = Ex[x˜] = 1 and suppose x˜ second-order stochastically dominates y˜. Then, y˜
and x˜ "˜ are equal in distribution, that is, y˜
d
= x˜ "˜ and x˜ and "˜ are mean independent, that is,
E"["˜ | x˜ = x] = E"["˜] = 1, 8x. Moreover, the following three statements hold:
1.
Ey [g (y˜)]  Ex[g(x˜)],
for all concave functions g,
2.
Vy [y˜]   Vx [x˜] ,
3. and
Ey
⇥
(log (y˜))2
⇤   Ex ⇥(log (x˜))2⇤ ,
if x˜ and "˜ are independent.
Proof. See Internet Appendix.
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Proof of Theorem 2. We split this proof into three parts
1. Disagreement:
We need to show that if  t second order stochastically dominates ⌘t, then the belief
structure B⌘t⌘ ,T⌘ exhibits more disagreement than the belief structure Bt,T , that is,
D⌘t⌘ ,T⌘   Dt,T . Specifically,
Dt⌘ ,t⌘+⌧ =  
1
⌧
E⌘,1t⌘

log
✓
⌘t⌘+⌧
⌘t⌘
◆ 
   1
⌧
E1t

log
✓
 t+⌧
 t
◆ 
= Dt,t+⌧ ,
which is equivalent to showing that
E⌘,1t⌘

log
✓
⌘t⌘+⌧
⌘t⌘
◆ 
 E1t

log
✓
 t+⌧
 t
◆ 
. (A.2)
The function g(x) = log(x) is concave and, thus, it follows from Remark 2 that in-
equality (A.2) is satisfied if  t second order stochastically dominates ⌘t.
2. Real Yields:
We need to show that if  t second order stochastically dominates ⌘t, then the real yield
in economy E⌘ =
⇣
B⌘t⌘ ,T⌘ , f(⌘t⌘)
⌘
exceeds the real yield in economy E = (Bt,T , f( t)) if
  > 1, that is, yt⌘ ,T⌘ > yt,T , Bt⌘ ,T⌘ < Bt,T . If   < 1, the opposite needs to be shown
and if   = 1, then we need to show equality.
Let ⇠0T denote the state price density when there is no disagreement. Specifically,
⇠0t = e
 ⇢tC  t H
  1
t .
The joint distribution of
CT⌘
Ct⌘
and
HT⌘
Ht⌘
conditional on Ft⌘ is equal to the joint distribution
of CTCt and
HT
Ht
conditional on Ft and, thus, the real price of a real bond when there
is no disagreement and the representative investor has belief P0 is the same in both
economies, that is,
B0t,T = E0t

⇠0T
⇠0t
 
= E1t

⇠0T
⇠0t
 
= E2t

⇠0T
⇠0t
 
= B0t⌘ ,T⌘ .
The likelihood ratio  t is independent of ⇠0t and, thus, the real price of a real bond
with disagreement is
Bt,T = E1t
"
⇠0T
⇠0t
 
f( t) + (1  f( t))
✓
 T
 t
◆ 1
 
! #
= E1t

⇠0T
⇠0t
 
E1t
" 
f( t) + (1  f( t))
✓
 T
 t
◆ 1
 
! #
= B0t,TE1t
" 
f( t) + (1  f( t))
✓
 T
 t
◆ 1
 
! #
.
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Similarly,
B⌘t⌘ ,T⌘ = B
0
t⌘ ,T⌘E
⌘,1
t⌘
" 
f(⌘t⌘) + (1  f(⌘t⌘))
✓
⌘T⌘
⌘t⌘
◆ 1
 
! #
.
We have that ⌧ = T⌘   t⌘ = T   t and, thus, B0t,t+⌧ = B0t⌘ ,t⌘+⌧ . Moreover, 0 < ft =
f( t) = f(⌘t⌘) < 1, and, hence,
Bt,t+⌧ = B
0
t,t+⌧E1t
" 
ft + (1  ft)
✓
 t+⌧
 t
◆ 1
 
! #
,
B⌘t⌘ ,t⌘+⌧ = B
0
t,t+⌧E
⌘,1
t⌘
" 
ft + (1  ft)
✓
⌘t⌘+⌧
⌘t⌘
◆ 1
 
! #
.
Suppose   = 1. Then the bond prices simplify to
Bt,t+⌧ = B
0
t,t+⌧E1t

ft + (1  ft) t+⌧
 t
 
= B0t,t+⌧ ,
B⌘t⌘ ,t⌘+⌧ = B
0
t,t+⌧E
⌘,1
t⌘

ft + (1  ft)⌘t⌘+⌧
⌘t⌘
 
= B0t,t+⌧ .
This concludes the proof for the case when   = 1.
Define the function g(x) =
⇣
f + (1  f)x 1 
⌘ 
with 0 < f < 1, which is strictly concave
if   > 1 and strictly convex if   < 1. Suppose   > 1 and, thus, h(x) is strictly concave.
The case of   < 1 is similar and, thus, omitted. We need to show that B⌘t⌘ ,t⌘+⌧ < Bt,t+⌧ ,
which is equivalent to showing that
E⌘,1t⌘

g
✓
⌘t⌘+⌧
⌘t⌘
◆ 
< E1t

g
✓
 t+⌧
 t
◆ 
,
which follows directly from second-order stochastic dominance (see Remark 2).
3. Consumption Growth Volatility:
We need to show that if  t second order stochastically dominates ⌘t and
 T
 t
and "
are independent, then expected cross-sectional variance of consumption growth from
time t to T in economy E⌘ =
⇣
B⌘t⌘ ,T⌘ , f(⌘t⌘)
⌘
is at least as large as in economy E =
(Bt,T , f( t)). Specifically,
E⌘,1t⌘
⇥
 2CS(⌘t⌘ , ⌘t⌘+⌧ )
⇤   E1t ⇥ 2CS( t, t+⌧ )⇤ . (A.3)
Inserting  2CS(·, ·), which is given in equation (2.9), into equation (A.3) leads to
E⌘,1t⌘
"✓
log
✓
⌘t⌘+⌧
⌘t⌘
◆◆2#
  E1t
"✓
log
✓
 t+⌧
 t
◆◆2#
. (A.4)
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If  t second-order stochastic dominates ⌘t (see Remark 2) and if " and  t+⌧ are inde-
pendent, then inequality (A.4) follows from Point 3 in Remark 2.
We generalize Theorem 3 of the main text by dropping Assumption 2 which rules out any
risk premia for inflation when there is no inflation disagreement. In this case, we also require
that the weighted average across each investor’s inflation risk premium belief is fixed when
inflation disagreement changes. Hence, we define the modified market view by adding the
restriction (A.6) to Definition 3. Specifically,
Definition 4 (Modified Market View). Let P0 denotes the market belief that satisfies
E0t

⇧t
⇧T
 
= f( t)E1t

⇧t
⇧T
 
+ (1  f( t))E2t

⇧t
⇧T
 
, (A.5)
Cov0t

⇧t
⇧T
,
⇠0T
⇠0t
 
= f( t)Cov1t

⇧t
⇧T
,
⇠0T
⇠0t
 
+ (1  f( t))Cov2t

⇧t
⇧T
,
⇠0T
⇠0t
 
, (A.6)
where ⇠0t = e
 ⇢tC  t H
  1
t is the state price density when there is no inflation disagreement.
If inflation is independent of consumption and the preference shock (Assumption 2) or if there
is only disagreement about expected inflation, then equation (A.6) is trivially satisfied. We
also allow for disagreement about higher order moments of inflation and the joint distribution
of inflation and real quantities and, hence, the beliefs P1 and P2 about the covariances in
equation (A.6) do not have to be the same.
Theorem 4 (Nominal Yield). Fix the modified market view of Definition 4 and suppose
Assumption 1 is satisfied, then
1. the break-even inflation rate and nominal yields do not depend on inflation disagree-
ment if   = 1 and
2. nominal yields are higher with than without inflation disagreement if   > 1 (the opposite
is true if   < 1) even though the e↵ects of inflation disagreement on the break-even
inflation rate are ambiguous if   6= 1.
Proof of Theorem 4. Let ⇠0T denote the state price density when there is no disagreement
and the representative investor has belief P0. Specifically,
⇠0t = e
 ⇢tC  t H
  1
t .
The nominal price of a nominal bond when there is no disagreement and the representative
investor has belief Pi is
P¯ it,T = Eit

⇠0T
⇠0t
⇧t
⇧T
 
, i = 0, 1, 2.
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The nominal price of a nominal bond with disagreement is
Pt,T = E1t
"
⇠0T
⇠0t
⇧t
⇧T
 
ft + (1  ft)
✓
 T
 t
◆ 1
 
! #
.
Suppose   = 1. Then, the bond price simplifies to
Pt,T = E1t

⇠0T
⇠0t
⇧t
⇧T
✓
ft + (1  ft)
✓
 T
 t
◆◆ 
= ftE1t

⇠0T
⇠0t
⇧t
⇧T
 
+ (1  ft)E1t

 T
 t
⇠0T
⇠0t
⇧t
⇧T
 
= ftE1t

⇠0T
⇠0t
⇧t
⇧T
 
+ (1  ft)E2t

⇠0T
⇠0t
⇧t
⇧T
 
= ftP¯
1
t,T + (1  ft)P¯ 2t,T .
We need to show that
ftP¯
1
t,T + (1  ft)P¯ 2t,T = P¯ 0t,T .
We have for all beliefs indexed by i = 0, 1, 2 that
P¯ it,T = Eit

⇠0T
⇠0t
⇧t
⇧T
 
= Covit

⇠0T
⇠0t
,
⇧t
⇧T
 
+ Eit

⇠0T
⇠0t
 
Eit

⇧t
⇧T
 
.
By Assumption 1, investors have identical joint distributions of CTCt and
HT
Ht
conditional on
Ft and, hence,
Bt,T ⌘ Eit

⇠0T
⇠0t
 
, 8i = 0, 1, 2.
Therefore,
P¯ 1t,T = Cov1t

⇠0T
⇠0t
,
⇧t
⇧T
 
+Bt,TE1t

⇧t
⇧T
 
, and P¯ 2t,T = Cov2t

⇠0T
⇠0t
,
⇧t
⇧T
 
+Bt,TE2t

⇧t
⇧T
 
.
Multiplying the first equation with ft and the second equation with (1   ft), adding them
up, and imposing that the modified market view of Definition 4 does not change with dis-
agreement, leads to
Pt,T = ftP¯
1
t,T + (1  ft)P¯ 2t,T = ftCov1t

⇠0T
⇠0t
,
⇧t
⇧T
 
+ (1  ft)Cov2t

⇠0T
⇠0t
,
⇧t
⇧T
 
+Bt,T
✓
ftE1t

⇧t
⇧T
 
+ (1  ft)E2t

⇧t
⇧T
 ◆
= Cov0t

⇠0T
⇠0t
,
⇧t
⇧T
 
+Bt,TE0t

⇧t
⇧T
 
= P¯ 0t,T .
This concludes the proof of the case   = 1.
Consider the function h(x) = x
1
  , which is strictly convex if   < 1 and strictly concave if
  > 1. Suppose   > 1. The case of   < 1 is similar and, thus, omitted.
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The nominal price of a nominal bond with disagreement is
Pt,T = E1t
"
⇠0T
⇠0t
⇧t
⇧T
 
ft + (1  ft)
✓
 T
 t
◆ 1
 
! #
= E1t

⇠0T
⇠0t
⇧t
⇧T
 
E1t
24 ⇠0T⇠0t ⇧t⇧T
E1t
h
⇠0T
⇠0t
⇧t
⇧T
i ✓ft + (1  ft)h✓ T
 t
◆◆ 35
= P¯ 1t,T Eˆ1t
✓
ft + (1  ft)h
✓
 T
 t
◆◆  
,
where Eˆ1t denotes the conditional mean using the bond price P¯ 1t,T as numeraire. Specifically,
⇣1T
⇣1t
⌘ dPˆ
1
dP1 =
⇠0T⇧
 1
T
⇠0t⇧
 1
t
1
P¯ 1t,T
.
We have that
Eˆ1t

 T
 t
 
= E1t

 T
 t
⇣1T
⇣1t
 
= E2t

⇣1T
⇣1t
 
=
E2t
h
⇠0T
⇠0t
⇧t
⇧T
i
P¯ 1t,T
=
P¯ 2t,T
P¯ 1t,T
.
Strict concavity of h(·) and 0 < ft < 1 implies that
fth(1) + (1  ft)h
✓
 T
 t
◆
< h
✓
ft · 1 + (1  ft) ·  T
 t
◆
.
Hence,
Pt,T = P¯
1
t,T Eˆ1t
✓
ft + (1  ft)h
✓
 T
 t
◆◆  
< P¯ 1t,T Eˆ1t

h
✓
ft · 1 + (1  ft) ·  T
 t
◆  
= P¯ 1t,T
✓
ft + (1  ft)Eˆ1t

 T
 t
 ◆
= P¯ 1t,T
 
ft + (1  ft)
P¯ 2t,T
P¯ 1t,T
!
= ftP¯
1
t,T + (1  ft)P¯ 2t,T = P¯ 0t,T .
This concludes the proof of the case   > 1.
It remains to prove the statements about the break-even inflation rate. Suppose   = 1. We
know from Theorem 1 that Bt,T = B¯0t,T and we have just shown that Pt,T = P¯
0
t,T if   = 1.
Hence, Pt,TBt,T =
P¯ 0t,T
B¯0t,T
and, thus, the break-even inflation rate does not depend on disagreement.
If   6= 1, then the break-even inflation rate can be higher or lower with disagreement as the
Edgeworth box example plotted in the left graph of Figure IA.1 shows.52
Proof of Theorem 3. Equation (A.6) is satisfied if Assumption 2 holds. Hence, Theorem 3
follows from Theorem 4.
52See the Internet Appendix for more details.
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This Internet Appendix serves as a companion to our paper “Disagreement about In-
flation and the Yield Curve.” It provides additional theoretical and empirical results not
reported in the main text due to space constraints. We present the results in the order they
appear in the main paper.
1. Theoretical Results
In this section, we provide closed-form solutions for the disagreement measure, the expected
cross-sectional consumption growth variance, the real short rate, the real price of a real
bond, the expected real value of one dollar, the nominal short rate, and the nominal price
of a nominal bond in the GBM and Poisson examples. If risk aversion   is not an integer,
then the closed form solutions for the real and nominal bond price in both examples involve
infinite sums. We approximate the infinite sums with a finite sum and choose the number of
summands su ciently large to obtain basis point accuracy for real and nominal yields. The
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subjective discount factor in both examples is set to zero and aggregate consumption and
the preference shock are normalized to one.
1.1. Geometric Brownian Motion Example
Consider a continuous-time economy in which the price level ⇧t follows a geometric Brownian
motion and two investors disagree on the expected inflation rate. The dynamics of the price
level are
d⇧t = x
i⇧t dt+  ⇧⇧t dz
i
t,
where xi denotes the expected inflation rate and zit denotes the perceived nominal shock of
investor i. The dynamics of the likelihood ratio  t are
d t =   t dz
1
t ,   =
x2   x1
 ⇧
.
The disagreement measure for the period t to T is
Dt,T = 1
2
 2.
The expected cross-sectional consumption growth variance from time t to T is
E1
⇥
 2CS(t, T )
⇤
=
1
4 2
✓
 2(T   t) + 1
4
 4(T   t)2
◆
.
The real short rate at time t is
rt =
    1
2 
 2ft(1  ft).
The real price of a real discount bond at time t that matures at T is
Bt,T = f
 
t  
✓
 ,
1
 
,
1  ft
ft
, 1
2
 2(T   t), 2(T   t)
◆
,
where  (·, ·, ·, ·, ·) is given in Proposition IA.1.
The expected real value of a time T dollar at t is
Eit

1
⇧T
 
=
1
⇧t
e (x
i  2⇧)(T t).
2
The nominal short rate at time t is
rP,t = rt + ftx
1 + (1  ft)x2    2⇧.
The nominal price of a nominal discount bond at time t that matures at T is
Pt,T = e
 (x1  2⇧)(T t)f t  
✓
 ,
1
 
,
1  ft
ft
,
 
x1   x2  (T   t)  1
2
 2(T   t), 2(T   t)
◆
,
where  (·, ·, ·, ·, ·) is given in Proposition IA.1.
Proposition IA.1 (GBM Example). Suppose x is normally distributed with mean M and
variance V . Let A, B, and C denote positive real numbers. Then
 (A,B,C,M, V ) ⌘ E
h 
1 + CeBx
 Ai
=
( PA
n=0
 
A
n
 
CnenBM+
1
2n
2B2V if A = 1, 2, . . . ,
 1(·) +  2(·) otherwise,
where
 1(A,B,C,M, V ) =
1
2
e 
1
2
(MB+logC)2
B2V
1X
n=0
✓
A
n
◆
erfcx
✓
MB + logC + nB2V
B
p
2V
◆
,
 2(A,B,C,M, V ) =
1
2
e 
1
2
(MB+logC)2
B2V
1X
n=0
✓
A
n
◆
erfcx
✓
(n  A)B2V   (MB + logC)
B
p
2V
◆
,
and where
 
A
k
 
denotes the generalized binomial coe cient and erfcx(·) the scaled comple-
mentary error function.
1.2. Poisson Example
Consider a continuous-time economy in which the dynamics of the price level are
d⇧t = x⇧t  dt+ ✓⇧t dN it ,
where x denotes a constant and ✓ denotes the constant jump size with ✓ 6= 0 and ✓ >  1.
The two investors agree on the jump times of the Poisson process, but disagree on the jump
intensity li. Hence, they disagree on the expected inflation rate x + ✓li. The dynamics of
the likelihood ratio  t are
d t =   t 
 
dN1t    l1dt
 
,   =
l2   l1
l1
.
3
The disagreement measure for the period t to T is
Dt,T =  l1(log(1 + )  ).
The expected cross sectional consumption growth variance from time t to T is
E1
⇥
 2CS(t, T )
⇤
=
1
4 2
⇣ 
l1(T   t) 2 (log(1 + )  ))2 + l1(T   t) (log(1 + ))2⌘ .
The real short rate at time t is
rt = (1  ft) l1  
⇣⇣
ft + (1  ft)(1 + ) 1 
⌘    1⌘ l1.
The real price of a real discount bond at time t that matures at T is
Bt,T = f
 
t  
✓
 ,
1
 
log(1 + ),
1  ft
ft
e 
l2 l1
  (T t), l1(T   t)
◆
,
where  (·, ·, ·, ·) is given in Proposition IA.2.
The expected real value of a time T dollar at t is
Eit

1
⇧T
 
=
1
⇧t
e (x+
✓
1+✓ l
i)(T t).
The nominal short rate at time t is
rP,t = rt + x+
⇣
ft + (1  ft)(1 + ) 1 
⌘  ✓
1 + ✓
l1.
The nominal price of a nominal discount bond at time t that matures at T is
Pt,T = e
 
⇣
x+ ✓l
1
1+✓
⌘
(T t)
f t  
✓
 ,
1
 
log(1 + ),
1  ft
ft
e 
l2 l1
  (T t),
l1(T   t)
1 + ✓
◆
,
where  (·, ·, ·, ·) is given in Proposition IA.2.
Proposition IA.2 (Poisson Example). Suppose x is Poisson distributed with parameter L
4
and define the functions
 1(x, y, z) = e
z(ey 1)   2(x, y, z)  3(x, y, z),
 2(x, y, z) =
(
0 if x  0,Pb xc
⇠=0
z⇠
⇠! e
y⇠ z otherwise,
 3(x, y, z) =
(
zx
x! e
xy z if x = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,
0 otherwise,
where x! denotes the factorial of x and bxc denotes the floor of x, that is, the largest integer
not greater than x. Let A, B, and C denote real numbers with A and C positive. Then
 (A,B,C, L) =E
h 
1 + CeBx
 Ai
=
8><>:
 +1 (·) +  +2 (·) +  3(·) if B > 0,
(1 + C)A if B = 0,
  1 (·) +   2 (·) +  3(·), if B < 0,
(IA.1)
where
 +1 (A,B,C, L) =
1X
n=0
✓
A
n
◆
Cn · 2
✓
  log(C)
B
, nB,L
◆
,
 +2 (A,B,C, L) =
1X
n=0
✓
A
n
◆
CA n · 1
✓
  log(C)
B
, (A  n)B,L
◆
,
 3(A,B,C, L) = 2
A 3
✓
  log(C)
B
, 0, L
◆
,
  1 (A,B,C, L) =
1X
n=0
✓
A
n
◆
Cn · 1
✓
  log(C)
B
, nB,L
◆
,
  2 (A,B,C, L) =
1X
n=0
✓
A
n
◆
CA n · 2
✓
  log(C)
B
, (A  n)B,L
◆
.
If A is a positive integer, then equation (IA.1) simplifies to
 (A,B,C, L) =
AX
n=0
✓
A
n
◆
CneL(e
nB 1).
1.3. Second-Order Stochastic Dominance
Proof of Remark 2 in the main paper: Second Order Stochastic Dominance.
We split the proof into three parts:
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1. It follows from the definition of equality in distribution, mean independence, and
Jensen’s inequality that
Ey [g (y˜)] = Ey [g (x˜"˜)] = Ex [E" [g (x˜"˜) | x˜]]  Ex [g (E" [x˜"˜ | x˜])] = Ex [g (x˜Ex ["˜ | x˜])]
= Ex [g (x˜)] .
2. It follows from the definition of equality in distribution, mean independence, and
Jensen’s inequality that
Vy [y˜] = Vy [x˜ "˜] = Ey
⇥
x˜2"˜2
⇤  (Ey [x˜ "˜])2 = Ex ⇥E" ⇥x˜2"˜2 | x˜⇤⇤  (Ex [E" [x˜ "˜ | x˜]])2
= Ex
⇥
x˜2E"
⇥
"˜2 | x˜⇤⇤  (Ex [x˜E" ["˜ | x˜]])2   Ex ⇥x˜2 (E" ["˜ | x˜])2⇤  (Ex [x˜])2
= Ex
⇥
x˜2
⇤  (Ex [x˜])2 = Vx [x˜] .
3. Since g(x) = log(x)2 is convex for 0 < x < 1 and concave for x > 1, we cannot apply
the first result to show the third result. However, if x˜ and "˜ are independent, then
Ey
⇥
(log (y˜))2
⇤
= Ey
⇥
(log (x˜ "˜))2
⇤
= Ey
⇥
(log (x˜) + log ("˜))2
⇤
= Ex
⇥
(log (x˜))2
⇤
+ 2Ey [log (x˜) log ("˜)] + E"
⇥
(log ("˜))2
⇤
= Ex
⇥
(log (x˜))2
⇤
+ 2Ex [log (x˜)]E" [log ("˜)] + E"
⇥
(log ("˜))2
⇤
.
The first and third terms are non-negative and, thus, it remains to be shown that the
second term is nonnegative. We know that x˜ and "˜ have unit mean and, thus, the
average of the log of both variables is nonpositive because by Jensen’s inequality
Ex [log (x˜)]  log (Ex [x˜]) = 0.
Hence,
Ex [log (x˜)]E" [log ("˜)]   0,
which concludes the proof of the third statement.
1.4. Counterexample for E↵ects on Break Even Inflation Rate
Figure IA.1 shows the di↵erence between the break-even inflation rate in an economy with
and without inflation disagreement as a function of risk aversion. The price level today
is normalized to one. In the high inflation state, it is 1.25. In the low inflation state, it
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is 0.9. The second investor thinks that both inflation states are equally likely. Suppose
the first investor thinks that the probability of a high inflation state is less likely than the
second investor thinks. The red area shows that the break-even inflation rate is lower with
disagreement if   > 1 and higher if   < 1. Suppose the first investor thinks that the
probability of a high inflation state is more likely than the second investor thinks. The blue
area shows that the break-even inflation rate is higher with disagreement if   > 1 and lower
if   < 1.
1.5. Inflation Risk Premium
In this subsection, we study whether disagreement drives a wedge between real and nominal
yields. Let BEIRt,T denote the break-even inflation rate defined as the di↵erence between
the nominal and real yield of a T year bond, that is, BEIRt,T = yPt,T   yBt,T . In contrast to
the break-even inflation rate, which is a statement about prices, the inflation risk premium
is sensitive to the belief chosen to determine inflation expectations. Specifically, let Pˆ denote
the belief of an econometrician. Then the nominal yield can be decomposed into:
yPt,T = y
B
t,T +\EINFLt,T + dIRPt,T = yBt,T + EINFLit,T + IRPit,T , 8 i = 0, 1, 2. (IA.2)
Investors and econometricians agree on prices, so they agree on the break-even inflation rate
BEIRt,T = yPt,T   yBt,T . However, they may have di↵erent beliefs about inflation. If they
disagree about expected inflation, then by equation (IA.2) they have to disagree on the
inflation risk premium. For example, consider the case when the first investor predicts lower
inflation than the second investor, that is, EINFL1t,T < EINFL
2
t,T . Subtracting the expected
inflation rate from the agreed upon break-even inflation rate leads to a higher perceived
compensation for inflation risk for the first investor, that is, IRP1t,T > IRP
2
t,T .
Figure IA.2 shows the inflation risk premium in an economy with disagreement perceived
by an econometrician for di↵erent beliefs Pˆ. In all three examples, the first investor thinks
expected inflation is 1% and the second investor thinks expected inflation is 3%, that is,
EINFL1t,T = 1% < EINFL
2
t,T = 3%. Both investors consume the same fraction of consump-
tion today, so the consumption-share weighted average belief about expected inflation is 2%.
When the belief of the econometrician coincides with the consumption-share weighted aver-
age belief, then the inflation risk premium is slightly negative in the Edgeworth box example
because the break-even inflation rate is smaller with than without disagreement. In the other
two examples, the risk premium is positive. The plot of the inflation risk premium perceived
by an econometrician in an economy without disagreement is very similar. In this case, the
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inflation risk premium is zero when we impose rational expectations, that is, if we impose
that the belief of the econometrician coincides with the belief of the representative investor
(P0 = Pˆ). If the econometrician underestimates expected inflation (\EINFLt,T < EINFL0t,T ),
then she perceives a positive inflation risk premium.
We characterize the inflation risk premium perceived by both investors in the following
proposition.
Proposition IA.3. The di↵erence in investors’ perceived inflation risk premiums is inde-
pendent of preferences and consumption allocations. Specifically,
IRP2t,T   IRP1t,T = EINFL1t,T   EINFL2t,T =  EINFLt,T .
Moreover, we have the following limits
lim
ft!1
IRP1t,T = IRP
H,1
t,T , lim
ft!0
IRP1t,T = IRP
H,2
t,T   EINFLt,T ,
lim
ft!0
IRP2t,T = IRP
H,2
t,T , lim
ft!1
IRP2t,T = IRP
H,1
t,T + EINFLt,T ,
where IRPH,it,T is the inflation risk premium in an economy populated by investor i only.
Proof of Proposition IA.3. Straightforward.
While the di↵erence in inflation risk premiums is independent of preferences and con-
sumption shares, the investor who actually perceives the largest (absolute) inflation risk
premium is not. Consider the case when investor one has a consumption share that is close
to one. Then, bond prices reflect the view of investor one. Therefore, the speculative com-
ponent, as captured by  EINFLt,T , is negligible from that investor’s point of view. The
entire speculative component is captured by the second investor. As the consumption shares
become similar across investors, bond prices reflect both views and the perceived inflation
risk premiums for both investors reflect the disagreement in the economy.
The perceived inflation risk premiums are not bounded between the risk premiums in the
homogeneous investor economies; that is, min
 
IRP1t,T , IRP
2
t,T
  minnIRPH,1t,T , IRPH,2t,T o or
max
 
IRP1t,T , IRP
2
t,T
   maxnIRPH,1t,T , IRPH,2t,T o can occur. The next example shows that
investors can disagree about the distribution of inflation, but agree on the inflation risk
premium. Consider a two date economy with two investors and three states, where the time
discount factor is zero and aggregate consumption and habit are normalized to one. We
choose probabilities perceived by the investors in such a way that they agree on expected
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inflation, EINFL1t,T = EINFL
2
t,T , but disagree about the distribution of inflation. In this
case, the nominal yield in a homogeneous investor economy with beliefs given by investor
one would be equal to that of a homogeneous investor economy with beliefs given by investor
two and the inflation risk premium would be zero under both beliefs. However, once both
investors are present in the same economy and   6= 1, then the inflation risk premium is
non-zero due to changes in the investment opportunity set caused by speculative trade.
Figure IA.3 shows the real and nominal yields, the break-even inflation, and the inflation
risk premium as a function of disagreement. Both real and nominal yields are increasing
in disagreement. In addition, both investors agree on the inflation risk premium. Yet,
the inflation risk premium di↵ers from that of a homogeneous investor economy. Here,
disagreement about the distribution of inflation creates a positive inflation risk premium
that increases in disagreement.
2. Additional Empirical Results Including Robustness
Checks
2.1. Disagreement about the Variance and Skewness of Inflation
In the paper, we illustrate that disagreement about expected inflation increases the nominal
and real yields. Our theory in Section 1 is more general because real and nominal yields also
increase when there is disagreement about other moments of inflation, not just the mean. To
empirically test this prediction, we use the SPF to compute disagreement about the mean
(DisInfMean), which serves as a robustness check for the results in the main paper, disagree-
ment about the variance (DisInfVar), and disagreement about the skewness (DisInfSkew)
of the one year inflation rate based on the probability forecasts for the GDP deflator. We
consider the GDP deflator instead of the CPI because probability forecasts based on the CPI
are only available since the first quarter of 2007 whereas probability forecasts based on the
GDP deflator are available since the third quarter of 1981. The two measures of inflation
are very similar, that is, the correlation between the cross-sectional average inflation rate
based on CPI and the GDP deflator is 96.21%. The survey respondents provide probability
forecasters for the current and next calendar year which implies that the forecast horizon
shrinks within both years. To keep the forecast horizon constant, we interpolate between
the two probability forecasts. The time series for the second probability forecast starts in
the third quarter of 1981. Specifically, the survey asks professional forecasters each quarter
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to assign probabilities to a set of fixed bins for GDP deflator growth until the end of this
year and the end of next year. To determine a probability distribution for one year inflation
rates, we interpolate between both forecasts. Specifically, for forecaster j we approximate
the fixed horizon forecast in the following way:
xj = wquarterx
j
current + (1  wquarter)xjnext,
where xjcurrent is the forecast for the current year, x
j
next is the forecast for the next year,
and wquarter 2 {1, 2/3, 1/3, 0} are the weights. For each forecaster, we construct the implied
mean, variance, and skewness based on the histograms. Specifically, we assume that for a
specific bin all the probability mass is concentrated at the mid-point. Let there be N bins
with xn the mid-point of bin n. For forecaster j = 1, . . . , J the mean, variance, and skewness
are
mj =
NX
n=1
pjnxj,
vj =
NX
n=1
pjnx
2
j  m2j ,
skj =
PN
n=1 p
j
nx
3
j   3mjvj  m3j
v
2
3
j
,
where pjn is the probability mass assigned to bin n by forecaster j and mj, vj, and skj are
the mean, variance, and skewness of the inflation distribution for forecaster j, respectively.
Given a cross section of J forecasters at time t, we calculate disagreement about the mean,
variance, and skewness of inflation as the cross-sectional standard deviation of the individ-
ual mean, variance, and skewness forecasts. Table IA.1 provides summary statistics for all
three disagreement measures. Disagreement about expected inflation derived from the prob-
ability forecasts for the GDP deflator is slightly lower and less volatile than disagreement
about expected inflation based on the CPI.1 The three disagreement measures are positively
correlated.
Table IA.2 shows regression results of real and nominal yields on inflation disagreement.
Panels 1, 2, and 3 of Table IA.2 show in univariate regressions that the coe cient of inflation
disagreement about the mean, variance, and skewness is positive as well as economically and
1There is less variation in the probability forecasts than in the mean forecasts for inflation. The cross-
sectional mean, median, and standard deviation of one year inflation forecasts based on the GDP deflator
are 0.6570%, 0.5943%, and 0.3126%, respectively, which is nevertheless very similar to the ones based on the
CPI.
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statistically significant. Disagreement about skewness shows the weakest relation and has
the lowest explanatory power. This is not surprising given there is more noise in estimating
skewness.2 From Panel 4 in Table IA.2, we see that disagreement about skewness is no
longer significant when including all three disagreement measures as independent variables.
Importantly, the economic and statistical significance of DisInfMean and DisInfVar is very
similar. This remains the case, even when we control for expected inflation and the volatility
of inflation, as shown in Panel 5, although the economic magnitudes are slightly lower.
2.2. Emprical Robustness Checks
We conduct several robustness checks of our empirical results. The tables with these checks
are attached to the end of this Internet Appendix.
1. Estimation results and summary statistics.
(a) Table IA.3 and IA.4 reports summary statistics of the most important variables.
(b) Table IA.5 reports estimation results of di↵erent models for expected consumption
growth.
2. Inflation disagreement and Fama-Bliss nominal yields.
(a) Table IA.6 reports results from OLS regressions of the one-, to five-year nominal
yield on disagreement about inflation (DisInf), expected inflation (ExpInf), and
the volatility of inflation (SigInf). ExpInf and SigInf are estimators from a time
series model with an ARMA(1,1) mean equation and a GARCH(1,1) variance
equation for the mean and volatility of inflation over the corresponding yield
maturity horizon. The results for the two- and five-year nominal yield are already
reported in Table 2 of the draft.
(b) Table IA.7 reports results from OLS regressions of the one-, to five-year nominal
yield on disagreement about inflation (DisInf), expected inflation (ExpInf), the
volatility of inflation (SigInf), and expected consumption growth (ExpC). ExpC
is an estimator from a time series model with an ARMA(1,1) mean equation for
the mean of consumption growth over the corresponding yield maturity horizon.
The results for the two- and five-year nominal yield are already reported in Table
2 of the draft.
2A significant fraction of forecasters cluster their probability estimates in a few bins. The average number
of bins is 4.004 with a standard deviation of 1.842. The median number of buckets is 4.
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(c) Table IA.8 reports results from OLS regressions of the one-, to five-year nominal
yield on disagreement about inflation (DisInf), expected inflation (ExpInf), the
volatility of inflation (SigInf), and expected industrial production growth (Ex-
pIP). ExpIP is an estimator from a time series model with an ARMA(1,1) mean
equation for the mean of industrial production growth over the corresponding
yield maturity horizon. The results for the two- and five-year nominal yield and
MSC inflation disagreement are already reported in Table 2 of the draft.
(d) Table IA.9 reports results from OLS regressions of the one-, to five-year nominal
yield on disagreement about inflation (DisInf), expected inflation (ExpInf), the
volatility of inflation (SigInf), and expected GDP growth (ExpGDP). ExpGDP
is an estimator from a time series model with an ARMA(1,1) mean equation for
the mean of GDP growth over the corresponding yield maturity horizon.
(e) Table IA.10 reports results from OLS regressions of the one-, to five-year nom-
inal yield on disagreement about inflation (DisInf), expected inflation (ExpInf),
the volatility of inflation (SigInf), and expected consumption growth (ExpCII).
ExpCII denotes the projection from a regression of one quarter ahead consump-
tion growth (gct+1) on a constant (Const) and current quarterly consumption
growth (gct).
(f) Table IA.11 reports results from OLS regressions of the one-, to five-year nom-
inal yield on disagreement about inflation (DisInf), expected inflation (ExpInf),
the volatility of inflation (SigInf), and expected consumption growth (ExpCIII).
ExpCIII denotes the projection from a regression of one quarter ahead consump-
tion growth (gct+1) on a constant (Const), current quarterly consumption growth
(gct), and inflation disagreement (DisInft).
(g) Table IA.12 reports results from OLS regressions of the one-, to five-year nom-
inal yield on disagreement about inflation (DisInf), expected inflation (ExpInf),
the volatility of inflation (SigInf), and expected consumption growth (ExpCIV ).
ExpCIV denotes the projection from a regression of one quarter ahead consump-
tion growth (gct+1) on a constant (Const), current quarterly consumption growth
(gct), inflation disagreement (DisInft), and current quarterly inflation rate (Inft).
(h) Table IA.13 reports results from OLS regressions of the one-, to five-year nom-
inal yield on disagreement about inflation (DisInf), expected inflation (ExpInf),
the volatility of inflation (SigInf), and expected consumption growth (ExpCV ).
ExpCV denotes the projection from a regression of one quarter ahead consump-
tion growth (gct+1) on a constant (Const), current quarterly consumption growth
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(gct), inflation disagreement (DisInft), and the instrumented real interest rate
(rYldt).
3. Inflation disagreement and real yields based on Chernov and Mueller (2012) and TIPS
data.
(a) Table IA.14 reports results from OLS regressions of the two, three, five, seven,
and ten-year real yield on disagreement about inflation (DisInf), expected inflation
(ExpInf), and the volatility of inflation (SigInf). ExpInf and SigInf are estimators
from a time series model with an ARMA(1,1) mean equation and a GARCH(1,1)
variance equation for the mean and volatility of inflation over the corresponding
yield maturity horizon. The results for the two- and five-year nominal yield are
already reported in Table 2 of the draft.
(b) Table IA.15 reports results from OLS regressions of the two, three, five, seven,
and ten-year real yield on disagreement about inflation (DisInf), expected inflation
(ExpInf), the volatility of inflation (SigInf), and expected consumption growth
(ExpC). ExpC is an estimator from a time series model with an ARMA(1,1)
mean equation for the mean of consumption growth over the corresponding yield
maturity horizon. The results for the two- and five-year nominal yield are already
reported in Table 2 of the draft.
(c) Table IA.16 reports results from OLS regressions of the two, three, five, seven,
and ten-year real yield on disagreement about inflation (DisInf), expected in-
flation (ExpInf), the volatility of inflation (SigInf), and expected GDP growth
(ExpGDP). ExpGDP is an estimator from a time series model with an ARMA(1,1)
mean equation for the mean of GDP growth over the corresponding yield maturity
horizon.
(d) Table IA.17 reports results from OLS regressions of the two, three, five, seven,
and ten-year real yield on disagreement about inflation (DisInf), expected in-
flation (ExpInf), the volatility of inflation (SigInf), and expected consumption
growth (ExpCII). ExpCII denotes the projection from a regression of one quarter
ahead consumption growth (gct+1) on a constant (Const) and current quarterly
consumption growth (gct).
(e) Table IA.18 reports results from OLS regressions of the two, three, five, seven,
and ten-year real yield on disagreement about inflation (DisInf), expected inflation
(ExpInf), the volatility of inflation (SigInf), and expected consumption growth
(ExpCIII). ExpCIII denotes the projection from a regression of one quarter ahead
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consumption growth (gct+1) on a constant (Const), current quarterly consumption
growth (gct), and inflation disagreement (DisInft).
(f) Table IA.19 reports results from OLS regressions of the two, three, five, seven,
and ten-year real yield on disagreement about inflation (DisInf), expected inflation
(ExpInf), the volatility of inflation (SigInf), and expected consumption growth
(ExpCIV ). ExpCIV denotes the projection from a regression of one quarter ahead
consumption growth (gct+1) on a constant (Const), current quarterly consumption
growth (gct), inflation disagreement (DisInft), and current quarterly inflation rate
(Inft).
(g) Table IA.20 reports results from OLS regressions of the two, three, five, seven,
and ten-year real yield on disagreement about inflation (DisInf), expected inflation
(ExpInf), the volatility of inflation (SigInf), and expected consumption growth
(ExpCV ). ExpCV denotes the projection from a regression of one quarter ahead
consumption growth (gct+1) on a constant (Const), current quarterly consumption
growth (gct), inflation disagreement (DisInft), and the instrumented real interest
rate (rYldt).
4. Inflation disagreement and Fama-Bliss nominal yield volatility.
(a) Table IA.21 reports results from OLS regressions of the one-, to five-year nominal
yield volatility on disagreement about inflation (DisInf), expected inflation (Ex-
pInf), and the volatility of inflation (SigInf). ExpInf and SigInf are estimators
from a time series model with an ARMA(1,1) mean equation and a GARCH(1,1)
variance equation for the mean and volatility of inflation over the corresponding
yield maturity horizon. The results for the two- and five-year nominal yield are
already reported in Table 2 of the draft.
(b) Table IA.22 reports results from OLS regressions of the one-, to five-year nominal
yield volatility on disagreement about inflation (DisInf), expected inflation (Ex-
pInf), the volatility of inflation (SigInf), and the volatility of consumption growth
(SigC). SigC is the annualized predictor of the volatility of consumption growth
over the corresponding yield maturity horizon using a GARCH(1,1) model with
an ARMA(1,1) mean equation. The results for the two- and five-year nominal
yield volatility for SPF are already reported in Table 2 of the draft.
(c) Table IA.23 reports results from OLS regressions of the one-, to five-year nominal
yield on disagreement about inflation (DisInf), expected inflation (ExpInf), the
volatility of inflation (SigInf), and expected industrial production growth (Ex-
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pIP). ExpIP is an estimator from a time series model with an ARMA(1,1) mean
equation for the mean of industrial production growth over the corresponding
yield maturity horizon. The results for the two- and five-year nominal yield and
MSC inflation disagreement are already reported in Table 2 of the draft.
(d) Table IA.24 reports results from OLS regressions of the one-, to five-year nominal
yield volatility on disagreement about inflation (DisInf), expected inflation (Ex-
pInf), the volatility of inflation (SigInf), and the volatility of consumption growth
(SigGDP). SigGDP is the annualized predictor of the volatility of GDP growth
over the corresponding yield maturity horizon using a GARCH(1,1) model with
an ARMA(1,1) mean equation. The results for the two- and five-year nominal
yield volatility for SPF are already reported in Table 2 of the draft.
(e) Table IA.25 reports results from OLS regressions of the one-, to five-year nominal
yield volatility on disagreement about inflation (DisInf), expected inflation (Ex-
pInf), the volatility of inflation (SigInf), expected consumption growth (ExpC),
and the volatility of consumption growth (SigC). ExpC and SigC is the annualized
predictor of the mean and volatility of consumption growth over the correspond-
ing yield maturity horizon using a GARCH(1,1) model with an ARMA(1,1) mean
equation.
(f) Table IA.26 reports results from OLS regressions of the one-, to five-year nom-
inal yield volatility on disagreement about inflation (DisInf), expected inflation
(ExpInf), the volatility of inflation, and the CME Volatility Index VXO.
5. Inflation disagreement and real yield volatilities based on Chernov and Mueller (2012)
and TIPS data.
(a) Table IA.27 reports results from OLS regressions of the two, three, five, seven, and
ten-year real yield volatility on disagreement about inflation (DisInf), expected
inflation (ExpInf), and the volatility of inflation (SigInf). ExpInf and SigInf are
estimators from a time series model with an ARMA(1,1) mean equation and a
GARCH(1,1) variance equation for the mean and volatility of inflation over the
corresponding yield maturity horizon. The results for the two- and five-year real
yield volatility are already reported in Table 2 of the draft.
(b) Table IA.28 reports results from OLS regressions of the two, three, five, seven,
and ten-year real yield volatility on disagreement about inflation (DisInf), ex-
pected inflation (ExpInf), the volatility of inflation (SigInf), and the volatility
of consumption growth (SigC). SigC is an estimator from a time series model
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with an ARMA(1,1) mean equation and GARCH(1,1) variance equation for the
volatility of consumption growth over the corresponding yield maturity horizon.
The results for the two- and five-year nominal yield are already reported in Table
2 of the draft.
(c) Table IA.29 reports results from OLS regressions of the two, three, five, seven, and
ten-year real yield on disagreement about inflation (DisInf), expected inflation
(ExpInf), the volatility of inflation (SigInf), and the volatility of GDP growth
(SigGDP). SigGDP is an estimator from a time series model with an ARMA(1,1)
mean equation and GARCH(1,1) variance equation for the volatility of GDP
growth over the corresponding yield maturity horizon.
(d) Table IA.30 reports results from OLS regressions of the one-, to five-year real yield
volatility on disagreement about inflation (DisInf), expected inflation (ExpInf),
the volatility of inflation (SigInf), expected consumption growth (ExpC), and
the volatility of consumption growth (SigC). ExpC and SigC is the annualized
predictor of the mean and volatility of consumption growth over the corresponding
yield maturity horizon using a GARCH(1,1) model with an ARMA(1,1) mean
equation.
(e) Table IA.31 reports results from OLS regressions of the one-, to five-year real yield
volatility on disagreement about inflation (DisInf), expected inflation (ExpInf),
the volatility of inflation (SigInf), and the CME Volatility Index VXO.
6. We consider zero-coupon bond yields ranging from 1 year to 15 years extracted from
U.S. Treasury security prices by the method of Gu¨rkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2007).
(a) In Table IA.32, we report regression results for disagreement based on the SPF.
(b) In Table IA.33, we report regression results for disagreement based on the MSC.
7. We consider two alternative proxies for real yields:
(a) In Table IA.34, we subtract an ARMA(1,1) predictor of expected inflation from
nominal yields.
(b) In Table IA.35, we subtract from each nominal yield expected inflation, which is
predicted by regressing future inflation over the horizon of each bond on current
inflation and yields with maturities ranging from one to five years.
8. We consider three alternative proxies for inflation disagreement:
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(a) In Table IA.36, we report regression results when inflation disagreement is mea-
sured as the cross-sectional variance of inflation forecasts based on MSC and SPF.
(b) In Table IA.37, we report regression results when inflation disagreement is mea-
sured as the cross-sectional interquartile range of inflation forecasts based on MSC
and SPF.
(c) We compute inflation disagreement for professionals and households as the cross-
sectional standard deviation divided by inflation volatility. Tables IA.38, IA.39,
and IA.40 show the nominal yield, real yield, and nominal and real yield volatility
results, respectively.
(d) In Table IA.41, we report regression results when inflation disagreement is mea-
sured as the first PC of the cross-sectional standard deviation of inflation forecasts
based on SPF and MSC.
9. We control for two di↵erent measures of disagreement about real quantities:
(a) We control for disagreement about GDP growth. Table IA.42 shows regression
results for nominal yields and their volatilities and Table IA.43 shows results for
real yields and their volatilites.
(b) Table IA.44 shows regression results for real and nominal yields when controlling
for earnings disagreement.
10. We control for five di↵erent measures of economic uncertainty:
(a) Table IA.45 shows regression results when we control for the volatility of real
consumption growth estimated by a GARCH(1,1) model.
(b) Table IA.46 shows regression results when we control for the volatility of real
GDP growth estimated by a GARCH(1,1) model.
(c) Table IA.47 shows regression results when we control for the volatility of industrial
production estimated by a GARCH(1,1) model.
(d) Table IA.48 shows regression results when we control for the Jurado, Ludvigson,
and Ng (2015) Uncertainty Measure.
(e) Table IA.49 shows regression results when we control for the Baker, Bloom, and
Davis (2015) Uncertainty Measure.
11. We control for the output gap and the NBER business cycle indicator.
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(a) Table IA.50 shows regression results when we control for the output gap computed
as in Cooper and Priestley (2009).
(b) Table IA.51 shows regression results when we control for the Chicago Fed National
Activity Index (CFNAI) developed in Stock and Watson (1999).
3. Additional Details on Section 4 - Model-Based Quan-
titative Evidence
In this section, we report details on the model in Section 4 of the main paper. We have
included the model description from the paper, and hence this section can be read indepen-
dently.
The exogenous real aggregate output process Ct follows a geometric Brownian motion
with dynamics given by
dCt = µCCt dt+  CCt dzC,t, C0 > 0,
where zC represents a real shock. The dynamics of the price level ⇧t and the unobservable
expected inflation rate xt are
d⇧t = xt⇧t dt+  ⇧⇧t dz⇧,t, dxt =  (x¯  xt) dt+  x dzx,t, ⇧0 = 1,
where z⇧,t represents a nominal shock. The three Brownian motions zC,t, z⇧,t, and zx,t are
uncorrelated.
To obtain zero disagreement in the steady-state and a tractable stochastic disagreement
process, we assume that investors agree on the long run mean x¯ and the speed of mean
reversion , but di↵er in their beliefs about the volatility of expected inflation,  x.3 The
dynamics of the price level and the best estimator for expected inflation as perceived by
investor i are given by (Liptser and Shiryaev (1974a,b)):
d⇧t = x
i
t⇧t dt+  ⇧⇧t dz
i
⇧,t, dx
i
t = 
 
x¯  xit
 
dt+  ˆix dz
i
⇧,t, x
i
0 ⇠ N
⇣
µix¯,0,  
2
xi0
⌘
.
The volatility  ˆix is a function of  and  
i
x. Investors observe the price level for a su ciently
3The disagreement process is deterministic if there is only disagreement about the long run mean and it
is not Markov if there is disagreement about the speed of mean reversion.
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long time so that the perceived volatility,  ˆix, has reached its steady state level.
4
Investors’ nominal innovation processes are linked through the disagreement process  t,
which summarizes current disagreement about expected inflation. Specifically,
dz2⇧,t = dz
1
⇧,t   tdt,  t =
x2t   x1t
 ⇧
.
The disagreement process  t follows an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process
d t =    tdt+   dz1⇧,t,   =
 ⇧ +  ˆ2x
 ⇧
,    =
 ˆ2x    ˆ1x
 ⇧
,
and the dynamics of the likelihood ratio  t are
d t =  t tdz
1
⇧,t.
We determine the disagreement measure over the horizon T   t in the next Proposition.
Proposition IA.4. The disagreement measure is
Dt,T ⌘ D
 
 2t , T   t
 
=
 2 
4 
+
1
4  (T   t)
✓
 2t  
 2 
2 
◆ 
1  e 2 (T t)  .
Proof of Proposition IA.4. The disagreement measure is
Dt,T = 1
2 (T   t)E
1
Z T
t
 2sds
 
=
1
2 (T   t)
Z T
t
E1
⇥
 2s
⇤
ds
To evaluate the above we need to know E1 [ 2s]. To this end, note that by Ito’s lemma
d 2t = 2 
✓
 2 
2 
  2t
◆
dt  2  tdz1⇧,t.
Using the dynamics of  2t , we have E1 [ 2s] =
 2 
2  + e
 2 
⇣
 2t    
2
 
2 
⌘
. Inserting this back into
the expression for the disagreement measure and integrating yields the result.
Disagreement is strictly increasing in  2t and converges to
1
2 
2
t and
 2 
4  as T goes to t and
4The steady state level is  ˆix =  ⇧
 r
2 +
⇣
 ix
 ⇧
⌘2
  
!
. Note that the perceived volatility of expected
inflation  ˆix is lower than  
i
x, due to updating.
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infinity, respectively. Hence, the instantaneous disagreement measure is given by 12 
2
t and
the long-run disagreement measure equals
 2 
4  . In the empirical analysis in the main paper,
we measure disagreement as the standard deviation of expected inflation across investors,
which in the model is 12 ⇧
1
 (1  e ) |  t |. Therefore, the empirical disagreement measure
is strictly increasing in D ( (t)2, T   t) for any maturity T   t.
Each investor solves the consumption-savings problem given by
Ei
"Z T 0
t=0
e ⇢tu
✓
C it
Ht
◆
dt
#
s.t. Ei
"Z T 0
t=0
⇠itC
i
t dt
#
 wi0, (IA.3)
where wi0 denotes initial wealth of investor i.
We conclude the description of the model by specifying an external habit process which
helps match asset pricing moments.5 Specifically,
log(Ht) = log(H0)e
  t +  
Z t
0
e  (t a) log(Ca) da,   > 0,
where   describes the dependence of Ht on the history of aggregate output. Relative log
output !t = log(Ct/Ht), a state variable in the model, follows a mean reverting process
d!t =  (!¯   !t) dt+  C dzC,t, !¯ = (µC    2C/2)/ .
Equilibrium consumption allocations and state price densities are given in Proposition IA.5.
Proposition IA.5 (Consumption Allocations and State Price Densities). Optimal consump-
tion allocations are C1t = f( t)Ct and C
2
t = (1  f( t))Ct with
f( t) =
1
1 + (y t)
1
 
,
where y = y
2
y1 and y
i is the constant Lagrange multiplier from the static budget constraint
given in equation (IA.3). The state price densities are
⇠1t = (y
1) 1e ⇢tC  t H
  1
t f( t)
  , ⇠2t = (y
2) 1e ⇢tC  t H
  1
t (1  f( t))  .
5See Abel (1990), Abel (1999), Chan and Kogan (2002), and Ehling and Heyerdahl-Larsen (2016).
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3.1. Real Yields
We provide closed-form solutions of real bond prices in the next proposition.6
Proposition IA.6. The real bond price, when   is an integer is
Bt,T =
 X
k=0
wktB
k
t,T . (IA.4)
The stochastic weights wkt sum up to one and are given by
wkt =
✓
 
k
◆
 
k
 
t✓
1 +  
1
 
t
◆  = ✓ k
◆
f( t)
  k(1  f( t)k. (IA.5)
Bkt,T is an exponential quadratic function of the state vector Y1,t = ( t,!t):
Bkt,T = exp
 AkB(T   t) + BkB(T   t)0Y1,t + Y 01,tCkB(T   t)Y1,t  ,
where the coe cients AkB(·),BkB(·), CkB(·) are solutions to ordinary di↵erential equations sum-
marized in Section 3.3 of the Internet Appendix.
Proof of Proposition IA.6. Assume   is integer. The real bond price is Bt,T = E1t
h
⇠1T
⇠1t
i
. From
Proposition IA.5, we have that the SDF is
⇠1t = (y
1) 1e ⇢tC  t H
  1
t f( t)
   = (y1) 1e ⇢tC  t H
  1
t
⇣
1 + (y t)
1
 
⌘ 
=
 X
k=0
✓
 
k
◆
(y1) 1e ⇢tC  t H
  1
t (y t)
k
  .
Inserting the above into the expression for the bond price we have
 X
k=0
wktE1t
"✓
CT
Ct
◆   ✓HT
Ht
◆  1✓ T
 t
◆ k
 
#
, where wkt =
✓
 
k
◆
 
k
 
t✓
1 +  
1
 
t
◆  .
Define
⇠kT
⇠kt
=
⇣
CT
Ct
⌘   ⇣
HT
Ht
⌘  1 ⇣
 T
 t
⌘ k
 
. We can think of this as a stochastic discount factor
6Our solution method relies on a binomial expansion similar to the approach in Yan (2008), Dumas,
Kurshev, and Uppal (2009), and Bhamra and Uppal (2014). Alternatively, the model can be solved by the
generalized transform analysis proposed in Chen and Joslin (2012).
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in an artificial economy. Applying Ito’s lemma we have
d⇠kt
⇠kt
=  rkt dt  ✓kt dz, where dz =
 
dzC,t, dz
1
⇧,t
 
and
✓kt =
✓
  C ,
k
 
 t
◆
, and rkt = ⇢+  µC  
1
2
 (  + 1) 2C    (    1)!t +
1
2
k
 
✓
1  k
 
◆
 2t .
Define the state vector Y1,t = ( t,!). We have that Y1,t follows a multidimensional Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck process. Moreover, the real short rate in the artificial economies are quadratic in
the state vector and the market prices of risk are linear in the state vector. Hence, the artifi-
cial state price densities are in the class of quadratic Gaussian term structure (QGTS) mod-
els and the solution to E1t
⇣
CT
Ct
⌘   ⇣
HT
Ht
⌘  1 ⇣
 T
 t
⌘ k
 
 
= E1
h
⇠kT
⇠kt
i
is an exponential quadratic
function of the state vector with time dependent coe cients that are solutions to ordinary
di↵erential equations.7
The bond price in equation (IA.4) is a weighted average of artificial bond prices that
belong to the class of quadratic Gaussian term structure models. To gain intuition, we
inspect the real short rate rt which is the limit of the bond yield as maturity T approaches
t:
rt = ⇢+  µC   1
2
 (  + 1) 2C| {z }
CRRA
   (    1)!t| {z }
Habit
+
✓
1  1
 
◆
f( t)(1  f( t))1
2
 2t| {z }
Disagreement
. (IA.6)
We see from equation (IA.6) that the real short rate is the real short rate in a CRRA
preferences representative investor economy plus two additional terms. The additional terms
account for habit preferences and inflation disagreement. The impact from inflation disagree-
ment on the real yield curve depends on the consumption share f( t), risk aversion  , and
the instantaneous disagreement measure 12 
2
t . The real short rate does not depend on dis-
agreement if   = 1 and is increasing in disagreement when   > 1 (the opposite is true when
  < 1).
7We derive solutions to bond prices that belong to the class of QGTS models in Section 3.3 in this Internet
Appendix.
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3.2. Nominal Yields
We provide closed-form solutions of the nominal price of a nominal bond in the next propo-
sition.
Proposition IA.7. The nominal bond price, when   is an integer, is
Pt,T =
 X
k=0
wkt P
k
t,T ,
where wkt is given in equation (IA.5). P
k
t,T is an exponential quadratic function of the state
vector Yt = (x1t , t,!t):
P kt,T = exp
 AkP (T   t) + BkP (T   t)0Yt + Y 0t CkP (T   t)Yt  ,
where the coe cients AkP (·),BkP (·), CkP (·) are solutions to ordinary di↵erential equations sum-
marized in Section 3.3 of the Internet Appendix.
Proof of Proposition IA.7. The proof follows similar steps as in the proof of Proposition
IA.6. In particular, the bond price can be written as
 X
k=0
wktE1t
"✓
CT
Ct
◆   ✓HT
Ht
◆  1✓ T
 t
◆ k
  ⇧t
⇧T
#
,
and we can define a set of artificial nominal stochastic discount factors
⇠k⇧,T
⇠k⇧,t
=
✓
CT
Ct
◆   ✓HT
Ht
◆  1✓ T
 t
◆ k
  ⇧t
⇧T
.
Applying Ito’s lemma, we have
d⇠k⇧,t
⇠k⇧,t
=  rk⇧,tdt  ✓k⇧,tdz, where ✓k⇧,t = ✓kt +  ⇧, rk⇧,t = rk⇧,t + x1t +
k
 
 t    2⇧.
Define the state vector Yt = (x1t , t,!). We have that Yt follows a multidimensional Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck process. Moreover, the real short rate in the artificial economies are quadratic
in the state vector and the market prices of risk are linear in the state vector. Hence, the
artificial state price densities are in the class of QGTS models and, thus, we can solve for
the bond price in closed form up to the solution of ordinary di↵erential equations.
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Similarly to the real bond price, the nominal bond price can be expressed as a weighed
average of artificial bond prices that belong to the class of quadratic Gaussian term structure
models. Taking the limit of the nominal bond yield as the maturity T approaches t, we obtain
the nominal short rate
rP,t = rt + ftx
1
t + (1  ft)x2t    2⇧. (IA.7)
We see from equation (IA.7) that the nominal short rate is the sum of the real short rate,
the market view about expected inflation, and a Jensen’s inequality term. The intuition for
this is straightforward; when an investor has a larger consumption share, her view is more
important in determining the price of the nominal bond. Hence, the market view replaces
expected inflation in a standard economy with homogeneous beliefs.
The main channel through which inflation disagreement a↵ects nominally interest rates
becomes transparent through equation (IA.7) of the nominal short rate. There is no inflation
risk premium without disagreement and from the perspective of an outsider whose view
coincides with the market view there is also no inflation risk premium with disagreement.
Therefore, an increase in inflation disagreement raises the real short rate and, consequently,
also the nominal short rate.8
3.3. Quadratic Gaussian Term Structure Models
In this section, we summarize results from the quadratic Gaussian term structure literature
which we use to solve for closed-form real and nominal bond prices. Here we use the same
notation as Ahn, Dittmar, and Gallant (2002).9 Let Y (t) denote a N dimensional vector
of state variables and ZM(t) a M dimensional vector of independent Brownian motions.
Assumption 1. The dynamics of the stochastic discount factor SDF(t) are10
dSDF(t)
SDF(t)
=  r(t) dt+ 10M diag [⌘0m + ⌘0Y mY (t)]M dZM(t),
with
⌘0 = (⌘01, . . . , ⌘0M)
0 2 RM , ⌘Y = (⌘Y 1, . . . , ⌘YM)0 2 RM⇥N .
8Both investors’ inflation views di↵er from the market view and, thus, they perceive positive inflation
risk premiums on their investments.
9In contrast to Ahn, Dittmar, and Gallant (2002): (i) we assume that the vector of Brownian motions
driving the discount factor is identical to the vector of Brownian motions driving the state variables and,
thus, ⌥ is the identify matrix, and (ii) we allow the vector of Brownian motions to have a dimension that is
di↵erent from the number of state variables.
10An apostrophe denotes the transpose of a vector or matrix, 10M denotes a vector of ones, and diag [Y
0
m]M
denotes a M -dimensional matrix with diagonal elements (Y1, . . . , Ym).
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Hence, the market price of risk is an a ne function of the state vector Y (t).
Assumption 2. The short rate is a quadratic function of the state variables:
r(t) = ↵ +  0Y (t) + Y (t)0 Y (t),
where ↵ is a constant,   is an N-dimensional vector of constants, and  is an N ⇥ N
dimensional positive semidefinite matrix of constants.11
If the matrix  is non singular, then r(t)   ↵  12 0  1  8t.
Assumption 3. The state vector Y (t) follows a multidimensional OU-process:
dY (t) = (µ+ ⇠Y (t)) dt+ ⌃dZM(t),
where µ is an N-dimensional vector of constants, ⇠ is an N-dimensional square matrix
of constants, and ⌃ is a N ⇥ M-dimensional matrix of constants. We assume that ⇠ is
diagonalizable and has negative real components of eigenvalues. Specifically, ⇠ = U⇤U 1 in
which U is the matrix of N eigenvectors and ⇤ is the diagonal matrix of eigenvalues.
Let V (t, ⌧) denote the price of a zero-coupon bond and y(t, ⌧) the corresponding yield.
Specifically,
V (t, ⌧) = Et

SDF(t+ ⌧)
SDF(t)
 
, and y(t, ⌧) =  1
⌧
ln (V (t, ⌧)) .
The bond price and corresponding yield are given in the next proposition.
Proposition IA.8 (Quadratic Gaussian Term Structure Model). Let  0 =  ⌃⌥⌘0 =  ⌃⌘0
and  Y =  ⌃⌥⌘Y =  ⌃⌘Y . The bond price is an exponential quadratic function of the state
vector
V (t, ⌧) = exp {A(⌧) + B(⌧)0Y (t) + Y (t)0C(⌧)Y (t)} ,
where A(⌧), B(⌧), and C(⌧) satisfy the ordinary di↵erential equations,
dA(⌧)
d⌧
= trace [⌃⌃0C(⌧)] +
1
2
B(⌧)0⌃⌃0B(⌧) + B(⌧)0(µ   0)  ↵, with A(0) = 0,
dB(⌧)
d⌧
= 2C(⌧)⌃⌃0B(⌧) + (⇠    Y )0B(⌧) + 2C(⌧)(µ   0)   , with B(0) = 0,
dC(⌧)
d⌧
= 2C(⌧)⌃⌃0C(⌧) + (C(⌧)(⇠    Y ) + (⇠    Y )0C(⌧))  , with C(0) = 0N⇥N .
11We do not impose an additional parameter restriction that guarantees non-negativity of the short rate.
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Moreover, the yield is a quadratic function of the state vector Y (t):
y(t, ⌧) = Ay(⌧) + By(⌧)
0Y (t) + Y (t)0Cy(⌧)Y (t),
with Ay(⌧) =  A(⌧)/⌧ , By(⌧) =  B(⌧)/⌧ , and Cy(⌧) =  C(⌧)/⌧.
Proof. See Ahn, Dittmar, and Gallant (2002).
If the short rate is an a ne function of the state vector Y (t), then the bond price is an
exponential a ne function of the state vector Y (t) because  = 0N⇥N implies C(⌧) = 0N⇥N
for all ⌧ . The bond price in this case belongs to the class of essential a ne term structure
models (see Du↵ee (2002)) and is given in the next proposition.
Proposition IA.9 (Essential A ne Term Structure Model). Let  = 0N⇥N ,  0 =  ⌃⌥⌘0 =
 ⌃⌘0, and  Y =  ⌃⌥⌘Y =  ⌃⌘Y and assume that (⇠    Y ) is invertible. The bond price is
an exponential a ne function of the state vector
V (t, ⌧) = exp {A(⌧) + B(⌧)0Y (t)} ,
where A(⌧) and B(⌧) satisfy the ordinary di↵erential equations,
dA(⌧)
d⌧
=
1
2
B(⌧)0⌃⌃0B(⌧) + B(⌧)0(µ   0)  ↵, with A(0) = 0,
dB(⌧)
d⌧
= (⇠    Y )0B(⌧)   , with B(0) = 0.
Moreover, the yield is an a ne function of the state vector Y (t):
y(t, ⌧) = Ay(⌧) + By(⌧)
0Y (t) with Ay(⌧) =  A(⌧)/⌧, By(⌧) =  B(⌧)/⌧.
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Figure IA.1: Break-Even Inflation Rate in Edgeworth Box
This plot shows the di↵erence between the break-even inflation rate in an economy with
and without inflation disagreement as a function of risk aversion. The price level today is
normalized to one and it is 1.25 in the high and 0.9 in the low inflation state tomorrow. The
second investor thinks that both inflation states are equally likely.
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Figure IA.2: Inflation Risk Premium
This plot shows the inflation risk premium when there is a disagreement as a function of
perceived expected inflation of an econometrician. The inflation risk premium is sensitive to
the belief of the econometrician.
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Figure IA.3: Inflation Risk Premium
The figure shows the real yield (top-left), nominal yield (top-right), break-even inflation
(bottom-left), and inflation risk premium (bottom-right) as an increasing function of inflation
disagreement D0,1 when   = 2. There are three states with inflation given by (0.9, 1, 1.125)
in state one, two, and three, respectively. The probability as perceived by investor one over
the three states are given by (0.2, 0.4, 0.4). For the second investor, we vary the probability
of the first state from 0.2 to 0.05 and then solve for the probability of the two other states
such that E1
h
1
⇧1
i
= E2
h
1
⇧1
i
. There is a positive break even inflation rate and inflation risk
premium even though investors agree on the expected real value of one dollar.
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Table IA.1: Summary Statistics - Disagreement about the Mean, Variance, and
Skewness of Inflation. The table reports summary statistics for disagreement about the
mean (DisInfMean), disagreement about the variance (DisInfVar), and disagreement about
the skewness (DisInfSkew) of inflation in percent. The three disagreement measures are
calculated as the cross-sectional standard deviation of the individual mean, variance, and
skewness of one-year inflation rates based on the probability forecasts for the GDP deflator
provided by the Survey of Professional Forecasters. Samples: Q3-1981 to Q2-2014.
Mean Median STD Correlation
DisInfMean DisInfVar DisInfSkew
DisInfMean 0.5546 0.5174 0.1711 100 51.63 18.59
DisInfVar 0.0082 0.0071 0.0041 100 49.15
DisInfSkew 0.0034 0.0007 0.0075 100
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Table IA.2: Real and Nominal Yield Levels and Disagreement about the Mean,
Variance, and Skewness of Inflation. The table reports results from OLS regressions of
real and nominal yields on disagreement about the mean (DisInfMean), disagreement about
the variance (DisInfVar), and disagreement about the skewness (DisInfSkew) of inflation.
The three disagreement measures are calculated as the cross-sectional standard deviation of
the individual mean, variance, and skewness of one year inflation rates based on the prob-
ability forecasts for the GDP deflator provided by the Survey of Professional Forecasters.
The first three panels show univariate regression results of real and nominal yields onto each
disagreement measure. In Panel 4, all three disagreements are included. Panel 5 also con-
trols for expected inflation (ExpInf), and the volatility of inflation (SigInf). The t-statistics
(t-stat) are Newey-West corrected with 12 lags. Regression coe cients are standardized. Ex-
pInf and SigInf are predicted by a GARCH(1, 1) model with an ARMA(1, 1) mean equation
over multiple horizons (T). Samples: Q3-1981 to Q2-2014.
Real Yields Nominal Yields
Maturity 2y 3y 5y 7y 10y 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y
DisInfMean 0.44 0.44 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.49 0.50
t-stat 2.88 2.86 2.83 2.83 2.85 3.19 3.23 3.31 3.41 3.50
adj. R2 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.24
DisInfVar 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.45 0.45 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53
t-stat 3.06 3.04 2.96 2.93 2.91 4.29 4.19 4.16 4.17 4.18
adj. R2 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.28
DisInfSkew 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24
t-stat 2.31 2.33 2.31 2.31 2.32 3.07 3.08 3.05 3.03 3.06
adj. R2 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
DisInfMean 0.28 0.29 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.26 0.27 0.29 0.30 0.30
t-stat 2.44 2.43 2.45 2.49 2.53 2.20 2.31 2.45 2.55 2.66
DisInfVar 0.32 0.31 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.40 0.39 0.38 0.37 0.38
t-stat 2.56 2.56 2.46 2.39 2.33 3.70 3.52 3.45 3.44 3.39
DisInfSkew -0.03 -0.02 -0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
t-stat -0.29 -0.21 -0.01 0.06 0.13 -0.09 -0.03 -0.00 -0.00 -0.02
adj. R2 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.34
DisInfMean 0.22 0.22 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.19 0.20 0.22 0.23 0.24
t-stat 2.27 2.28 2.34 2.40 2.46 2.19 2.33 2.49 2.58 2.71
DisInfVar 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.30 0.31
t-stat 2.18 2.21 2.17 2.14 2.11 3.37 3.27 3.24 3.26 3.23
DisInfSkew -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
t-stat -0.27 -0.24 -0.08 -0.03 0.02 -0.37 -0.31 -0.28 -0.28 -0.28
ExpInf 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.26 0.25 0.39 0.37 0.36 0.35 0.33
t-stat 2.04 2.08 2.00 1.93 1.84 2.70 2.59 2.46 2.37 2.33
SigInf 0.12 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01
t-stat 1.13 0.94 0.80 0.65 0.46 0.17 0.00 -0.05 -0.13 -0.16
adj. R2 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.44 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43
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Table IA.5: Expected Consumption Growth. The table reports estimation results of dif-
ferent models for expected consumption growth. Panel A shows estimation results from OLS
regressions of one quarter ahead consumption growth (gct+1) on a constant (Const), current
quarterly consumption growth (gct), inflation disagreement (DisInft), current quarterly in-
flation rate (Inft), and the instrumented real interest rate (rYldt). Each column corresponds
to a di↵erent regression model and ExpCi, with i 2 {II, III, IV, V, V I}, is its annualized
predictor. The t-statistics (t-stat) are Newey-West corrected with 12 lags. rYldt is the date
t-1 projector from a regression of the real interest rate at time t on the real interest rate
at time t  1 with estimation results shown in Panel B. Data are available at the quarterly
frequency from Q3-1981 to Q2-2014.
Panel A: Survey of Professional Forecasters Surveys of Consumers
ExpCII ExpCIII ExpCIV ExpCV ExpCIII ExpCIV ExpCV
Const. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
t-stat 2.87 2.56 2.57 2.63 0.82 0.91 1.34
gct 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.36 0.38 0.39 0.36
t-stat 2.89 2.90 2.72 2.63 2.92 2.74 2.57
DISt - 0.00 0.01 -0.12 0.03 0.03 -0.01
t-stat - 0.00 0.07 -0.93 0.79 1.04 -0.19
Inflt - - -0.09 - - -0.11 -
t-stat - - -1.25 - - -1.54 -
rYldt - - - 0.05 - - 0.04
t-stat - - - 1.85 - - 1.62
R2 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.16 0.17 0.18
N 131 131 131 130 131 131 130
Panel B: Instrumented Real Yield rYldt
y⌧r,t 1 t-stat R
2 Nobs
y⌧r,t 0.95 52.60 0.86 131
34
Table IA.6: Inflation Disagreement and Nominal Yields I. The table reports results
from OLS regressions of the one-, to five-year nominal yield on disagreement about inflation
(DisInf), expected inflation (ExpInf), and the volatility of inflation (SigInf). The t-statistics
(t-stat) are Newey-West corrected with 12 lags and regression coe cients are standardized.
ExpInf and SigInf are annualized predictors of the mean and volatility of inflation over the
corresponding yield maturity horizon using a GARCH(1,1) model with an ARMA(1,1) mean
equation. The survey of professional forecasters (SPF) is available at the quarterly frequency
from Q3-1981 to Q2-2014 and the Michigan survey of consumers (MSC) is available at the
monthly frequency from January 1978 to June 2014.
Survey of Professional Forecasters Surveys of Consumers
Maturity 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y
DisInf 0.354 0.356 0.363 0.364 0.377 0.470 0.513 0.548 0.571 0.594
t-stat 3.63 3.60 3.65 3.74 3.88 4.11 4.39 4.61 4.80 5.05
ExpInf 0.459 0.449 0.437 0.435 0.424 0.356 0.298 0.249 0.219 0.196
t-stat 4.36 4.37 4.26 4.26 4.19 3.49 2.73 2.16 1.81 1.62
adj. R2 0.41 0.40 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.58 0.56 0.55 0.54 0.55
N 132 132 132 132 132 438 438 438 438 438
DisInf 0.364 0.374 0.381 0.384 0.397 0.488 0.542 0.582 0.613 0.636
t-stat 3.51 3.50 3.51 3.58 3.63 4.16 4.55 4.86 5.17 5.42
ExpInf 0.448 0.430 0.416 0.411 0.399 0.334 0.264 0.207 0.169 0.144
t-stat 3.21 3.07 2.94 2.89 2.83 3.15 2.41 1.84 1.46 1.24
SigInf -0.024 -0.041 -0.044 -0.049 -0.050 -0.061 -0.091 -0.107 -0.126 -0.126
t-stat -0.24 -0.40 -0.42 -0.46 -0.47 -0.86 -1.31 -1.55 -1.88 -1.97
adj. R2 0.40 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.58 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.56
N 132 132 132 132 132 438 438 438 438 438
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Table IA.7: Inflation Disagreement and Nominal Yields II. The table reports results
from OLS regressions of the one-, to five-year nominal yield on disagreement about inflation
(DisInf), expected inflation (ExpInf), the volatility of inflation (SigInf), and expected con-
sumption growth (ExpC). The t-statistics (t-stat) are Newey-West corrected with 12 lags
and regression coe cients are standardized. ExpInf and SigInf are annualized predictors of
the mean and volatility of inflation over the corresponding yield maturity horizon using a
GARCH(1,1) model with an ARMA(1,1) mean equation. ExpC is the annualized predictor
of the mean of consumption growth over the corresponding yield maturity horizon using a
GARCH(1,1) model with an ARMA(1,1) mean equation. Data are available at the quarterly
frequency from Q3-1981 to Q2-2014.
Survey of Professional Forecasters Surveys of Consumers
Maturity 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y
DisInf 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.37 0.50 0.53 0.56 0.58 0.59
t-stat 3.41 3.54 3.62 3.74 3.95 4.72 5.35 5.76 6.14 6.43
ExpC 0.36 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.41 0.42
t-stat 2.35 2.38 2.34 2.27 2.30 5.07 5.35 5.33 5.21 5.43
ExpInf 0.50 0.49 0.47 0.47 0.46 0.44 0.41 0.39 0.37 0.36
t-stat 3.40 3.29 3.17 3.12 3.07 4.77 4.61 4.34 4.21 3.96
SigInf 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.13
t-stat 0.98 0.92 0.90 0.85 0.87 2.10 1.86 1.71 1.48 1.45
adj. R2 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.49 0.69 0.71 0.72 0.73 0.74
N 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132
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Table IA.8: Inflation Disagreement and Nominal Yields III. The table reports results
from OLS regressions of the one-, to five-year nominal yield on disagreement about inflation
(DisInf), expected inflation (ExpInf), the volatility of inflation (SigInf), and expected indus-
trial production growth (ExpIP). The t-statistics (t-stat) are Newey-West corrected with 12
lags and regression coe cients are standardized. ExpInf and SigInf are annualized predictors
of the mean and volatility of inflation over the corresponding yield maturity horizon using a
GARCH(1,1) model with an ARMA(1,1) mean equation. ExpIP is the annualized predictor
of the mean of industrial production growth over the corresponding yield maturity horizon
using a GARCH(1,1) model with an ARMA(1,1) mean equation. Data are available at the
monthly frequency from January 1978 to June 2014.
Maturity 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y
DisInf 0.50 0.55 0.59 0.62 0.65
t-stat 4.34 4.75 5.03 5.33 5.57
ExpIP 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09
t-stat 1.18 1.24 1.10 1.10 1.12
ExpInf 0.34 0.27 0.21 0.17 0.15
t-stat 3.29 2.53 1.94 1.56 1.34
SigInf -0.01 -0.04 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07
t-stat -0.13 -0.49 -0.77 -1.07 -1.09
adj. R2 0.58 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.57
N 438 438 438 438 438
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Table IA.9: Inflation Disagreement and Nominal Yields IV. The table reports results
from OLS regressions of the one-, to five-year nominal yield on disagreement about infla-
tion (DisInf), expected inflation (ExpInf), the volatility of inflation (SigInf), and expected
GDP growth (ExpGDP). The t-statistics (t-stat) are Newey-West corrected with 12 lags
and regression coe cients are standardized. ExpInf and SigInf are annualized predictors of
the mean and volatility of inflation over the corresponding yield maturity horizon using a
GARCH(1,1) model with an ARMA(1,1) mean equation. ExpGDP is the annualized pre-
dictor of the mean of GDP growth over the corresponding yield maturity horizon using a
GARCH(1,1) model with an ARMA(1,1) mean equation. Data are available at the quarterly
frequency from Q3-1981 to Q2-2014.
Survey of Professional Forecasters Surveys of Consumers
Maturity 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y
DisInf 0.38 0.39 0.40 0.40 0.42 0.48 0.52 0.54 0.57 0.58
t-stat 3.94 4.00 4.02 4.13 4.25 3.55 3.94 4.21 4.48 4.66
ExpGDP 0.19 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.25 0.23 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.25
t-stat 1.83 2.03 2.04 2.05 2.18 2.99 3.17 3.12 3.07 3.22
ExpInf 0.46 0.44 0.43 0.42 0.41 0.43 0.40 0.37 0.36 0.35
t-stat 3.22 3.09 2.97 2.92 2.87 4.20 3.99 3.72 3.58 3.36
SigInf 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.06
t-stat 0.55 0.52 0.51 0.49 0.53 1.26 1.08 0.94 0.73 0.74
adj. R2 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.59 0.61 0.62 0.63 0.64
N 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132
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Table IA.10: Inflation Disagreement and Nominal Yields V. The table reports results
from OLS regressions of the one-, to five-year nominal yield on disagreement about inflation
(DisInf), expected inflation (ExpInf), the volatility of inflation (SigInf), and expected con-
sumption growth (ExpCII). The t-statistics (t-stat) are Newey-West corrected with 12 lags
and regression coe cients are standardized. ExpInf and SigInf are annualized predictors
of the mean and volatility of inflation over the corresponding yield maturity horizon using
a GARCH(1,1) model with an ARMA(1,1) mean equation. ExpCII is the annualized esti-
mator from a regression of future quarterly consumption growth on a constant and current
quarterly consumption growth. Data are available at the quarterly frequency from Q3-1981
to Q2-2014.
Survey of Professional Forecasters Surveys of Consumers
Maturity 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y
DisInf 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.52 0.55 0.58 0.60 0.61
t-stat 3.20 3.26 3.32 3.41 3.57 3.86 4.30 4.63 4.95 5.16
ExpCII 0.21 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.27
t-stat 1.95 2.01 1.98 1.94 1.99 3.37 3.47 3.46 3.47 3.52
ExpInf 0.49 0.48 0.47 0.46 0.45 0.38 0.36 0.34 0.32 0.31
t-stat 3.28 3.18 3.05 2.99 2.93 3.51 3.41 3.26 3.19 3.09
SigInf 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.06
t-stat 0.54 0.48 0.45 0.40 0.40 1.10 0.97 0.88 0.74 0.75
adj. R2 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.42 0.43 0.58 0.60 0.61 0.62 0.64
N 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
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Table IA.11: Inflation Disagreement and Nominal Yields VI. The table reports results
from OLS regressions of the one-, to five-year nominal yield on disagreement about infla-
tion (DisInf), expected inflation (ExpInf), the volatility of inflation (SigInf), and expected
consumption growth (ExpCIII). The t-statistics (t-stat) are Newey-West corrected with 12
lags and regression coe cients are standardized. ExpInf and SigInf are annualized predic-
tors of the mean and volatility of inflation over the corresponding yield maturity horizon
using a GARCH(1,1) model with an ARMA(1,1) mean equation. ExpCIII is the annualized
estimator from a regression of future quarterly consumption growth on a constant, current
quarterly consumption growth, and current inflation disagreement. Data are available at the
quarterly frequency from Q3-1981 to Q2-2014.
Survey of Professional Forecasters Surveys of Consumers
Maturity 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y
DisInf 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.47 0.50 0.52 0.55 0.56
t-stat 3.20 3.26 3.32 3.41 3.57 3.52 3.97 4.32 4.66 4.91
ExpCIII 0.21 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.27
t-stat 1.95 2.01 1.98 1.94 1.99 3.37 3.47 3.46 3.47 3.52
ExpInf 0.49 0.48 0.47 0.46 0.45 0.38 0.36 0.34 0.32 0.31
t-stat 3.28 3.18 3.05 2.99 2.93 3.51 3.41 3.26 3.19 3.09
SigInf 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.06
t-stat 0.54 0.48 0.45 0.40 0.40 1.10 0.97 0.88 0.74 0.75
adj. R2 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.42 0.43 0.58 0.60 0.61 0.62 0.64
N 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
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Table IA.12: Inflation Disagreement and Nominal Yields VII. The table reports re-
sults from OLS regressions of the one-, to five-year nominal yield on disagreement about
inflation (DisInf), expected inflation (ExpInf), the volatility of inflation (SigInf), and ex-
pected consumption growth (ExpCIV ). The t-statistics (t-stat) are Newey-West corrected
with 12 lags and regression coe cients are standardized. ExpInf and SigInf are annual-
ized predictors of the mean and volatility of inflation over the corresponding yield maturity
horizon using a GARCH(1,1) model with an ARMA(1,1) mean equation. ExpCIV is the an-
nualized estimator from a regression of future quarterly consumption growth on a constant,
current quarterly consumption growth, current inflation disagreement, and current quarterly
inflation. Data are available at the quarterly frequency from Q3-1981 to Q2-2014.
Survey of Professional Forecasters Surveys of Consumers
Maturity 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y
DisInf 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.32 0.33 0.43 0.46 0.49 0.51 0.52
t-stat 2.88 2.95 3.01 3.11 3.27 3.34 3.82 4.20 4.56 4.84
ExpCIV 0.27 0.28 0.29 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.31
t-stat 2.28 2.32 2.28 2.24 2.28 3.70 3.75 3.72 3.72 3.76
ExpInf 0.57 0.56 0.55 0.54 0.53 0.47 0.45 0.42 0.41 0.40
t-stat 3.53 3.44 3.29 3.23 3.17 4.30 4.26 4.11 4.04 3.93
SigInf 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.08
t-stat 0.68 0.62 0.58 0.53 0.53 1.22 1.08 0.99 0.86 0.86
adj. R2 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.44 0.45 0.59 0.61 0.63 0.64 0.65
N 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
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Table IA.13: Inflation Disagreement and Nominal Yields VIII. The table reports
results from OLS regressions of the one-, to five-year nominal yield on disagreement about
inflation (DisInf), expected inflation (ExpInf), the volatility of inflation (SigInf), and ex-
pected consumption growth (ExpCV ). The t-statistics (t-stat) are Newey-West corrected
with 12 lags and regression coe cients are standardized. ExpInf and SigInf are annual-
ized predictors of the mean and volatility of inflation over the corresponding yield maturity
horizon using a GARCH(1,1) model with an ARMA(1,1) mean equation. ExpCV is the an-
nualized estimator from a regression of future quarterly consumption growth on a constant,
current quarterly consumption growth, current inflation disagreement, and the instrumented
two year real yield. Data are available at the quarterly frequency from Q3-1981 to Q2-2014.
Survey of Professional Forecasters Surveys of Consumers
Maturity 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y
DisInf 0.31 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.44 0.47 0.50 0.52 0.54
t-stat 4.07 4.18 4.24 4.34 4.56 4.36 5.09 5.63 6.17 6.49
ExpCV 0.48 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.48 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.42 0.42
t-stat 4.31 4.24 4.11 4.02 3.97 5.55 5.60 5.56 5.54 5.56
ExpInf 0.43 0.42 0.41 0.40 0.39 0.35 0.32 0.30 0.29 0.28
t-stat 3.42 3.34 3.21 3.15 3.08 3.49 3.40 3.25 3.19 3.08
SigInf 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.09
t-stat 1.16 1.05 0.99 0.91 0.89 1.61 1.44 1.33 1.15 1.15
adj. R2 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.65 0.67 0.68 0.69 0.70
N 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130
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Table IA.14: Inflation Disagreement and Real Yields I. The table reports results from
OLS regressions of real yields on disagreement about inflation (DisInf), expected inflation
(ExpInf), and the volatility of inflation (SigInf). The t-statistics (t-stat) are Newey-West
corrected with 12 lags. Regression coe cients are standardized. ExpInf and SigInf are
annualized predictors of the mean and volatility of inflation over the corresponding yield
maturity horizon using a GARCH(1,1) model with an ARMA(1,1) mean equation. Data are
available at the quarterly frequency from Q3-1981 to Q2-2014.
Survey of Professional Forecasters Surveys of Consumers
Maturity 2y 3y 5y 7y 10y 2y 3y 5y 7y 10y
DisInf 0.407 0.397 0.388 0.382 0.376 0.560 0.575 0.583 0.589 0.595
t-stat 3.48 3.33 3.23 3.18 3.12 3.04 3.18 3.29 3.39 3.50
adj. R2 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.31 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.35
N 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132
DisInf 0.290 0.285 0.281 0.280 0.280 0.452 0.472 0.487 0.501 0.515
t-stat 2.27 2.20 2.12 2.12 2.12 2.55 2.75 3.00 3.17 3.34
ExpInf 0.350 0.359 0.358 0.352 0.344 0.251 0.246 0.236 0.221 0.206
t-stat 2.19 2.17 2.03 1.95 1.88 1.98 1.98 1.87 1.77 1.64
SigInf 0.099 0.080 0.068 0.057 0.042 0.106 0.077 0.056 0.038 0.018
t-stat 0.71 0.57 0.48 0.39 0.29 1.04 0.80 0.62 0.43 0.20
adj. R2 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.34 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.37
N 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132
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Table IA.15: Inflation Disagreement and Real Yields II. The table reports results from
OLS regressions of the two, three, five, seven, and ten-year real yield on disagreement about
inflation (DisInf), expected inflation (ExpInf), the volatility of inflation (SigInf), and ex-
pected consumption growth (ExpC). The t-statistics (t-stat) are Newey-West corrected with
12 lags and regression coe cients are standardized. ExpInf and SigInf are annualized pre-
dictors of the mean and volatility of inflation over the corresponding yield maturity horizon
using a GARCH(1,1) model with an ARMA(1,1) mean equation. ExpC is the annualized
predictor of the mean of consumption growth over the corresponding yield maturity horizon
using a GARCH(1,1) model with an ARMA(1,1) mean equation. Data are available at the
quarterly frequency from Q3-1981 to Q2-2014.
Survey of Professional Forecasters Surveys of Consumers
Maturity 2y 3y 5y 7y 10y 2y 3y 5y 7y 10y
DisInf 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.46 0.48 0.49 0.51 0.52
t-stat 2.21 2.18 2.18 2.22 2.27 3.25 3.60 4.23 4.59 4.92
ExpC 0.41 0.42 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.44 0.45 0.48 0.49 0.49
t-stat 2.46 2.49 2.67 2.66 2.64 3.56 3.64 3.97 4.01 4.01
ExpInf 0.41 0.42 0.43 0.42 0.42 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.26
t-stat 2.43 2.42 2.29 2.22 2.15 2.21 2.26 2.21 2.13 2.03
SigInf 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.31 0.34 0.32 0.32 0.30 0.28
t-stat 1.42 1.36 1.37 1.33 1.26 2.04 1.97 2.01 1.93 1.80
adj. R2 0.36 0.37 0.39 0.38 0.38 0.49 0.51 0.54 0.55 0.55
N 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132
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Table IA.16: Inflation Disagreement and Real Yields III. The table reports results
from OLS regressions of the two, three, five, seven, and ten-year real yield on disagreement
about inflation (DisInf), expected inflation (ExpInf), the volatility of inflation (SigInf), and
expected GDP growth (ExpGDP). The t-statistics (t-stat) are Newey-West corrected with 12
lags and regression coe cients are standardized. ExpInf and SigInf are annualized predictors
of the mean and volatility of inflation over the corresponding yield maturity horizon using
a GARCH(1,1) model with an ARMA(1,1) mean equation. ExpGDP is the annualized
predictor of the mean of GDP growth over the corresponding yield maturity horizon using a
GARCH(1,1) model with an ARMA(1,1) mean equation. Data are available at the quarterly
frequency from Q3-1981 to Q2-2014.
Survey of Professional Forecasters Surveys of Consumers
Maturity 2y 3y 5y 7y 10y 2y 3y 5y 7y 10y
DisInf 0.31 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.46 0.48 0.49 0.50 0.52
t-stat 2.75 2.70 2.67 2.70 2.73 2.70 2.94 3.29 3.51 3.72
ExpGDP 0.25 0.27 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.24 0.25 0.29 0.30 0.30
t-stat 2.01 2.10 2.49 2.57 2.61 2.05 2.18 2.63 2.73 2.80
ExpInf 0.36 0.37 0.38 0.37 0.36 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.25 0.23
t-stat 2.22 2.21 2.08 2.01 1.95 2.03 2.06 1.99 1.90 1.80
SigInf 0.23 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.24 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.19
t-stat 1.19 1.12 1.14 1.10 1.03 1.59 1.49 1.55 1.47 1.34
adj. R2 0.28 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.29 0.38 0.40 0.42 0.43 0.43
N 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132
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Table IA.17: Inflation Disagreement and Real Yields IV. The table reports results
from OLS regressions of the two, three, five, seven, and ten-year real yield on disagreement
about inflation (DisInf), expected inflation (ExpInf), the volatility of inflation (SigInf), and
expected consumption growth (ExpCII). The t-statistics (t-stat) are Newey-West corrected
with 12 lags and regression coe cients are standardized. ExpInf and SigInf are annualized
predictors of the mean and volatility of inflation over the corresponding yield maturity
horizon using a GARCH(1,1) model with an ARMA(1,1) mean equation. ExpCII is the
annualized estimator from a regression of future quarterly consumption growth on a constant
and current quarterly consumption growth. Data are available at the quarterly frequency
from Q3-1981 to Q2-2014.
Survey of Professional Forecasters Surveys of Consumers
Maturity 2y 3y 5y 7y 10y 2y 3y 5y 7y 10y
DisInf 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.43 0.45 0.46 0.47 0.49
t-stat 1.86 1.81 1.76 1.78 1.80 2.65 2.92 3.35 3.62 3.87
ExpCII 0.26 0.27 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.28 0.29 0.32 0.32 0.32
t-stat 1.96 2.01 2.23 2.26 2.26 2.77 2.84 3.17 3.21 3.23
ExpInf 0.41 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.42 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.29 0.28
t-stat 2.35 2.33 2.21 2.14 2.07 2.24 2.28 2.23 2.15 2.04
SigInf 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.23 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.17
t-stat 1.16 1.08 1.08 1.03 0.96 1.71 1.59 1.59 1.49 1.33
adj. R2 0.29 0.30 0.31 0.30 0.30 0.40 0.42 0.44 0.45 0.45
N 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
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Table IA.18: Inflation Disagreement and Real Yields V. The table reports results
from OLS regressions of the two, three, five, seven, and ten-year real yield on disagreement
about inflation (DisInf), expected inflation (ExpInf), the volatility of inflation (SigInf), and
expected consumption growth (ExpCIII). The t-statistics (t-stat) are Newey-West corrected
with 12 lags and regression coe cients are standardized. ExpInf and SigInf are annual-
ized predictors of the mean and volatility of inflation over the corresponding yield maturity
horizon using a GARCH(1,1) model with an ARMA(1,1) mean equation. ExpCIII is the
annualized estimator from a regression of future quarterly consumption growth on a con-
stant, current quarterly consumption growth, and current inflation disagreement. Data are
available at the quarterly frequency from Q3-1981 to Q2-2014.
Survey of Professional Forecasters Surveys of Consumers
Maturity 2y 3y 5y 7y 10y 2y 3y 5y 7y 10y
DisInf 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.37 0.39 0.40 0.41 0.42
t-stat 1.86 1.81 1.76 1.78 1.80 2.26 2.51 2.93 3.21 3.47
ExpCIII 0.26 0.27 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.28 0.29 0.32 0.32 0.33
t-stat 1.96 2.01 2.23 2.26 2.26 2.77 2.84 3.17 3.21 3.23
ExpInf 0.41 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.42 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.29 0.28
t-stat 2.35 2.33 2.21 2.14 2.07 2.24 2.28 2.23 2.15 2.04
SigInf 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.23 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.17
t-stat 1.16 1.08 1.08 1.03 0.96 1.71 1.59 1.59 1.49 1.33
adj. R2 0.29 0.30 0.31 0.30 0.30 0.40 0.42 0.44 0.45 0.45
N 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
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Table IA.19: Inflation Disagreement and Real Yields VI. The table reports results
from OLS regressions of the two, three, five, seven, and ten-year real yield on disagreement
about inflation (DisInf), expected inflation (ExpInf), the volatility of inflation (SigInf), and
expected consumption growth (ExpCIV ). The t-statistics (t-stat) are Newey-West corrected
with 12 lags and regression coe cients are standardized. ExpInf and SigInf are annualized
predictors of the mean and volatility of inflation over the corresponding yield maturity
horizon using a GARCH(1,1) model with an ARMA(1,1) mean equation. ExpCIV is the
annualized estimator from a regression of future quarterly consumption growth on a constant,
current quarterly consumption growth, current inflation disagreement, and current quarterly
inflation. Data are available at the quarterly frequency from Q3-1981 to Q2-2014.
Survey of Professional Forecasters Surveys of Consumers
Maturity 2y 3y 5y 7y 10y 2y 3y 5y 7y 10y
DisInf 0.21 0.21 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.34 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.38
t-stat 1.64 1.59 1.52 1.53 1.55 2.05 2.29 2.70 2.98 3.25
ExpCIV 0.29 0.31 0.34 0.35 0.36 0.30 0.31 0.34 0.35 0.35
t-stat 2.10 2.17 2.38 2.41 2.43 2.84 2.93 3.28 3.33 3.34
ExpInf 0.48 0.50 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.39 0.39 0.40 0.39 0.38
t-stat 2.52 2.50 2.39 2.32 2.26 2.66 2.71 2.69 2.61 2.50
SigInf 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.21 0.21 0.19 0.18
t-stat 1.20 1.13 1.13 1.09 1.02 1.71 1.59 1.60 1.50 1.34
adj. R2 0.30 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.40 0.43 0.45 0.46 0.46
N 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
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Table IA.20: Inflation Disagreement and Real Yields VII. The table reports results
from OLS regressions of the two, three, five, seven, and ten-year real yield on disagreement
about inflation (DisInf), expected inflation (ExpInf), the volatility of inflation (SigInf), and
expected consumption growth (ExpCV ). The t-statistics (t-stat) are Newey-West corrected
with 12 lags and regression coe cients are standardized. ExpInf and SigInf are annualized
predictors of the mean and volatility of inflation over the corresponding yield maturity
horizon using a GARCH(1,1) model with an ARMA(1,1) mean equation. ExpCV is the
annualized estimator from a regression of future quarterly consumption growth on a constant,
current quarterly consumption growth, current inflation disagreement, and the instrumented
two year real yield. Data are available at the quarterly frequency from Q3-1981 to Q2-2014.
Survey of Professional Forecasters Surveys of Consumers
Maturity 2y 3y 5y 7y 10y 2y 3y 5y 7y 10y
DisInf 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.34 0.36 0.37 0.39 0.40
t-stat 2.39 2.35 2.32 2.35 2.39 2.64 3.02 3.74 4.19 4.59
ExpCV 0.54 0.55 0.57 0.57 0.56 0.48 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.49
t-stat 4.24 4.14 3.98 3.88 3.80 4.62 4.55 4.54 4.46 4.38
ExpInf 0.35 0.36 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.24
t-stat 2.51 2.53 2.39 2.31 2.23 2.25 2.32 2.26 2.18 2.07
SigInf 0.32 0.30 0.30 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.26 0.25 0.23 0.21
t-stat 1.78 1.69 1.63 1.55 1.45 2.17 2.05 2.00 1.87 1.68
adj. R2 0.46 0.47 0.48 0.48 0.47 0.51 0.53 0.55 0.56 0.55
N 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130
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Table IA.21: Inflation Disagreement and Nominal Yield Volatilities I. The ta-
ble reports results from OLS regressions of the one-, to five-year nominal yield volatility on
disagreement about inflation (DisInf), expected inflation (ExpInf), and the volatility of infla-
tion (SigInf). The t-statistics (t-stat) are Newey-West corrected with 12 lags and regression
coe cients are standardized. ExpInf and SigInf are annualized predictors of the mean and
volatility of inflation over the corresponding yield maturity horizon using a GARCH(1,1)
model with an ARMA(1,1) mean equation. Data are available at the quarterly frequency
from Q3-1981 to Q2-2014.
Survey of Professional Forecasters Surveys of Consumers
Maturity 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y
DisInf 0.597 0.606 0.567 0.656 0.644 0.474 0.464 0.442 0.501 0.511
t-stat 5.24 5.20 5.94 6.92 8.13 4.40 4.03 4.01 3.67 3.65
ExpInf 0.287 0.265 0.260 0.204 0.205 0.287 0.261 0.283 0.170 0.126
t-stat 2.90 2.74 2.44 2.25 2.31 1.60 1.44 1.50 0.96 0.68
SigInf 0.129 0.116 0.113 0.088 0.063 0.174 0.174 0.150 0.153 0.114
t-stat 1.37 1.21 1.15 1.09 0.81 2.45 2.26 2.08 1.99 1.45
adj. R2 0.55 0.54 0.48 0.56 0.53 0.52 0.47 0.46 0.42 0.38
N 132 132 132 132 132 438 438 438 438 438
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Table IA.22: Inflation Disagreement and Nominal Yield Volatilities II. The table
reports results from OLS regressions of the one-, to five-year nominal yield volatility on
disagreement about inflation (DisInf), expected inflation (ExpInf), the volatility of inflation
(SigInf), and the volatility of consumption growth (SigC). The t-statistics (t-stat) are Newey-
West corrected with 12 lags and regression coe cients are standardized. ExpInf and SigInf
are annualized predictors of the mean and volatility of inflation over the corresponding yield
maturity horizon using a GARCH(1,1) model with an ARMA(1,1) mean equation. SigC is
the annualized predictor of the volatility of consumption growth over the corresponding yield
maturity horizon using a GARCH(1,1) model with an ARMA(1,1) mean equation. Data are
available at the quarterly frequency from Q3-1981 to Q2-2014.
Survey of Professional Forecasters Surveys of Consumers
Maturity 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y
DisInf 0.47 0.49 0.45 0.56 0.53 0.41 0.39 0.35 0.39 0.38
t-stat 4.20 4.16 4.49 5.32 6.02 2.92 2.70 2.69 2.38 2.32
SigC 0.37 0.33 0.35 0.29 0.32 0.27 0.26 0.29 0.25 0.28
t-stat 2.82 2.40 2.28 2.10 2.23 2.15 1.88 1.95 1.69 1.83
ExpInf 0.25 0.23 0.22 0.17 0.17 0.25 0.23 0.22 0.16 0.15
t-stat 3.80 3.60 3.18 2.78 2.95 3.04 2.95 2.72 1.84 1.70
SigInf 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.06 0.12 0.11 0.07 0.11 0.06
t-stat 0.14 0.06 -0.20 -0.28 -0.92 1.22 0.96 0.63 0.85 0.47
adj. R2 0.65 0.61 0.56 0.61 0.60 0.57 0.51 0.48 0.44 0.44
N 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132
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Table IA.23: Inflation Disagreement and Nominal Yield Volatilities III. The table
reports results from OLS regressions of the one-, to five-year nominal yield volatility on
MSC disagreement about inflation (DisInf), expected inflation (ExpInf), the volatility of
inflation (SigInf), and the volatility of industrial production growth (SigIP). The t-statistics
(t-stat) are Newey-West corrected with 12 lags and regression coe cients are standardized.
ExpInf and SigInf are annualized predictors of the mean and volatility of inflation over
the corresponding yield maturity horizon using a GARCH(1,1) model with an ARMA(1,1)
mean equation. SigIP is the annualized predictor of the volatility of industrial production
growth over the corresponding yield maturity horizon using a GARCH(1,1) model with an
ARMA(1,1) mean equation. Data are available at the monthly frequency from January 1978
to June 2014.
Maturity 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y
DisInf 0.45 0.44 0.41 0.48 0.49
t-stat 4.45 4.10 4.03 3.73 3.70
SigIP 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.15
t-stat 1.73 1.73 1.74 1.45 1.30
ExpInf 0.28 0.25 0.27 0.15 0.11
t-stat 1.60 1.43 1.49 0.90 0.62
SigInf 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.03
t-stat 1.43 1.16 0.86 0.84 0.45
adj. R2 0.54 0.49 0.48 0.44 0.39
N 438 438 438 438 438
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Table IA.24: Inflation Disagreement and Nominal Yield Volatilities IV. The table
reports results from OLS regressions of the one-, to five-year nominal yield volatility on
disagreement about inflation (DisInf), expected inflation (ExpInf), the volatility of inflation
(SigInf), and the volatility of GDP growth (SigGDP). The t-statistics (t-stat) are Newey-
West corrected with 12 lags and regression coe cients are standardized. ExpInf and SigInf
are annualized predictors of the mean and volatility of inflation over the corresponding yield
maturity horizon using a GARCH(1,1) model with an ARMA(1,1) mean equation. SigGDP
is the annualized predictor of the volatility of GDP growth over the corresponding yield
maturity horizon using a GARCH(1,1) model with an ARMA(1,1) mean equation. Data are
available at the quarterly frequency from Q3-1981 to Q2-2014.
Survey of Professional Forecasters Surveys of Consumers
Maturity 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y
DisInf 0.33 0.36 0.36 0.45 0.45 0.33 0.34 0.36 0.32 0.33
t-stat 3.95 3.95 3.73 4.56 3.93 3.23 2.96 2.67 2.30 2.23
SigGDP 0.45 0.41 0.36 0.34 0.33 0.51 0.49 0.44 0.50 0.48
t-stat 3.22 2.51 2.01 2.03 1.76 3.45 3.17 2.83 3.10 2.93
ExpInf 0.27 0.26 0.25 0.20 0.19 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.19 0.17
t-stat 3.71 3.30 2.87 2.65 2.67 4.28 4.17 3.65 3.31 2.93
SigInf -0.02 -0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.04 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.00 -0.02
t-stat -0.36 -0.05 0.09 -0.28 -0.57 0.10 0.36 0.40 0.04 -0.28
adj. R2 0.63 0.62 0.56 0.62 0.57 0.65 0.63 0.58 0.59 0.55
N 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132
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Table IA.25: Inflation Disagreement and Nominal Yield Volatilities V. The table
reports results from OLS regressions of the one-, to five-year nominal yield volatility on
disagreement about inflation (DisInf), expected inflation (ExpInf), the volatility of inflation
(SigInf), expected consumption growth (ExpC), and the volatility of consumption growth
(SigC). The t-statistics (t-stat) are Newey-West corrected with 12 lags and regression co-
e cients are standardized. ExpInf and SigInf are annualized predictors of the mean and
volatility of inflation over the corresponding yield maturity horizon using a GARCH(1,1)
model with an ARMA(1,1) mean equation. ExpC and SigC are annualized predictors of the
mean and volatility of consumption growth over the corresponding yield maturity horizon
using a GARCH(1,1) model with an ARMA(1,1) mean equation. Data are available at the
quarterly frequency from Q3-1981 to Q2-2014.
Survey of Professional Forecasters Surveys of Consumers
Maturity 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y
DisInf 0.44 0.47 0.42 0.53 0.50 0.40 0.38 0.34 0.38 0.36
t-stat 4.10 3.98 4.28 5.09 5.61 3.40 3.02 3.00 2.66 2.58
ExpC 0.21 0.20 0.23 0.23 0.26 0.24 0.22 0.25 0.27 0.29
t-stat 2.42 2.29 2.44 3.19 3.53 2.79 2.51 2.49 3.10 3.32
SigC 0.39 0.35 0.37 0.32 0.35 0.30 0.29 0.32 0.29 0.32
t-stat 2.95 2.43 2.49 2.29 2.51 1.53 1.66 1.65 1.49 1.26
ExpInf 0.28 0.26 0.26 0.21 0.21 0.28 0.26 0.26 0.20 0.20
t-stat 3.94 3.61 3.34 3.08 3.32 3.31 3.05 2.91 2.10 2.04
SigInf 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.22 0.21 0.17 0.22 0.19
t-stat 1.18 1.01 1.04 1.11 0.90 1.79 1.42 1.23 1.42 1.20
adj. R2 0.68 0.64 0.60 0.65 0.64 0.61 0.54 0.52 0.50 0.51
N 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132
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Table IA.26: Inflation Disagreement and Nominal Yield Volatilities VI. The table
reports results from OLS regressions of the one-, to five-year nominal yield volatility on
disagreement about inflation (DisInf), expected inflation (ExpInf), the volatility of inflation
(SigInf), the volatility of consumption growth (SigC), and the CME Volatility Index VXO.
The t-statistics (t-stat) are Newey-West corrected with 12 lags and regression coe cients
are standardized. ExpInf and SigInf are annualized predictors of the mean and volatility
of inflation over the corresponding yield maturity horizon using a GARCH(1,1) model with
an ARMA(1,1) mean equation. The VXO volatility index is based on trading of S&P 100
(OEX) options. Data are available at the quarterly frequency from Q2-1986 to Q2-2014.
Survey of Professional Forecasters Surveys of Consumers
Maturity 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y
DisInf 0.11 0.15 0.15 0.27 0.30 0.39 0.36 0.31 0.28 0.27
t-stat 0.65 0.94 1.04 2.19 2.45 3.72 3.12 2.20 1.88 1.74
VXO 0.33 0.34 0.30 0.32 0.31 0.34 0.35 0.31 0.33 0.31
t-stat 2.15 2.21 1.87 2.17 2.09 3.24 3.36 2.59 2.75 2.53
ExpInf 0.42 0.41 0.37 0.31 0.29 0.31 0.33 0.30 0.27 0.26
t-stat 3.00 2.69 2.39 2.27 2.33 2.96 2.96 2.72 2.58 2.57
SigInf 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.10 0.03 0.14 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.13
t-stat 0.77 0.82 0.88 0.74 0.23 1.23 1.55 1.75 1.90 1.31
adj. R2 0.21 0.24 0.19 0.23 0.22 0.35 0.33 0.26 0.24 0.20
N 113 113 113 113 113 113 113 113 113 113
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Table IA.27: Inflation Disagreement and Real Yield Volatilities I. The table reports
results from OLS regressions of the two, three, five, seven, and ten-year real yield volatility
on disagreement about inflation (DisInf), expected inflation (ExpInf), and the volatility of
inflation (SigInf). The t-statistics (t-stat) are Newey-West corrected with 12 lags and regres-
sion coe cients are standardized. ExpInf and SigInf are annualized predictors of the mean
and volatility of inflation over the corresponding yield maturity horizon using a GARCH(1,1)
model with an ARMA(1,1) mean equation. Data are available at the quarterly frequency
from Q3-1981 to Q2-2014.
Survey of Professional Forecasters Surveys of Consumers
Maturity 2y 3y 5y 7y 10y 2y 3y 5y 7y 10y
DisInf 0.523 0.560 0.624 0.700 0.749 0.332 0.387 0.420 0.447 0.471
t-stat 8.13 8.76 8.61 9.32 9.52 1.97 2.16 2.15 2.04 1.97
ExpInf 0.018 0.065 0.081 0.055 0.025 0.074 0.110 0.137 0.129 0.108
t-stat 0.20 0.75 0.94 0.60 0.25 0.61 0.96 1.20 1.02 0.80
SigInf 0.238 0.228 0.183 0.114 0.016 0.391 0.380 0.351 0.305 0.219
t-stat 2.17 2.08 1.84 1.40 0.22 2.87 2.87 2.66 2.19 1.51
adj. R2 0.40 0.44 0.50 0.56 0.57 0.28 0.32 0.34 0.33 0.31
N 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132
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Table IA.28: Inflation Disagreement and Real Yield Volatilities II. The table reports
results from OLS regressions of the two, three, five, seven, and ten-year real yield volatility on
disagreement about inflation (DisInf), expected inflation (ExpInf), the volatility of inflation
(SigInf), and consumption growth volatility (SigC). The t-statistics (t-stat) are Newey-West
corrected with 12 lags and regression coe cients are standardized. ExpInf and SigInf are
annualized predictors of the mean and volatility of inflation over the corresponding yield
maturity horizon using a GARCH(1,1) model with an ARMA(1,1) mean equation. SigC is
the annualized predictor of the volatility of consumption growth over the corresponding yield
maturity horizon using a GARCH(1,1) model with an ARMA(1,1) mean equation. Data are
available at the quarterly frequency from Q3-1981 to Q2-2014.
Survey of Professional Forecasters Surveys of Consumers
Maturity 2y 3y 5y 7y 10y 2y 3y 5y 7y 10y
DisInf 0.45 0.47 0.54 0.63 0.69 0.17 0.22 0.26 0.31 0.36
t-stat 6.24 7.14 8.02 9.75 10.17 1.45 1.84 2.05 2.02 1.97
SigC 0.23 0.27 0.25 0.21 0.17 0.27 0.29 0.28 0.24 0.19
t-stat 1.56 1.72 1.70 1.55 1.36 1.54 1.64 1.60 1.42 1.16
ExpInf 0.00 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.09 0.12 0.15 0.14 0.11
t-stat -0.04 0.53 0.76 0.40 0.07 0.82 1.24 1.46 1.18 0.88
SigInf 0.16 0.14 0.10 0.04 -0.04 0.30 0.28 0.26 0.22 0.15
t-stat 1.63 1.47 1.13 0.50 -0.62 2.14 2.05 1.86 1.54 1.06
adj. R2 0.43 0.49 0.54 0.58 0.58 0.31 0.36 0.38 0.36 0.32
N 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132
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Table IA.29: Inflation Disagreement and Real Yield Volatilities III. The table re-
ports results from OLS regressions of the two, three, five, seven, and ten-year real yield
volatility on disagreement about inflation (DisInf), expected inflation (ExpInf), the volatil-
ity of inflation (SigInf), and GDP growth volatility (SigGDP). The t-statistics (t-stat) are
Newey-West corrected with 12 lags and regression coe cients are standardized. ExpInf and
SigInf are annualized predictors of the mean and volatility of inflation over the correspond-
ing yield maturity horizon using a GARCH(1,1) model with an ARMA(1,1) mean equation.
SigGDP is the annualized predictor of the volatility of consumption growth over the cor-
responding yield maturity horizon using a GARCH(1,1) model with an ARMA(1,1) mean
equation. Data are available at the quarterly frequency from Q3-1981 to Q2-2014.
Survey of Professional Forecasters Surveys of Consumers
Maturity 2y 3y 5y 7y 10y 2y 3y 5y 7y 10y
DisInf 0.15 0.18 0.25 0.29 0.36 0.04 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.14
t-stat 1.05 1.36 2.03 2.52 3.22 0.42 0.96 1.19 1.02 1.08
SigGDP 0.62 0.64 0.63 0.63 0.61 0.70 0.72 0.74 0.77 0.80
t-stat 3.69 3.97 4.13 4.13 3.74 5.34 6.28 6.68 6.30 5.53
ExpInf 0.00 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.04
t-stat 0.05 0.78 1.19 0.68 0.14 0.31 0.68 1.08 0.98 0.51
SigInf 0.04 0.02 -0.02 -0.07 -0.17 0.05 0.03 -0.01 -0.06 -0.16
t-stat 0.61 0.30 -0.38 -1.13 -1.97 0.66 0.41 -0.12 -0.71 -1.41
adj. R2 0.57 0.62 0.67 0.69 0.72 0.56 0.61 0.65 0.66 0.67
N 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132
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Table IA.30: Inflation Disagreement and Real Yield Volatilities IV. The table re-
ports results from OLS regressions of the two, three, five, seven, and ten-year real yield
volatility on disagreement about inflation (DisInf), expected inflation (ExpInf), the volatil-
ity of inflation (SigInf), expected consumption growth (ExpC), and consumption growth
volatility (SigC). The t-statistics (t-stat) are Newey-West corrected with 12 lags and regres-
sion coe cients are standardized. ExpInf and SigInf are annualized predictors of the mean
and volatility of inflation over the corresponding yield maturity horizon using a GARCH(1,1)
model with an ARMA(1,1) mean equation. ExpC and SigC are annualized predictors of the
mean and volatility of consumption growth over the corresponding yield maturity horizon
using a GARCH(1,1) model with an ARMA(1,1) mean equation. Data are available at the
quarterly frequency from Q3-1981 to Q2-2014.
Survey of Professional Forecasters Surveys of Consumers
Maturity 2y 3y 5y 7y 10y 2y 3y 5y 7y 10y
DisInf 0.47 0.49 0.55 0.63 0.68 0.18 0.22 0.26 0.31 0.36
t-stat 6.81 7.71 8.43 9.86 9.90 1.48 1.85 2.07 2.08 2.07
ExpC -0.21 -0.14 -0.07 -0.01 0.08 -0.16 -0.08 -0.01 0.06 0.14
t-stat -1.28 -0.96 -0.59 -0.06 0.86 -0.77 -0.45 -0.07 0.36 0.94
SigC 0.21 0.25 0.24 0.21 0.17 0.26 0.29 0.28 0.24 0.20
t-stat 1.40 1.62 1.66 1.55 1.39 1.53 1.66 1.65 1.49 1.26
ExpInf -0.03 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.11 0.15 0.14 0.13
t-stat -0.5 0.31 0.67 0.38 0.18 0.74 1.21 1.42 1.15 0.92
SigInf 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.04 -0 0.22 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.22
t-stat 0.35 0.52 0.54 0.35 -0 1.1 1.22 1.3 1.26 1.17
adj. R2 0.46 0.5 0.54 0.58 0.59 0.33 0.36 0.37 0.36 0.33
N 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132
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Table IA.31: Inflation Disagreement and Real Yield Volatilities V. The table reports
results from OLS regressions of the two, three, five, seven, and ten-year real yield volatility
on disagreement about inflation (DisInf), expected inflation (ExpInf), the volatility of infla-
tion (SigInf), and the CME Volatility Index VXO. The t-statistics (t-stat) are Newey-West
corrected with 12 lags and regression coe cients are standardized. ExpInf and SigInf are
annualized predictors of the mean and volatility of inflation over the corresponding yield ma-
turity horizon using a GARCH(1,1) model with an ARMA(1,1) mean equation. The VXO
volatility index is based on trading of S&P 100 (OEX) options. Data are available at the
quarterly frequency from Q2-1986 to Q2-2014.
Survey of Professional Forecasters Surveys of Consumers
Maturity 2y 3y 5y 7y 10y 2y 3y 5y 7y 10y
DisInf 0.35 0.33 0.32 0.31 0.33 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.02
t-stat 2.26 2.26 2.45 2.77 3.02 0.74 1.05 1.00 0.52 0.15
VXO 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.02 -0.10 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.00 -0.11
t-stat 0.79 0.67 0.45 0.10 -0.57 0.67 0.62 0.40 0.03 -0.63
ExpInf -0.07 -0.04 -0.04 -0.10 -0.18 -0.02 -0.00 -0.01 -0.05 -0.11
t-stat -0.75 -0.43 -0.46 -0.89 -1.26 -0.13 -0.00 -0.05 -0.36 -0.76
SigInf 0.19 0.22 0.21 0.17 0.07 0.36 0.37 0.35 0.31 0.22
t-stat 1.63 1.64 1.56 1.36 0.60 2.23 2.14 2.06 1.81 1.32
adj. R2 0.24 0.23 0.21 0.17 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.13 0.09 0.05
N 113 113 113 113 113 113 113 113 113 113
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Table IA.34: Real Yields = Nominal Yields - Expected Inflation from ARMA(1,1).
The table reports results from OLS regressions of real yields on disagreement about inflation
(DisInf). Real yields are computed from nominal yields by subtracting expected inflation pre-
dicted by an ARMA(1,1). ExpInf is predicted by a GARCH(1, 1) model with an ARMA(1, 1)
mean equation over multiple horizons (T). The t-statistics (t-stat) are Newey-West corrected
with 12 lags. Regression coe cients are standardized. Samples: Q3-1981 to Q2-2014 and
January 1978 to June 2014.
SPF MSC
1y 2y 3y 4y 5y 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y
DisInf 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.47 0.48 0.45 0.50 0.53 0.56 0.59
t-stat 3.59 3.59 3.66 3.74 3.89 2.82 3.25 3.50 3.79 4.12
adj. R2 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.20 0.25 0.28 0.32 0.35
N 132 132 132 132 132 438 438 438 438 438
DisInf 0.41 0.42 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.66 0.70 0.72 0.74 0.76
t-stat 3.51 3.50 3.51 3.58 3.63 4.16 4.55 4.86 5.17 5.42
ExpInf 0.19 0.22 0.26 0.29 0.31 -0.30 -0.27 -0.26 -0.25 -0.23
t-stat 1.21 1.40 1.69 1.90 2.08 -2.08 -1.94 -1.88 -1.77 -1.64
SigInf -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.08 -0.12 -0.13 -0.15 -0.15
t-stat -0.24 -0.40 -0.42 -0.46 -0.47 -0.86 -1.31 -1.55 -1.88 -1.97
adj. R2 0.23 0.25 0.28 0.30 0.32 0.24 0.29 0.32 0.35 0.38
N 132 132 132 132 132 438 438 438 438 438
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Table IA.35: Real Yields = Nominal Yields - Expected Inflation from VAR. The
table reports results from OLS regressions of real yields on disagreement about inflation (Dis-
Inf) in the top panel and disagreement about inflation (DisInf), expected inflation (ExpInf)
and the volatility of inflation (SigInf). Real yields are computed from nominal yields by sub-
tracting expected inflation (ExpInf). ExpInf is predicted by regressing realized inflation over
the bond maturity horizon on lagged monthly inflation and yields with maturity 1-5 years.
The volatility of inflation is calculated by regressing the squared residuals from the first
regression onto lagged squared residuals and yields with maturity 1-5 years. The t-statistics
(t-stat) are Newey-West corrected with 12 lags. Regression coe cients are standardized.
Samples: Q3-1981 to Q2-2014 and January 1978 to June 2014.
SPF MSC
1y 2y 3y 4y 5y 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y
DisInf 0.38 0.40 0.45 0.49 0.52 0.51 0.55 0.57 0.58 0.59
t-stat 2.79 2.98 3.74 4.58 5.68 3.49 3.93 4.13 4.22 4.23
adj. R2 0.14 0.15 0.19 0.23 0.27 0.26 0.30 0.32 0.33 0.35
N 128 124 120 116 112 426 414 402 390 378
DisInf 0.21 0.22 0.25 0.33 0.39 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.47 0.51
t-stat 1.37 1.52 1.86 2.75 3.90 3.59 3.65 3.54 3.51 3.85
ExpInf 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.32 0.27 0.13 0.17 0.19 0.16 0.09
t-stat 2.78 2.76 2.82 2.91 2.77 1.13 1.48 1.66 1.41 0.83
SigInf 0.03 0.09 0.12 0.04 0.01 -0.10 -0.09 -0.07 -0.01 0.06
t-stat 0.32 1.01 1.40 0.58 0.18 -1.05 -1.19 -0.95 -0.07 0.60
adj. R2 0.24 0.28 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.27 0.31 0.34 0.34 0.35
N 128 124 120 116 112 426 414 402 390 378
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Table IA.36: Cross-Sectional Variance as a Measure of Inflation Disagreement.
The table reports results from OLS regressions of real and nominal yields and their volatilities
on disagreement about inflation (DisInf) and expected inflation (ExpInf). The t-statistics
(t-stat) are Newey-West corrected with 12 lags. Regression coe cients are standardized.
Disagreement about inflation is the cross-sectional variance of one year ahead inflation fore-
casts (DisInf). ExpInf is predicted by a GARCH(1, 1) model with an ARMA(1, 1) mean
equation over multiple horizons (T). Samples: Q3-1981 to Q2-2014 and January 1978 to
June 2014.
VARIANCE SPF VARIANCE MSC
2y 3y 5y 7y 10y 2y 3y 5y 7y 10y
Real Yields
DisInf 0.40 0.39 0.38 0.38 0.37 0.57 0.58 0.59 0.59 0.60
t-stat 4.70 4.63 4.58 4.51 4.44 3.50 3.64 3.75 3.84 3.93
adj. R2 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.31 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.35
N 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132
Real Yield Volatilities
DisInf 0.52 0.58 0.66 0.71 0.73 0.42 0.49 0.54 0.57 0.57
t-stat 7.30 9.48 13.14 14.92 13.83 2.15 2.36 2.33 2.21 2.15
adj. R2 0.27 0.33 0.43 0.50 0.52 0.17 0.24 0.29 0.31 0.33
N 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132
1y 2y 3y 4y 5y 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y
Nominal Yields
DisInf 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.46 0.50 0.53 0.55 0.57
t-stat 5.95 5.79 5.86 5.89 5.63 3.89 4.12 4.23 4.37 4.59
ExpInf 0.46 0.45 0.44 0.44 0.43 0.34 0.28 0.23 0.20 0.18
t-stat 3.86 3.86 3.77 3.76 3.69 3.40 2.65 2.08 1.74 1.54
adj. R2 0.41 0.40 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.56 0.54 0.52 0.51 0.51
N 132 132 132 132 132 438 438 438 438 438
Nominal Yield Volatilities
DisInf 0.65 0.66 0.60 0.68 0.64 0.59 0.58 0.56 0.62 0.60
t-stat 13.88 14.02 13.10 14.73 12.73 4.57 4.35 4.54 4.16 4.06
ExpInf 0.23 0.21 0.21 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.12 0.15 0.03 0.01
t-stat 2.38 2.39 2.16 1.87 2.08 0.95 0.75 0.89 0.20 0.07
adj. R2 0.54 0.54 0.46 0.54 0.50 0.50 0.46 0.46 0.41 0.37
N 132 132 132 132 132 438 438 438 438 438
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Table IA.37: Interquartile Range as a Measure of Inflation Disagreement. The
table reports results from OLS regressions of real and nominal yields and their volatilities
on disagreement about inflation (DisInf) and expected inflation (ExpInf). The t-statistics
(t-stat) are Newey-West corrected with 12 lags. Regression coe cients are standardized.
Disagreement about inflation is the interquartile range (IQR) of one year ahead inflation
forecasts (DisInf) computed from the 75th percentile minus the 25th percentile of inflation
forecasts. ExpInf is predicted by a GARCH(1, 1) model with an ARMA(1, 1) mean equation
over multiple horizons (T). Samples: Q3-1981 to Q2-2014 and January 1978 to June 2014.
IQR — SPF IQR — MSC
2y 3y 5y 7y 10y 2y 3y 5y 7y 10y
Real Yields
DisInf 0.30 0.30 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.40 0.41 0.43 0.44 0.45
t-stat 1.63 1.60 1.69 1.72 1.76 2.53 2.66 2.90 3.05 3.17
adj. R2 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.19
N 132 132 132 132 132 129 129 129 129 129
Real Yield Volatilities
DisInf 0.51 0.53 0.55 0.58 0.59 0.65 0.71 0.76 0.81 0.82
t-stat 4.18 3.71 3.29 3.10 2.84 9.40 10.31 9.46 8.74 7.22
adj. R2 0.25 0.27 0.30 0.33 0.35 0.42 0.50 0.57 0.65 0.67
N 132 132 132 132 132 129 129 129 129 129
1y 2y 3y 4y 5y 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y
Nominal Yields
DisInf 0.24 0.26 0.28 0.28 0.31 0.46 0.50 0.53 0.55 0.57
t-stat 1.54 1.60 1.68 1.75 1.85 3.89 4.12 4.23 4.37 4.59
ExpInf 0.51 0.50 0.49 0.48 0.47 0.34 0.28 0.23 0.20 0.18
t-stat 4.04 4.11 4.06 4.05 4.09 3.40 2.65 2.08 1.74 1.54
adj. R2 0.35 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.56 0.54 0.52 0.51 0.51
N 132 132 132 132 132 438 438 438 438 438
Nominal Yield Volatilities
DisInf 0.50 0.52 0.53 0.58 0.58 0.59 0.58 0.56 0.62 0.60
t-stat 2.68 2.90 3.47 3.64 3.89 4.57 4.35 4.54 4.16 4.06
ExpInf 0.31 0.29 0.28 0.24 0.25 0.16 0.12 0.15 0.03 0.01
t-stat 2.30 2.32 2.27 2.01 2.20 0.95 0.75 0.89 0.20 0.07
adj. R2 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.43 0.43 0.50 0.46 0.46 0.41 0.37
N 132 132 132 132 132 438 438 438 438 438
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Table IA.38: Normalized Inflation Disagreement and Nominal Yields. The table re-
ports results from OLS regressions of nominal yields on disagreement about inflation scaled
by the volatility of inflation (NormDisInf), and expected inflation (ExpInf), and the volatil-
ity of inflation (SigInf). The t-statistics (t-stat) are Newey-West corrected with 12 lags.
Regression coe cients are standardized. ExpInf and SigInf are predicted by a GARCH(1, 1)
model with an ARMA(1, 1) mean equation over multiple horizons (T). Samples: Q3-1981 to
Q2-2014 and January 1978 to June 2014.
Survey of Professional Forecasters Surveys of Consumers
Maturity 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y
NormDisInf 0.309 0.326 0.337 0.346 0.366 0.309 0.355 0.383 0.409 0.421
t-stat 2.759 2.839 2.915 3.047 3.164 3.296 3.763 4.089 4.390 4.530
ExpInf 0.430 0.414 0.399 0.394 0.379 0.511 0.457 0.417 0.389 0.375
t-stat 2.876 2.820 2.716 2.680 2.592 4.853 4.251 3.748 3.429 3.271
adj. R2 0.370 0.369 0.364 0.367 0.371 0.527 0.511 0.493 0.491 0.489
N 132 132 132 132 132 438 438 438 438 438
NormDisInf 0.320 0.336 0.347 0.355 0.375 0.421 0.457 0.482 0.502 0.516
t-stat 2.973 3.036 3.120 3.252 3.389 3.737 4.079 4.354 4.588 4.784
ExpInf 0.488 0.469 0.456 0.450 0.438 0.477 0.430 0.393 0.368 0.355
t-stat 3.425 3.298 3.176 3.112 3.091 4.701 4.074 3.574 3.257 3.114
SigInf 0.170 0.157 0.156 0.152 0.156 0.192 0.183 0.182 0.174 0.181
t-stat 1.534 1.450 1.455 1.431 1.527 1.935 1.802 1.760 1.687 1.802
adj. R2 0.390 0.386 0.380 0.381 0.387 0.554 0.535 0.518 0.513 0.514
N 132 132 132 132 132 438 438 438 438 438
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Table IA.39: Normalized Inflation Disagreement and Real Yields. The table reports
results from OLS regressions of real yields on disagreement about inflation scaled by the
volatility of inflation (NormDisInf), expected inflation (ExpInf), and the volatility of infla-
tion (SigInf). The t-statistics (t-stat) are Newey-West corrected with 12 lags. Regression
coe cients are standardized. ExpInf and SigInf are predicted by a GARCH(1, 1) model with
an ARMA(1, 1) mean equation over multiple horizons (T). Sample: Q3-1981 to Q2-2014.
Survey of Professional Forecasters Surveys of Consumers
Maturity 2y 3y 5y 7y 10y 2y 3y 5y 7y 10y
NormDisInf 0.369 0.376 0.378 0.383 0.389 0.384 0.416 0.436 0.454 0.473
t-stat 2.655 2.771 2.814 2.917 3.056 2.139 2.371 2.565 2.701 2.852
adj. R2 0.130 0.135 0.136 0.140 0.144 0.141 0.166 0.184 0.200 0.218
N 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132
NormDisInf 0.278 0.279 0.280 0.285 0.292 0.433 0.453 0.464 0.478 0.492
t-stat 2.039 2.034 2.017 2.083 2.167 2.084 2.257 2.438 2.570 2.699
ExpInf 0.373 0.380 0.379 0.371 0.362 0.362 0.364 0.360 0.350 0.340
t-stat 2.407 2.384 2.241 2.160 2.081 2.636 2.664 2.563 2.486 2.392
SigInf 0.254 0.233 0.217 0.205 0.189 0.402 0.384 0.368 0.356 0.341
t-stat 2.077 1.926 1.816 1.722 1.585 2.599 2.523 2.429 2.386 2.315
adj. R2 0.245 0.247 0.244 0.240 0.236 0.316 0.332 0.337 0.341 0.347
N 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132
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Table IA.40: Normalized Inflation Disagreement and Real and Nominal Yield
Volatilities. The table reports results from OLS regressions of real and nominal yield
volatilities on disagreement about inflation scaled by the volatility of inflation (NormDisInf),
expected inflation (ExpInf), and the volatility of inflation (SigInf). The t-statistics (t-stat)
are Newey-West corrected with 12 lags. Regression coe cients are standardized. ExpInf
and SigInf are predicted by a GARCH(1, 1) model with an ARMA(1, 1) mean equation over
multiple horizons (T). Samples: Q3-1981 to Q2-2014 and January 1978 to June 2014.
Survey of Professional Forecasters Surveys of Consumers
Real Yield Volatilities
Maturity 2y 3y 5y 7y 10y 2y 3y 5y 7y 10y
NormDisInf 0.384 0.412 0.469 0.521 0.564 0.093 0.139 0.169 0.164 0.161
t-stat 4.326 3.980 3.861 4.177 4.474 0.556 0.883 1.089 1.000 0.924
ExpInf 0.104 0.158 0.180 0.163 0.140 0.215 0.267 0.301 0.303 0.295
t-stat 0.850 1.256 1.295 1.091 0.894 1.308 1.528 1.476 1.332 1.215
SigInf 0.522 0.530 0.518 0.476 0.399 0.534 0.556 0.549 0.500 0.418
t-stat 4.052 3.878 3.445 2.961 2.362 3.032 2.973 2.655 2.217 1.752
adj. R2 0.329 0.363 0.401 0.414 0.405 0.206 0.228 0.230 0.196 0.146
N 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132
Nominal Yield Volatilities
Maturity 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y
NormDisInf 0.458 0.471 0.476 0.538 0.537 0.312 0.278 0.275 0.292 0.290
t-stat 3.842 4.001 4.655 5.090 5.737 3.842 3.326 3.133 2.838 2.695
ExpInf 0.379 0.366 0.351 0.309 0.306 0.470 0.456 0.470 0.384 0.342
t-stat 2.728 2.661 2.579 2.460 2.520 2.550 2.470 2.428 2.169 1.863
SigInf 0.443 0.441 0.419 0.422 0.391 0.379 0.367 0.338 0.349 0.311
t-stat 2.732 2.705 2.937 2.964 2.912 3.538 3.268 3.382 2.971 2.613
adj. R2 0.467 0.465 0.445 0.481 0.463 0.453 0.406 0.408 0.331 0.281
N 132 132 132 132 132 438 438 438 438 438
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Table IA.41: First Principal Component. The table reports results from OLS regres-
sions of real and nominal yields and their volatilities on the first principal component of
the SPF and MSC based disagreement about inflation (DisInf). ExpInf is predicted by a
GARCH(1, 1) model with an ARMA(1, 1) mean equation over multiple horizons (T). The
t-statistics (t-stat) are Newey-West corrected with 12 lags. Regression coe cients are stan-
dardized. Sample: Q3-1981 to Q2-2014.
Real Yields Nominal Yields
2y 3y 5y 7y 10y 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y
DisInf 0.39 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.48 0.50 0.52 0.53 0.54
t-stat 3.25 3.42 3.67 3.83 3.98 5.61 6.05 6.42 6.82 6.95
ExpInf 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.30 0.27 0.24 0.23 0.21
t-stat 1.67 1.64 1.51 1.40 1.30 2.84 2.56 2.33 2.23 2.08
SigInf 0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.11 -0.13 -0.14 -0.15 -0.16
t-stat 0.23 -0.01 -0.18 -0.33 -0.50 -1.58 -1.99 -2.13 -2.28 -2.32
adj. R2 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.54 0.55 0.56 0.57 0.57
N 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132
Real Yield Volatilities Nominal Yield Volatilities
2y 3y 5y 7y 10y 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y
DisInf 0.46 0.50 0.56 0.60 0.63 0.61 0.61 0.59 0.63 0.62
t-stat 5.71 5.50 4.94 4.68 4.53 5.63 5.24 5.64 5.55 5.99
ExpInf -0.05 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 -0.08 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.09 0.08
t-stat -0.56 -0.23 -0.22 -0.56 -0.84 2.37 2.40 2.10 1.50 1.48
SigInf 0.25 0.23 0.19 0.12 0.03 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.02
t-stat 2.53 2.54 2.35 1.68 0.33 1.60 1.53 1.36 0.90 0.42
adj. R2 0.42 0.48 0.54 0.56 0.55 0.68 0.66 0.61 0.65 0.62
N 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132
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Table IA.42: Disagreement about GDP Growth and Nominal Yields. The table
reports results from OLS regressions of nominal yields and nominal yield volatilities on
disagreement about inflation (DisInf), disagreement about GDP growth (DisGDP), expected
inflation (ExpInf), expected GDP growth (muGDPgr), and the volatility of GDP growth
(SigGDPgr). The t-statistics (t-stat) are Newey-West corrected with 12 lags. Regression
coe cients are standardized. Sample: Q3-1981 to Q2-2014.
Nominal Yields
Survey of Professionals Surveys of Consumers
Maturity 2y 3y 5y 7y 10y 2y 3y 5y 7y 10y
DisInf 0.308 0.299 0.298 0.295 0.301 0.572 0.590 0.603 0.617 0.621
t-stat 2.16 2.09 2.08 2.08 2.16 3.75 4.06 4.32 4.58 4.79
DisGDP 0.300 0.317 0.326 0.332 0.341 0.223 0.228 0.231 0.230 0.240
t-stat 3.26 3.28 3.26 3.20 3.21 3.37 3.57 3.63 3.63 3.69
adj. R2 0.27 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.48 0.50 0.53 0.54 0.56
N 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132
DisInf 0.327 0.321 0.319 0.317 0.323 0.537 0.562 0.582 0.599 0.607
t-stat 3.92 3.76 3.63 3.56 3.61 4.03 4.46 4.79 5.13 5.35
ExpInf 0.345 0.331 0.318 0.315 0.303 0.218 0.195 0.176 0.167 0.153
t-stat 2.89 2.84 2.75 2.73 2.68 2.87 2.86 2.74 2.76 2.64
DisGDP 0.200 0.220 0.233 0.240 0.251 0.186 0.194 0.200 0.200 0.212
t-stat 2.67 2.57 2.51 2.42 2.45 2.51 2.57 2.59 2.56 2.62
muGDPgr 0.296 0.299 0.293 0.292 0.289 0.321 0.329 0.326 0.329 0.326
t-stat 2.58 2.60 2.55 2.55 2.53 3.38 3.62 3.70 3.90 3.98
adj. R2 0.51 0.51 0.50 0.50 0.51 0.65 0.67 0.68 0.70 0.71
N 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132
Nominal Yield Volatilities
DisInf 0.584 0.583 0.528 0.585 0.549 0.562 0.522 0.494 0.456 0.451
t-stat 4.30 4.20 4.27 5.03 5.14 3.06 2.89 2.76 2.61 2.62
DisGDP 0.238 0.237 0.260 0.280 0.310 0.310 0.325 0.331 0.397 0.411
t-stat 2.21 1.95 2.04 2.08 2.23 2.19 2.15 2.45 2.43 2.63
adj. R2 0.54 0.53 0.48 0.59 0.57 0.55 0.51 0.48 0.51 0.52
N 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132
DisInf 0.316 0.349 0.321 0.376 0.356 0.353 0.319 0.318 0.259 0.271
t-stat 3.19 3.08 2.82 3.51 3.40 2.95 2.66 2.43 2.13 2.18
ExpInf 0.266 0.239 0.223 0.175 0.177 0.203 0.194 0.173 0.156 0.151
t-stat 4.53 4.12 3.19 3.05 3.14 4.65 4.16 3.69 3.39 3.34
DisGDP 0.212 0.213 0.236 0.268 0.295 0.237 0.255 0.270 0.331 0.350
t-stat 2.53 2.11 2.13 2.32 2.39 3.42 2.99 3.20 3.30 3.44
SigGDPgr 0.329 0.286 0.251 0.263 0.239 0.373 0.363 0.312 0.379 0.339
t-stat 2.32 2.11 1.81 2.20 1.86 2.61 2.53 2.40 2.92 2.70
adj. R2 0.62 0.60 0.53 0.63 0.61 0.66 0.61 0.55 0.61 0.60
N 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132
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Table IA.43: Disagreement about GDP Growth and Real Yields. The table re-
ports results from OLS regressions of real yields and real yield volatilities on disagreement
about inflation (DisInf), disagreement about GDP growth (DisGDP), expected GDP growth
(expGDP), and the volatility of GDP growth (SigGDP). The t-statistics (t-stat) are Newey-
West corrected with 12 lags. Regression coe cients are standardized. Sample: Q3-1981 to
Q2-2014.
Real Yields
Survey of Professionals Surveys of Consumers
Maturity 2y 3y 5y 7y 10y 2y 3y 5y 7y 10y
DisInf 0.287 0.268 0.245 0.234 0.221 0.486 0.500 0.503 0.508 0.513
t-stat 2.42 2.21 1.96 1.86 1.75 2.79 2.97 3.14 3.27 3.40
DisGDP 0.229 0.246 0.273 0.284 0.295 0.177 0.179 0.192 0.195 0.197
t-stat 2.32 2.38 2.39 2.38 2.38 2.15 2.29 2.58 2.64 2.68
adj. R2 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.33 0.35 0.36 0.37 0.38
N 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132
DisInf 0.358 0.341 0.320 0.308 0.296 0.521 0.536 0.540 0.546 0.551
t-stat 4.24 3.91 3.48 3.27 3.06 3.26 3.50 3.76 3.93 4.10
DisGDP 0.203 0.220 0.246 0.256 0.268 0.173 0.175 0.189 0.191 0.194
t-stat 2.12 2.17 2.17 2.15 2.14 1.81 1.90 2.07 2.10 2.12
expGDP 0.341 0.348 0.357 0.356 0.356 0.331 0.343 0.355 0.356 0.358
t-stat 3.23 3.30 3.34 3.30 3.29 3.09 3.30 3.50 3.57 3.68
adj. R2 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.43 0.46 0.48 0.49 0.50
N 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132
Real Yield Volatilities
DisInf 0.612 0.641 0.689 0.733 0.736 0.334 0.392 0.423 0.431 0.428
t-stat 6.60 6.89 6.63 6.72 6.55 1.92 2.14 2.15 2.03 1.94
DisGDP -0.014 0.013 0.020 0.025 0.045 0.168 0.186 0.206 0.231 0.253
t-stat -0.15 0.12 0.16 0.17 0.28 1.19 1.24 1.21 1.18 1.22
adj. R2 0.36 0.41 0.48 0.55 0.57 0.17 0.24 0.28 0.31 0.33
N 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132
DisInf 0.140 0.208 0.316 0.398 0.471 0.052 0.127 0.173 0.186 0.209
t-stat 1.04 1.75 2.93 3.96 4.64 0.64 1.53 1.82 1.71 1.62
DisGDP 0.054 0.075 0.074 0.073 0.083 0.089 0.112 0.136 0.162 0.191
t-stat 1.01 1.17 0.85 0.67 0.63 2.48 2.94 2.30 1.89 1.71
SigGDP 0.662 0.608 0.524 0.470 0.373 0.722 0.679 0.639 0.628 0.563
t-stat 4.40 4.95 5.20 4.08 2.32 7.89 9.63 7.54 4.77 2.99
adj. R2 0.60 0.62 0.63 0.67 0.65 0.59 0.61 0.61 0.63 0.58
N 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132
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Table IA.44: Earnings Disagreement. The table reports results from OLS regressions of
real and nominal yields on disagreement about inflation (DisInf) and market capitalization
weighted disagreement about corporate earnings growth (DisEar). The t-statistics (t-stat)
are Newey-West corrected with 12 lags. Regression coe cients are standardized. Sample:
Q1-1983 to Q4-2013.
Real Yields Nominal Yields
Survey of Professionals Surveys of Consumers
2y 3y 5y 7y 10y 2y 3y 5y 7y 10y
DisEar -0.136 -0.130 -0.091 -0.075 -0.065 -0.072 -0.054 -0.040 -0.020 0.003
t-stat -0.68 -0.65 -0.46 -0.39 -0.34 -0.50 -0.37 -0.27 -0.14 0.02
adj. R2 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 124 124 124 124 124 371 371 371 371 371
DisInf 0.459 0.439 0.395 0.378 0.364 0.551 0.579 0.600 0.618 0.632
t-stat 4.08 3.66 3.05 2.82 2.64 4.28 4.63 4.94 5.21 5.39
DisEar -0.386 -0.369 -0.306 -0.281 -0.264 -0.136 -0.122 -0.110 -0.092 -0.071
t-stat -2.47 -2.38 -2.10 -1.95 -1.85 -1.17 -1.07 -1.00 -0.86 -0.68
adj. R2 0.15 0.14 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.30 0.33 0.35 0.37 0.39
N 124 124 124 124 124 371 371 371 371 371
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Table IA.45: Real Consumption. The top table reports results from OLS regressions of
real yields on disagreement about inflation (DisInf) and real consumption growth volatility
(SigC). The bottom table reports results from OLS regressions of nominal yields on disagree-
ment about inflation, expected inflation (ExpInfl), and real consumption growth volatility.
The t-statistics (t-stat) are Newey-West corrected with 12 lags. Regression coe cients are
standardized. ExpInf is predicted by a GARCH(1, 1) model with an ARMA(1, 1) mean
equation over multiple horizons (T). SigC is also predicted by a GARCH(1, 1) model with
an ARMA(1, 1) mean equation. Sample: Q3-1981 to Q2-2014.
Survey of Professionals Surveys of Consumers
Real Yields
2y 3y 5y 7y 10y 2y 3y 5y 7y 10y
DisInf 0.28 0.26 0.24 0.22 0.20 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.50 0.50
t-stat 2.19 2.00 1.76 1.65 1.54 2.78 2.93 3.05 3.13 3.19
SigC 0.26 0.29 0.33 0.35 0.37 0.10 0.11 0.14 0.15 0.17
t-stat 1.53 1.60 1.68 1.75 1.83 0.80 0.84 0.98 1.06 1.11
R2 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.31 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.36
N 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132
Nominal Yields
1y 2y 3y 4y 5y 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y
DisInf 0.23 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.45 0.47 0.48 0.49 0.50
t-stat 2.08 1.97 1.91 1.87 1.95 2.81 3.02 3.17 3.33 3.43
ExpInf 0.48 0.47 0.46 0.46 0.45 0.40 0.38 0.36 0.35 0.33
t-stat 5.77 5.96 5.95 6.06 6.04 5.18 5.28 5.13 5.12 4.94
SigC 0.26 0.29 0.32 0.34 0.35 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.11
t-stat 2.14 2.40 2.60 2.80 2.90 0.37 0.51 0.66 0.77 0.87
R2 0.46 0.46 0.47 0.48 0.48 0.55 0.57 0.58 0.59 0.60
N 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132
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Table IA.46: Real GDP. The top table reports results from OLS regressions of real yields on
disagreement about inflation (DisInf) and real GDP growth volatility (SigGDP). The bottom
table reports results from OLS regressions of nominal yields on disagreement about infla-
tion, expected inflation (ExpInfl), and real GDP growth volatility. The t-statistics (t-stat)
are Newey-West corrected with 12 lags. Regression coe cients are standardized. ExpInf
is predicted by a GARCH(1, 1) model with an ARMA(1, 1) mean equation over multiple
horizons (T). SigGDP is also predicted by a GARCH(1, 1) model with an ARMA(1, 1) mean
equation. Sample: Q3-1981 to Q2-2014.
Survey of Professionals Surveys of Consumers
Real Yields
2y 3y 5y 7y 10y 2y 3y 5y 7y 10y
DisInf 0.41 0.40 0.39 0.38 0.37 0.55 0.57 0.58 0.59 0.60
t-stat 3.67 3.58 3.41 3.28 3.10 2.79 2.96 3.08 3.19 3.30
SigGDP 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01
t-stat 0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.04 0.07 0.23 0.08 0.01 -0.01 -0.04
R2 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.30 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.34
N 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132
Nominal Yields
1y 2y 3y 4y 5y 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y
DisInf 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.49 0.53 0.55 0.56 0.57
t-stat 2.41 2.32 2.23 2.09 2.11 2.83 3.14 3.35 3.59 3.74
ExpInf 0.52 0.51 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.39 0.36 0.34 0.33 0.32
t-stat 4.57 4.69 4.67 4.78 4.76 4.00 4.07 4.01 4.10 4.05
SigGDP 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.07 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01
t-stat -0.01 0.11 0.22 0.32 0.40 -0.20 -0.20 -0.16 -0.14 -0.05
R2 0.44 0.43 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.55 0.57 0.57 0.59 0.59
N 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132
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Table IA.47: Industrial Production. The top table reports results from OLS regressions
of real yields on disagreement about inflation (DisInf) and the volatility of industrial pro-
duction (SigIP). The bottom table reports results from OLS regressions of nominal yields
on disagreement about inflation, expected inflation (ExpInfl), and the volatility of IP. The
t-statistics (t-stat) are Newey-West corrected with 12 lags. Regression coe cients are stan-
dardized. ExpInf is predicted by a GARCH(1, 1) model with an ARMA(1, 1) mean equation
over multiple horizons (T). Sample: Q3-1981 to Q2-2014.
Survey of Professionals Surveys of Consumers
Real Yields
2y 3y 5y 7y 10y 2y 3y 5y 7y 10y
DisInf 0.40 0.39 0.39 0.38 0.38 0.55 0.57 0.58 0.59 0.60
t-stat 3.14 3.09 3.06 3.06 3.05 2.98 3.14 3.27 3.38 3.49
SigIP 0.03 0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.01 -0.01
t-stat 0.49 0.24 0.00 -0.09 -0.21 0.99 0.65 0.30 0.12 -0.11
adj. R2 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.31 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.34
N 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132
Nominal Yields
1y 2y 3y 4y 5y 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y
DisInf 0.29 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.33 0.48 0.53 0.57 0.59 0.61
t-stat 2.50 2.54 2.60 2.67 2.77 4.15 4.51 4.77 5.04 5.27
ExpInf 0.51 0.50 0.49 0.48 0.47 0.35 0.29 0.24 0.21 0.19
t-stat 4.39 4.23 4.05 4.00 3.90 3.45 2.73 2.17 1.82 1.62
SigIP 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.10 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06
t-stat 1.40 1.24 1.18 1.14 1.06 -0.58 -0.83 -0.87 -1.00 -0.97
adj. R2 0.41 0.40 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.58 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.55
N 132 132 132 132 132 438 438 438 438 438
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Table IA.48: Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng (2015) Uncertainty Measure. The top table
reports results from OLS regressions of real yields on disagreement about inflation (DisInf)
and the Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng (2015) uncertainty measure (U-JLN). The bottom table
reports results from OLS regressions of nominal yields on disagreement about inflation,
expected inflation (ExpInfl), and the Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng (2015) uncertainty measure.
The t-statistics (t-stat) are Newey-West corrected with 12 lags. Regression coe cients are
standardized. ExpInf is predicted by a GARCH(1, 1) model with an ARMA(1, 1) mean
equation over multiple horizons (T). Sample: Q3-1981 to Q2-2014.
Survey of Professionals Surveys of Consumers
Real Yields
2y 3y 5y 7y 10y 2y 3y 5y 7y 10y
DisInf 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.51 0.53 0.55 0.56 0.57
t-stat 2.12 2.11 2.09 2.10 2.13 2.89 3.05 3.21 3.34 3.45
U-JLN 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.16 0.14 0.11 0.09 0.07
t-stat 0.70 0.55 0.40 0.33 0.25 1.18 0.96 0.76 0.66 0.53
adj. R2 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.35
N 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132
Nominal Yields
1y 2y 3y 4y 5y 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y
DisInf 0.32 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.37 0.45 0.51 0.54 0.57 0.59
t-stat 2.41 2.49 2.53 2.59 2.69 3.94 4.29 4.57 4.83 5.03
ExpInf 0.47 0.45 0.44 0.44 0.42 0.35 0.29 0.25 0.22 0.20
t-stat 3.87 3.71 3.58 3.53 3.43 3.22 2.55 2.01 1.71 1.52
U-JLN 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00
t-stat 0.36 0.20 0.15 0.10 0.03 0.37 0.14 0.09 0.00 0.02
adj. R2 0.40 0.39 0.39 0.38 0.39 0.58 0.56 0.55 0.54 0.55
N 132 132 132 132 132 438 438 438 438 438
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Table IA.49: Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2015) Uncertainty Measure. The top table
reports results from OLS regressions of real yields on disagreement about inflation (DisInf)
and the Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2015) uncertainty measure (U-BBD). The bottom table
reports results from OLS regressions of nominal yields on disagreement about inflation,
expected inflation (ExpInfl), and the Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2015) uncertainty measure.
The t-statistics (t-stat) are Newey-West corrected with 12 lags. Regression coe cients are
standardized. ExpInf is predicted by a GARCH(1, 1) model with an ARMA(1, 1) mean
equation over multiple horizons (T). Sample: Q3-1981 to Q2-2014.
Survey of Professionals Surveys of Consumers
Real Yields
2y 3y 5y 7y 10y 2y 3y 5y 7y 10y
DisInf 0.14 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.44 0.47 0.49 0.50 0.51
t-stat 1.18 1.04 0.87 0.78 0.65 2.65 2.90 3.16 3.30 3.41
U-BBD -0.47 -0.49 -0.51 -0.50 -0.49 -0.49 -0.51 -0.54 -0.54 -0.53
t-stat -3.32 -3.10 -2.68 -2.45 -2.22 -5.36 -5.22 -4.46 -4.05 -3.72
adj. R2 0.18 0.20 0.22 0.22 0.20 0.36 0.41 0.45 0.46 0.46
N 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118
Nominal Yields
1y 2y 3y 4y 5y 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y
DisInf -0.10 -0.13 -0.14 -0.15 -0.14 0.47 0.51 0.54 0.56 0.58
t-stat -0.69 -0.87 -0.98 -1.06 -1.06 4.48 5.06 5.44 5.74 5.98
ExpInf 0.44 0.43 0.42 0.41 0.41 0.26 0.25 0.23 0.23 0.23
t-stat 2.58 2.54 2.45 2.46 2.40 2.62 2.66 2.57 2.69 2.60
U-BBD 0.16 0.21 0.24 0.27 0.29 -0.44 -0.44 -0.43 -0.41 -0.40
t-stat 1.36 1.98 2.51 3.04 3.55 -6.65 -6.67 -6.30 -5.88 -5.51
adj. R2 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.52 0.54 0.55 0.56 0.56
N 118 118 118 118 118 354 354 354 354 354
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Table IA.50: Output Gap. The top table reports results from OLS regressions of real yields
on disagreement about inflation (DisInf) and the output gap (OG). The bottom table reports
results from OLS regressions of nominal yields on disagreement about inflation, expected
inflation (ExpInfl), and OG. The t-statistics (t-stat) are Newey-West corrected with 12 lags.
Regression coe cients are standardized. ExpInf is predicted by a GARCH(1, 1) model with
an ARMA(1, 1) mean equation over multiple horizons (T). Sample: Q3-1981 to Q2-2014.
Survey of Professionals Surveys of Consumers
Real Yields
2y 3y 5y 7y 10y 2y 3y 5y 7y 10y
DisInf 0.45 0.43 0.42 0.41 0.39 0.83 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.83
t-stat 4.25 3.93 3.61 3.45 3.29 5.91 5.64 5.11 4.89 4.73
ExpInf 0.16 0.14 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.50 0.49 0.48 0.46 0.43
t-stat 0.96 0.83 0.73 0.59 0.45 3.79 3.52 3.12 2.88 2.68
adj. R2 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.48 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.48
N 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132
Nominal Yields
1y 2y 3y 4y 5y 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y
DisInf 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.28 0.66 0.67 0.69 0.69 0.69
t-stat 3.50 3.29 3.23 3.19 3.27 3.88 3.77 3.74 3.69 3.69
ExpInf 0.51 0.51 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.16 0.13 0.10 0.09 0.09
t-stat 5.66 5.92 5.88 6.00 5.91 1.25 0.98 0.71 0.66 0.66
OG 0.04 0.00 -0.03 -0.06 -0.08 0.21 0.17 0.15 0.12 0.09
t-stat 0.30 -0.03 -0.24 -0.45 -0.64 1.48 1.16 0.99 0.81 0.63
adj. R2 0.44 0.43 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.61 0.59 0.57 0.56 0.56
N 132 132 132 132 132 146 146 146 146 146
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Table IA.51: Chicago Fed National Activity Index (CFNAI). The top table reports
results from OLS regressions of real yields on disagreement about inflation (DisInf) and
the CFNAI. The bottom table reports results from OLS regressions of nominal yields on
disagreement about inflation, expected inflation (ExpInfl), and the CFNAI. The t-statistics
(t-stat) are Newey-West corrected with 12 lags. Regression coe cients are standardized.
ExpInf is predicted by a GARCH(1, 1) model with an ARMA(1, 1) mean equation over
multiple horizons (T). The CFNAI is the index of economic activity developed in Stock and
Watson (1999). Sample: Q3-1981 to Q2-2014.
Survey of Professionals Surveys of Consumers
Real Yields
2y 3y 5y 7y 10y 2y 3y 5y 7y 10y
DisInf 0.42 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.40 0.56 0.58 0.60 0.60 0.61
t-stat 3.46 3.41 3.38 3.38 3.37 3.04 3.20 3.35 3.46 3.59
CFNAI 0.05 0.08 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.04 0.07 0.10 0.12 0.13
t-stat 0.63 0.98 1.37 1.57 1.74 0.54 1.01 1.57 1.91 2.24
adj. R2 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.30 0.32 0.34 0.35 0.36
N 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132
Nominal Yields
1y 2y 3y 4y 5y 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y
DisInf 0.29 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.33 0.38 0.42 0.46 0.48 0.50
t-stat 2.84 2.92 2.98 3.08 3.22 3.24 3.76 4.16 4.53 4.83
ExpInf 0.51 0.50 0.48 0.48 0.47 0.36 0.34 0.32 0.31 0.30
t-stat 4.89 4.78 4.64 4.63 4.46 3.06 3.05 2.98 3.07 2.94
CFNAI 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.13 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.19
t-stat 0.98 1.35 1.42 1.54 1.64 2.50 3.03 3.16 3.38 3.39
adj. R2 0.44 0.44 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.38 0.41 0.42 0.45 0.46
N 132 132 132 132 132 354 354 354 354 354
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